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CRACKING DOWN ON CAGES
Feminist and Prison Abolitionist Considerations for Litigating
Solitary Confinement in Canada
ABSTRACT
Guided by prison abolition ethic and intersectional feminism, my key argument
is that Charter section 15 is the ideal means of eradicating solitary confinement and its
adverse impact on women who are Aboriginal, racialized, mentally ill, or immigration
detainees. I utilize a provincial superior court’s failing in exploring a discrimination
analysis concerning Aboriginal women, to illustrate my key argument. However, because
of the piecemeal fashion in which courts can effect developments in the law, the abolition
of solitary confinement may very well occur through a series of ‘little wins’. In Chapter
11, I provide a constitutional analysis, arguing that solitary confinement unduly violates
Aboriginal women’s Charter section 15 right against discrimination, and therefore,
Aboriginal women must not be subjected to it. Hopefully, a discrimination challenge
against solitary confinement spearheaded by Aboriginal women will pave the way for
future discrimination challenges by other vulnerable women.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
My Research Topic
I wish to start this research project with a quote from the Late President of South
Africa, Mr. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela. He was imprisoned for 27 years (November 1962
until February 1990) 1 – much of that time in solitary confinement – for leading an AntiApartheid movement. 2
It is said that no one truly knows a nation until one has been inside its jails.
A nation should not be judged by how it treats its highest citizens, but its
lowest ones. 3
I want to discuss why this quote is significant. There are three main reasons. My first reason
relates to the research question of this paper. My research question is the following.
Under the anti-carceral lens, which originates from the prison abolition ethic,
would pursuing a Charter section 15 case serve as a more effective way to
abolish the practice of solitary confinement compared to the more popular
Charter provisions that are relied upon to challenge the practice (i.e.,
sections 7 and 12) and compared to other methods of advocating against the
practice (i.e., lobbying, public awareness campaigns, launching a human
rights complaint, giving into a settlement)?

I will respond and elaborate on this research question in the next paragraph. My second
reason relates to the legacy of Nelson Mandela’s inspiring life story on the emerging global
perspective of solitary confinement and our increasing awareness of the traumatic
experience of this practice. In 2015, the United Nations General Assembly achieved a

1
2
3

Biography.com Editors “Nelson Mandela Biography.com”, Biography (6 September 2017) online:
<www.biography.com/people/nelson-mandela-9397017>.
United Nations, “Nelson Mandela Rules” Nelson Mandela International Day, online:
<www.un.org/en/events/mandeladay/rules.shtml> [UN, “The Nelson Mandela Rules”].
Ibid.
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unanimous vote for adopting a revised version of the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners. 4 The revised version, which promotes the humane practice of
solitary confinement, was renamed, “The Nelson Mandela Rules”, in honour of him. My
third reason why Mandela’s quote is significant is that it serves as the underlying theme of
this paper. With this paper, I aim to encourage critical reflections on whether it is
acceptable for a country like Canada, which prides itself on its multicultural and
peacekeeping identity, to continue the State practice of solitary confinement, knowing the
discriminatory way it is wielded and its harmful effects.
In response to the research question that I posed in the previous paragraph, my
response is this. Yes, Charter section 15 is the superior means of abolishing solitary
confinement. As I endeavour to prove this argument, I want to clarify two points on my
research topic. The first point is that, from a strategic standpoint, the framing of this
discrimination claim should focus on the disproportionate manner in which solitary
confinement is used on vulnerable groups of women (i.e., Indigenous, racialized, and
mentally ill, foreign national women) and the disadvantage of this practice for these women,
using the available grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, disability, Aboriginal reserve
status, and citizenship. As will be seen, an array of literature raises concerns about the
application of solitary confinement in immigration holding centres, provincial jails, and
federal penitentiaries. This literature will be insightful to understand this State practice. 5 I
will explore how the prescribed law and policy governing the practice of solitary

4
5

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (The Nelson Mandela Rules), UN General
Assembly, 17 December 2015, Resolution A/RES/70/175 [The Nelson Mandela Rules].
Justin Piché and Karine Major, “Prisoner Writing in/on Solitary Confinement: Contributions from the Journal of
Prisoners on Prisons, 1988-2013” (2015) 4 Canadian Journal of Human Rights 1 at 8 [Piché & Major].
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confinement in Canada leads to direct and indirect discrimination. Further, I will show how
the discriminatory way solitary confinement is practised ultimately supports the conclusion
that solitary confinement should no longer be used in Canada.
The second clarifying point is that even though my research focus is on women in
solitary confinement, I do not intend to mean that men never experience discrimination
when they are placed in solitary confinement, or that solitary confinement is only
discriminatory if it is used on women. My focus on women is motivated by a desire to
narrow the focus of this paper, raise awareness to some of the unique ways in which women
experience discrimination when they are placed in solitary confinement, and discuss the
benefits of challenging the practice of solitary confinement, using women as the potential
claimants instead of men, who have long dominated prisoner litigation. I argue that men
ultimately stand to benefit from women launching a discrimination claim.
This paper strives to give a thorough argument for eradicating solitary confinement
under Charter section 15. The intended contributions of this essay will include explaining
how Charter section 15 lends itself well to the prison abolition ethic and anti-carceral lens;
defining the international law conception of solitary confinement; briefly recounting the
history of solitary confinement in Canada and how it is currently prescribed in law and
policy; explaining the various harms the practice causes; demonstrating why the Charter,
and why section 15 in particular, are the effective means of dismantling the “Carceral
State”; discussing why women inmates should be championed as the principal claimants
of a discrimination claim against solitary confinement; demonstrating what the
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discrimination claim would look like using the example of Aboriginal women; and pointing
out some challenges that may arise with launching the section 15 claim.
For quick reference, in Chapter 11, titled “Arguing the Discrimination Claim”, I
conduct a constitutional analysis where I argue that solitary confinement violates
Aboriginal women’s Charter section 15 right against discrimination, and I refute that the
practice can nevertheless continue under Charter section 1 as a reasonable limit on section
15. The section 15 analysis that I conduct for Aboriginal women in solitary confinement is
based on the multiple grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, sex, disability, and
Aboriginal reserve status. The practice imposes a compounded burden on Aboriginal
women that leads to severely negative psychological, social, emotional and spiritual harms,
in addition to poor criminal justice outcomes.
In the section 1 analysis, I argue that the racial bias against Aboriginal peoples that
is ubiquitous throughout the criminal justice system, as acknowledged by the Supreme
Court of Canada, means that it will not be possible for solitary confinement to be practised
in a non-discriminatory manner. The bias that influences this correctional decision-making
does not rationally connect to achieving the legislative objectives of the State. Further, the
alternative measures that are available in place of solitary confinement render the practice
obsolete and excessively restrictive concerning Aboriginal women. And further still, the
deleterious effects of solitary confinement overwhelmingly outweigh any salutary effects
that are alleged to derive from the practice. Accordingly, Aboriginal women should not be
subjected to any form of solitary confinement.
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I wish to make clear at the outset that my ultimate view is that all forms of solitary
confinement should be abolished for all inmates in the criminal justice and immigration
systems, and I believe abolishing this practice is a helpful step towards gradually
dismantling Canada’s ‘Carceral State’. Yet, the constraints of legal argument are such that
providing arguments to end solitary confinement for Aboriginal women, specifically, can
only allow for requesting a court to order that all Aboriginal women must not be held in
any form of solitary confinement. This is partly guided by the fact that, when warranted,
courts will effect piecemeal developments of law. As a result, the eventual abolition of
solitary confinement may very well occur through a series of ‘little wins’, removing one
vulnerable group after another out of harm’s way in solitary confinement, until the State is
eventually compelled on its own to use alternative means to manage all its inmates. It is
my hope that a discrimination challenge against solitary confinement spearheaded by
Aboriginal women will pave the way for additional discrimination challenges to achieve
the ‘big win’ – a total ban on solitary confinement in Canada.
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CHAPTER TWO: MY CONTRIBUTIONS TO SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS
Why several conversations?
The reason why I think my major research is contributing to various conversations
is because my major research project deals with several areas of law (i.e., human rights,
constitutional law, criminal law, and immigration law). Therefore, my project will
inevitably be making arguments and critiques about how these areas of law intersect and
impact one another, which may be informative and meaningful for anyone whose
preoccupation is any one of the areas of law that I incorporate into my project.

Human Rights and Constitutional Law Discourses
Since my research will predominantly take on a human rights and constitutional
law discourse, I aim to contribute by exploring the multi-faceted or multi-ground issues
that uniquely arise for women serving sentences, awaiting trial, and women held in
immigration detention. The lived experiences of women in each of these situations will be
important to consider in order to flesh out the impact that both systems of law – criminal
law and immigration law – have on women who are placed in solitary confinement.
Uncovering these experiences will provide a basis for determining if, when, and how
human rights and constitutional rights are triggered. While the constitutional law issues
will largely take on a domestic-focused discussion in my research paper, my discussion of
human right law issues will address both the domestic-based discourse and internationalbased discourse. By engaging international human rights law, I will be contributing to a
much broader conversation where I will be offering a perspective of the Canadian context
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on issues women face in solitary confinement while serving criminal sentences or held in
immigration detention.

Feminist Discourses
Detained people in the criminal justice system and the immigration system are often
rendered a forgotten, out-of-sight-out-of-mind, ‘underclass’ of people. Further, detained
women tend to be overshadowed and overlooked by larger numbers of detained men in
discussions of criminal justice or immigration law issues, generally. I aim to give the muchneeded attention to women’s issues in the criminal justice system and immigration system
and highlight how solitary confinement in either context can be a gendered issue, impacting
women in unique ways compared to men.

“Crimmigration” Policy Discourses
My research relates to the broader issue of crimmigration policy decisions — the
nexus between criminal law and immigration law in policy-making and state practices. The
contribution that I make will refocus the issue of solitary confinement on women and their
unique experiences while in custody for criminal or immigration purposes. By discussing
the incarceration of women serving sentences, awaiting trial or held in immigration
detention, specifically, I aim to draw connections between these experiences and offer a
unique comparison of how these seemingly separate systems of law have a lot in common,
especially when they place their subjects in the same facilities.
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Immigration Law Discourses
I aim to contribute to immigration law discourses by exploring the ways in which
women held in immigration detention in correctional facilities are de facto criminalized by
their status as foreign nationals in Canada. I also aim to explore how the precarious status
and condition of women held in immigration detention – in immigration holding centres or
correctional institutions – affects their ability to rely on constitutional law and human rights
law to protect them from discriminatory state practices that are used against them.

Criminal Law Discourses
I aim to contribute to criminal law discourses by showing how criminal justice
practices, such as detention and incarceration, are used as convenient means to control and
monitor foreign nationals in Canada, in the context of a heightened national security focus
in immigration practices. I also aim to show how the experiences of incarceration and
solitary confinement are not just unique to individuals serving criminal sentences or
awaiting trial. Those held in immigration detention are faced with similar and sometimes
worse experiences.

Prison Abolition Discourse
I plan to contribute to the prison abolition discourse by elaborating on how this
American theoretical perspective can be applied to the Canadian context and how aspects
of the prison abolition ethic – namely, carceral logic – have relevance to the Canadian
immigration system, especially with the development of the crimmigration trend.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES
My research project will engage a mixed methods analysis of four methodological
approaches: feminist, doctrinal, interdisciplinary, and comparative.

Feminist Approach
Why is the Feminist Approach well-suited?
The core methodological approach of my paper will be a feminist legal approach.
More specifically, my research will adopt an intersectional feminist approach to the law by
showcasing how multiple axes of identity, such as sex, disability, and race, colour our
experience of the world around us. My choice to consider a multi-ground claim of
discrimination is inspired by an intersectional theoretical perspective promoted by feminist
critical legal scholars, like Kimberlé Crenshaw. 6 In line with the feminist legal perspective,
my research is important because often women’s experiences of navigating the criminal
justice system and the immigration system are made indistinct and invisible by the larger
group of men who are navigating these same systems. 7 By forgetting women and their
particular needs, we become ignorant to the more damaging effects that the criminal justice
system and immigration system have on women. By failing to recognize these effects, we
allow for these women to continue to suffer in silence, ironically in a country where we
boldly tout our progressive constitutional and human rights on the international stage.

6

7

Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color” of Kimberlé Crenshaw, Critical race theory: the key writings that formed the movement (New York: The
New Press, 1996) [Crenshaw].
Joanne Belknap, The Invisible Woman: Gender, Crime and Justice, 2nd ed (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing,
2001) at 3-4 [Belknap].
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Assumptions and Perspectives of the Feminist Approach
For my feminist legal methodology, I will also draw inspiration from Katharine
Bartlett and her explanations of feminist legal methods. 8 Throughout my research project,
I will mostly engage in a feminist analysis centred on “asking the woman question”.
The “asking the woman question” feminist method involves identifying the genderbased implications of rules and practices, which on the surface, may be regarded as neutral,
objective, and taken-for-granted. 9 This method reveals the perspective of how political
choices and institutional practices contribute to women’s disadvantage, and this method
asserts the perspective that the status of women in society is the result of how our society
is organized, not the inherent characteristics of women. 10 This feminist method can be
incorporated into analyzing the precedential value of cases, stating the facts of a case, or in
applying law to facts. 11 This method aims to expose gender bias in substantive rules and
encourage legal decision-making that is cognizant and sensitive to this bias. 12
Bartlett importantly points out that when using a feminist lens on legal issues, we
need to be aware of the methods that are engaged to arrive at legal answers, because method
organizes and determines our apprehension of ‘truth’. 13 Method is the means by which
power structures in our society are maintained, and scholars engaging feminist legal
analysis must be attentive to method to avoid perpetuating the status quo of power
structures which these feminist scholars seek to challenge. 14 Bartlett says that method can

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Katharine T Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Methods” (1990) 103:4 Harvard Law Review 829 [Bartlett].
Ibid at 837.
Ibid at 843.
Ibid.
Ibid at 846.
Ibid at 830.
Ibid at 830-831.
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have the effect of empowering a group, and I would add that method can equally have the
effect of disempowering another group. 15
This feminist legal method will be particularly useful for exploring how laws
governing solitary confinement, may be perpetuating disadvantages against women. One
observation I point out is that while human rights legislation encourages complainants to
bring forth multi-ground discrimination claims in recognition of the intersectional
identities of complainants, the application of Charter section 15 seems to be a bit more
rigid in that the expectation is that a person will assert a discrimination claim based on one
enumerated or analogous ground. 16 Case law has also suggested that courts have trouble
fully incorporating an intersectional analysis into legal reasoning. 17 This could have
deleterious impacts on women meeting the evidentiary burden of Charter discrimination
claims. However, decisions, such as Law v Canada 18 and Withler v Canada, 19 from the
Supreme Court of Canada are encouraging, since the Court explains that it is acceptable to
assert a Charter discrimination claim based on a combination of enumerated or analogous
grounds. 20

15 Ibid.
16 Policy and Education Branch, Ontario Human Rights Commission, “An Intersectional Approach to
Discrimination: Addressing Multiple Grounds in Human Rights Claims” (OHRC, 2001) at 8 [Policy and
Education Branch].
17 Ibid.
18 Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497, 170 DLR (4th) 1 [Law].
19 Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12 at para 63, [2011] 1 SCR 396 [Withler].
20 Law, supra note 18 at 554-555.
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Shortcomings and Limits of the Feminist Approach
A shortcoming of the feminist method of “asking the woman question” is that the
woman question itself can perpetuate the exclusion of groups of women who are more
profoundly marginalized in society, particularly racialized women. 21 Asking a question on
behalf of all women leads to artificially universalizing women’s experiences. This in
essence leads to more privileged classes of women, namely White women – perhaps even
White female scholars – having the advantage of asking the woman question based on their
terms and from their privileged positions, while lesser privileged groups of women are
stuck with the disadvantage of dealing with a generalized answer to the woman question
that lacks responsiveness to the heterogeneity of women’s experiences. 22 In my research
project, I endeavour to be diligent about ensuring that the woman question that I ask is
reflective and considerate of the diverse experiences of women held in solitary confinement.
One solution that was offered in Bartlett’s article was to change the “woman question” to
the “question of the excluded” and to specify which women the question is referring to. 23
That way, it’s clear that the question and corresponding answer is limited to a particular
group of women and not all women. 24

21
22
23
24

Bartlett, supra note 8 at 847.
Ibid at 847.
Ibid at 848.
Ibid at 848.
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Doctrinal Approach
Why is the Doctrinal Approach well-suited?
I will utilize the doctrinal approach for explaining the relevant statutes, which
authorize solitary confinement, and immigration detention. I will also use this method to
distill the leading Charter cases on discrimination into the legal tests that must be met to
prove discrimination. Moreover, in some instances, I will mention other key cases that
address some of the issues that arise in my research project on solitary confinement.
However, ultimately, my doctrinal analysis will be reform-oriented, as Terry Hutchinson
describes, because I will be assessing the existing laws that allow for the practice of solitary
confinement and then make recommendations for change, namely, abolishing solitary
confinement on the basis that the practice is used in a discriminatory way that offends
Canadian constitutional law. 25

Assumptions and Perspectives of the Doctrinal Approach
Doctrinal methodology is the dominant method for conducting research in the legal
domain. It is considered the methodology that distinguishes research in the legal discipline
from research produced from other disciplines. 26 For that reason, the methodology has
several assumptions that allow this methodology to be so widely used and accepted in legal
scholarship. Firstly, doctrinal methodology is the assumed manner in which legal
scholarship is conducted and the most popular method revealing how we, as legal scholars,

25 Terry Hutchinson, “The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law” (2015)
3 Erasmus Law Review 130 at 132 [Hutchinson].
26 Ibid at 130.
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know what we know. 27 So much so that sometimes legal scholars, even in graduate studies
in law, fail to specifically state in their academic writing that they will be using doctrinal
methodology to arrive at the answer to their legal research question. 28 As Hutchinson
remarks, since each person can implement doctrinal methods in idiosyncratic ways, it is
especially important to know how a scholar arrives at their answer, so we can be
comfortable with accepting the answers that the scholar provides in their research project. 29
Secondly, doctrinal methodology assumes that we can know what the law means
and we can find our answers about the law, by looking to the law itself. 30 By contrast, in
reform-oriented research, interdisciplinary sources are incorporated into doctrinal research,
and doctrinal research ultimately takes on a consultative nature and function. 31 Similarly,
Hutchinson says that doctrinal scholars can benefit from understanding the law from the
perspective of scholars who do not belong to the legal discipline, such as criminologists or
psychologists. 32 This is the objective of what Hutchinson refers to as “fundamental
research”, which posits the following points: (1) law is a starting point of research – which
I note is an assuming pronouncement; (2) law is a social phenomenon in itself; and (3) law
is a problem that can function as a cause and effect. 33
Thirdly, mastering the art of doctrinal methods is assumed as equating to thinking
like a lawyer, which can mean that even though a non-legal response may be sufficient to
address a social problem, doctrinal thinkers – lawyers – by reflex will tend to use the tools

27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Ibid at 131.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 130.
Ibid at 132.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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of their discipline – doctrinal methods – to tackle the social problem. 34 Hutchinson states
that some legal scholars recognize that this can be a very limiting way of seeing the world.
Thus, while legal scholars may not use non-doctrinal methodologies themselves, they
might incorporate the results from these other methodologies into their legal scholarship,
which I would view as using the approach of looking for ways to fit extra-disciplinary
research methods into a doctrinal project. 35 This reform-oriented trend in doctrinal-based
research reveals that “thinking like a lawyer” does not necessarily need to be about thinking
just within the confines of the legal domain.

Shortcomings and Limits of the Doctrinal Approach
The main limitation of doctrinal approach in the analysis and synthesis of cases, is
that because case law traditionally builds our knowledge of the law in a piecemeal fashion,
our understanding of the scope and meaning of the law will only go so far as the facts of
cases enable judges to reasonably expound on the law. 36 However, I would add that it will
be up to legal scholars and advocates to be creative by expanding on the significance and
relevance of facts presented before courts to encourage judges to make more substantial
contributions to how we understand the law and envision it operating in our everyday lives.

34 Ibid at 130-131.
35 Ibid at 130.
36 Ibid at 131.
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Basic Interdisciplinary Approach
Why is the Basic Interdisciplinary Approach well-suited?
Solitary confinement has captured the interest of people from different disciplines:
criminology, sociology, psychology, and law. Having read Mathias Siems’ article, 37 I want
to engage a basic interdisciplinary approach, because in order to give meaningful critique
and analysis of the law, it’s important to look beyond traditional legal academia and gain
insights from other realms of study to see the various ways in which law impacts our society
according to different disciplines. I ascribe to the idea that law is a social construct, which
is a perspective congruent with Hutchinson’s description of “fundamental doctrinal
research”, as I mentioned earlier. 38 The interdisciplinary approach also recognizes that law
develops overtime within a social context of changing ideologies and phenomena in society.
I believe we must try to understand how society influences the law, just as much as we try
to understand how the law influences society. Criminal law and immigration law are both
areas of law that are constantly developing with the tides of political power and social
climate. Consulting various academic disciplines will help give rich perspectives on how
these areas of law are developing in Canadian society as it pertains to solitary confinement.
The practice of solitary confinement is to a large extent studied by non-legal academics.
Therefore, my research will inevitably rely on literature that is not legal or doctrinal in
nature, and that originates from different theoretical and methodological approaches.

37 Mathias M Siems, “The Taxonomy of Interdisciplinary Legal Research: Finding the Way out of the Desert” (2009)
7 Journal of Commonwealth Law and Legal Education 5 [Siems].
38 Hutchinson, supra note 25 at 132.
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Assumptions and Perspectives of the Basic Interdisciplinary Approach
Proponents of interdisciplinary research describe doctrinal approaches to
scholarship as overly “rigid” and prevent both the law student and the law teacher from
embarking on a more fluid, less restricted, journey of questioning how law impacts
society. 39 Moreover, they say that doctrinalism encourages “intellectual tunnel vision” by
focusing too much on the technicalities of the law. 40 As a result, interdisciplinary
approaches are called “rebellious” in that they are not confined by what the law has to offer,
and take the perspective that we can arrive at a “greater truth” in the answers to our
questions by transcending the legal domain. 41 Sometimes other disciplines can answer our
legal questions better than the legal discipline can by itself. 42

Shortcomings and Limits of the Basic Interdisciplinary Approach
According to Siems, critics of interdisciplinary research say that this approach is
too impractical and difficult to implement, since traditional legal research can be
completely done from beginning to end in the comfort of one’s office or law library. 43 I
would say this preference for ‘arm-chair scholarship’ and aversion to research that requires
leaving the office or law library may suggest laziness on the part of these critics who
repackage sentiments of feeling inconvenienced into a criticism. As Siems explains in his
article, these are not strong objections against using interdisciplinary research. 44 I would
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Siems, supra note 37 at 4.
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Ibid at 5.
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Ibid at 7.
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also venture to say that the academic aversion to interdisciplinary research and the
convenience of “arm-chair scholarship” is a key reason why using only a doctrinal research
methodology is so widely utilized by legal scholars.
Critics also say that interdisciplinary research has “little relevance to concrete
issues, or addresses concrete issues in a wholly theoretical manner.” 45 However, in my
situation, I would challenge this view, because the non-legal sources I have amassed are
just as relevant and crucial to answering my research question as my legal sources.
Moreover, I would say that my non-legal sources are the very sources that help provide a
concrete explanation of the problematic use of solitary confinement and how the practice
impacts the inmates subjected to it.
A final criticism against interdisciplinary research, which is a more persuasive one,
is that legal academics may run the risk of misunderstanding the nuance and theoretical
perspective of the other disciplines whose research is incorporated into legal research
projects. 46 Moreover, legal academics may be unaware of, or misunderstand the limitations
of the research produced by other disciplines. 47 Regarding this criticism, I have the benefit
of having studied criminology and psychology as my two primary focuses of study for my
undergraduate degree, so this academic background will help me to understand the
perspectives of these disciplines as I conduct my research. Fortunately, most of literature
from non-legal disciplines that discuss solitary confinement, derive from criminology and
psychology.

45 Ibid.
46 Ibid at 8.
47 Ibid.
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Comparative Approach
Why is the Comparative Approach well-suited?
My research project will employ a comparative approach in two main ways. The
first way is by comparing criminal law and immigration law to highlight the connections
between each system operating under these two areas of law, mainly through a discussion
of the ‘crimmigration’ policy trend, which is connected to the practice of solitary
confinement in Canada. The second way in which a comparative approach will be engaged
is by comparing constitutional law and human rights law and looking at how each body of
law would address a discrimination claim regarding solitary confinement, specifically,
what remedies are available under each area of law for a successful discrimination case.

Assumptions and Perspectives of the Comparative Approach
As articulated by Stefan Vogenauer, 48 when using a comparative approach to find
solutions to a legal problem that exists in different legal systems, one must consider the
law that pertains to each of these systems. 49 The ‘source of law’ of a given legal system is
deemed to be any source which has weight or an authoritative effect akin to traditional
notions of law, such as cases and legislation. 50 The source of law must be understood and
interpreted in the same way by experienced lawyers that practice within those same legal
systems. This is important because different legal systems are juridified differently and
operate under different legal principles and terminology. 51 Hence, it is important that the

48 Stefan Vogenauer, “Sources of Law and Legal Method in Comparative Law” in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard
Zimmermann, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) [Vogenauer].
49 Ibid at 872.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid at 873.
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solutions one proposes for a legal problem that exists in the compared legal systems are
appropriate and relevant for each legal system, based on how they uniquely operate and are
utilized by experienced lawyers. 52
Vogenauer makes the interesting point in his article on comparative law that legal
reasoning is the method – the “path” – through which legal scholars use a source of law to
arrive at a decision on a particular legal issue. 53 Vogenauer is describing the tasks of a
doctrinal methodological approach in his discussion of comparative legal approaches,
which indicates that doctrinalism – with its unique perspectives, assumptions, and
limitations – is key to utilizing the comparative legal approach.
Based on a surface level comparison, I note that criminal law and immigration law
are guided by different principles (i.e., constitutionally-entrenched legal rights guide
criminal law and administrative law principles guide immigration law). Each system is
operated by a different array of officials. Notably, though, correctional law primarily
follows administrative law principles, including habeas corpus, which is a right available
to both immigration detainees and those incarcerated for criminal purposes in correctional
institutions. Heeding to Vogenauer’s cautions for devising solutions to problems that exist
in multiple areas of law, I will seek to leverage off the connections that do exist between
the immigration system and the criminal justice system – through correctional law, for
example – when advancing my arguments.
Vogenauer provides some questions to promote a deeper understanding of the legal
systems being compared, namely, criminal law (more specifically, correctional law) and

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid at 885.
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immigration law. 54 The questions are the following: (1) What is the style of lawmaking?;
(2) Who applies and interprets the law?; (3) Which factors are taken into account in the
application and interpretation of the law?; and (4) How are these factors ranked? These
questions will be help me stay aware of the key differences that exist between the criminal
justice system and the immigration system. While I will devote a significant portion of my
research project to highlighting the connections and similarities between both systems,
each of these systems are nonetheless different in many ways. The differences between
these systems may impact how I engage with the Charter issue of discrimination on the
topic of solitary confinement.

Shortcomings and Limits of the Comparative Approach
The limitations of using a comparative approach, which apply to my research
project include that I need to have a thorough understanding of how criminal justice system
operates differently from the immigration system and how the sources of law governing
each system are interpreted by their respective adjudicators. 55 My arguments will only be
useful if I have carefully considered the differences and similarities between criminal law
and immigration law in my analysis. This will require cross-referencing between principles
of constitutional legal rights and principles of administrative law in my project.

54 Ibid at 886.
55 Ibid at 878.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THEORETICAL APPROACH
Advocates of incarceration . . . hoped that the penitentiary would rehabilitate
its inmates. Whereas philosophers perceived a ceaseless state of war
between chattel slaves and their masters, criminologists hoped to negotiate
a peace treaty of sorts within the prison walls. Yet herein lurked a paradox:
if the penitentiary's internal regime resembled that of the plantation so
closely that the two were often loosely equated, how could the prison
possibly function to rehabilitate criminals?
- Author Adam Jay Hirsch 56
In this paper, I adopt an anti-carceral theoretical lens. To get a fuller understanding
of this perspective, it is helpful to explore its origin – the prison abolition ethic – and how
it further informs the litigation perspective that I argue should be implemented to abolish
solitary confinement.

The Prison Abolition Ethic
The theoretical underpinnings of my research align with the prison abolition
perspective. Allegra M. McLeod, a law professor at Georgetown University, offers what
she describes as “the first sustained discussion” of the “prison abolition ethic”. 57 Although,
in the past, anti-prison activists and scholars, such as renowned Angela Y. Davis, have also
produced literature specifically on the idea of “prison abolition”. 58 Professor McLeod says
that prison abolition calls for an end to punitive policing (e.g., stop-and-frisk routines) and
“prison-backed” 59 punishment as the policy response for what are really social, economic,

56 Adam Jay Hirsh, The Rise of the Penitentiary: Prisons and Punishment in Early America (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1992) at 84.
57 Allegra M McLeod, “Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice” (2015) 62 UCLA Law Review 1156 at 1156
[McLeod].
58 See for example, Angela Y Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete (Toronto: Open Media, 2003) [Davis].
59 As I understand it, McLeod uses the term “prison-backed punishment” as opposed to “prison-based punishment”
to encompass not only instances of imprisonment, but also non-custodial sentences where imprisonment is the
consequence of a breach of conditions for different forms of release, including bail, probation, or parole.
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and political problems in society. 60 The abolitionist sees the penal act of caging, chaining,
confining, and controlling human beings as inherently violent, dehumanizing, and morally
wrong. 61 In other words, prisons are a form of State violence. 62 Prison abolitionists seek to
raise awareness of the conditions of imprisonment to actually see and know what we are in
fact talking about. Through this, we are better able to make an informed opinion on the
how we use of prisons in our society and whether our ideology of criminal regulation is
accurately being implemented. 63 I find this to be an important aim, because we simply
cannot give a fully informed opinion as to what punishment a person deserves, or whether
prisons do what we want them to do, or whether prisons and imprisonment is a necessity,
when life in prison is shrouded in opacity from public view.
The critical social thought and the growing social movement that embodies prison
abolition draws its ideological inspiration mainly from the work of W.E.B. Du Bois, who
wrote about slavery abolition in the United States. 64 Du Bois argued that meaningful
slavery abolition required more than simply ending the practice of slavery. Black slaves,
who were the property of White masters for over 240 years in America, were
disenfranchised. They had no political or socioeconomic base to leverage from. And, they
struggled to attain equal footing with the rest of society during the 90 years of legalized
segregation that followed. 65 The State had a positive responsibility that accompanied the

60 McLeod, supra note 57 at 1172. For more information on the racially discriminatory manner in which the
American criminal justice system operates, see Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in
the Age of Colorblindness (New York: The New Press, 2010). Ava DuVernay, “13th” (USA: Forward Movement
& Kandoo Films, 2016) on Netflix.
61 McLeod, supra note 57 at 1172.
62 Debra Parkes, “Solitary Confinement, Prisoner Litigation, and the Possibility of a Prison Abolitionist Lawyering
Ethic” (2017) 32 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 165 at 181 [Parkes, “Solitary”].
63 McLeod, supra note 57 at 1175.
64 Ibid at 1162.
65 Ibid at 1184, 1188.
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negative responsibility of abolishing slavery; the State needed to orchestrate a fundamental
restructuring of democracy and social institutions that enabled freed slaves to participate
fully in society. 66 Yet, there were utter flaws in the “Reconstruction” process during the
post-slavery era. What transpired has been described as “preservation through
transformation”. 67 Ultimately, the public’s resistance to slavery abolition and the legacy of
slavery led to the proliferation of incarceration, as criminal law operated in racially
subordinating ways to criminalize and marginalize blackness. 68 Slavery abolition was in
desperate need of positive undertakings by the State to equip and integrate former slaves
into a free and prosperous American society. Considering the strong connections that
today’s American criminal justice system has to the slave trade, McLeod explains that
prison abolition equally requires much of the same positive actions by the State to support
today’s marginalized, and predominantly Black, communities in a free and prosperous
American society. 69 McLeod reveals that the much needed work that prison abolition
demands is essentially the unfinished work of slavery abolition and the legacy of deepseated racial discrimination in society.
An abolitionist endeavours, through scholarship, to fully unearth the Statesanctioned dehumanization, violence, and racial degradation that gave birth to, and is
perpetuated by, incarceration practices and punitive policing measures, including solitary
confinement. 70 The abolition ethic focuses on substituting criminal law and policy as the
primary response to crime, with a process of gradual decarceration, using transformative
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Ibid at 1163.
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Ibid at 1193.
Ibid at 1163.
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social policy and regulation. 71 McLeod cautions, though, that the social policy and
regulation must contemplate the following considerations: the root causes of crime; the
interpersonal harm enabled by institutions; different forms of empowerment that can be
used in society; and regulatory approaches that exist outside the sphere of criminal
justice. 72 Speaking from the American context, McLeod argues that prison abolition is an
empirically-sound and much-needed paradigm shift to overhaul a retributivist and harmproducing institution in America that has developed from a history of racial subordination
and disenfranchisement. 73 McLeod argues that the unfortunate lack of interest in the prison
abolition account impedes moral, legal, and political imagination. 74 She says it is troubling
that prison abolition does not have a stronger footing in criminological scholarship, in light
of the appalling condition of the American criminal justice system, and the insights that
the prison abolition ethic has to offer on gradual decarceration through addressing the
problem of crime through non-criminal justice means. 75
In the Canadian context, Debra Parkes, a law professor at University of British
Columbia, affiliates with this theoretical perspective, and goes so far as to describe a
litigation strategy of “prison abolitionist lawyering” to challenge the practice of solitary
confinement by dismantling the carceral logic that is assumed by the judiciary, the legal
system, and society in general. I will discuss the “carceral logic” and the “anti-carceral”
litigation strategy in fuller detail later in this Chapter under the heading, “Challenging the
‘Carceral State’ in Canada through Prison Abolitionist Lawyering Ethic”.
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Ibid at 1208.
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Ibid at 1237.
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Adopting prison abolition ethic to the Canadian context, for the purposes of this
research project, it is important to recognize that Canada also has a history of Statesanctioned dehumanization, violence, and racial degradation that gave birth to, and is
perpetuated by, incarceration practices and punitive policing measures, such as solitary
confinement. The Supreme Court of Canada remarked in R v Gladue, “Canada is a world
leader in many fields, particularly in the areas of progressive social policy and human rights.
Unfortunately, our country is also distinguished as being a world leader in putting people
in prison.” 76 In 2016, while Canada’s crime rates reached a 45-year low, incarceration rates
soared to an all time high. 77 Different groups, including Aboriginal peoples, the Black
community, and individuals with mental health issues, have been marginalized in our
society, and in turn, have also been overly criminalized in our justice system.
For Aboriginal peoples, the history of colonialism, displacement, and residential
schools has current day ripple effects in the form of lower educational attainment, lower
incomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and suicide, and higher
levels of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples. 78 Aboriginal people are implicated in
Canada’s correctional system in numbers that are grossly disproportionate to their
representation in general society. 79 More than any other group in Canada, they are subject
to the damaging impacts of the criminal justice system’s heaviest sanctions. 80 According
to the Office of the Correctional Investigator, “Between 2007 and 2016, while the overall
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R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688 at para 52, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC) [Gladue].
Jody Chan, Lorraine Chuen, and Marsha McLeod, “Everything you were never taught about Canada’s prison
systems” Intersectional Analyst (20 July 2017) online: <www.intersectionalanalyst.com/intersectionalanalyst/2017/7/20/everything-you-were-never-taught-about-canadas-prison-systems>.
78 R v Jackson, 2018 ONSC 2527 at para 81.
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80 Ibid.
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federal prison population increased by less than 5%, the Indigenous prison population
increased by 39%. 81 For the last three decades, there has been an increase every single year
in the federal incarceration rate for Indigenous people.” 82
Across North America, individuals of African descent also have a long and tragic
history marked by slavery, systemic discrimination, marginalization and systemic
recruitment into criminality, which is coupled with over-policing that results in
disproportionate incarceration and differential experiences while incarcerated. 83 The
Office of the Correctional Investigator’s 2011-2012 Annual Report identified Black
inmates as one of the fastest growing sub-populations in federal corrections. From 2003 to
2013, African Canadian federally sentenced inmates have increased each year growing by
nearly 90% while white inmates declined by 3% over the same period. These increases
have occurred though the problem has been consistently raised. 84
As for individuals with mental health issues, it is reported that they are overrepresented in the criminal justice system, as they are criminally charged for conduct that

81 Canada, Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator 20162017 (Ottawa, OCI, 2017) at 48 [2016-2017 Annual Report].
82 Ibid at 48.
83 Jackson, supra note 78 at paras 31, 87. R v Parks, (1993) 1993 CanLII 3383 (ON CA) at para 54, 84 CCC (3d) 353
(Ont CA). R v Golden, 2001 SCC 83 (CanLII) at para 83, [2001] 3 SCR 679. In the recent decision of R v Jackson,
a sentencing judge briefly recounts some of the prevailing challenges of anti-Black racism in Canada and how this
has led to over-representation in the criminal justice system. “While it is obviously true that every visible minority
community experiences the indignities and wounds of systemic discrimination throughout Southern Ontario, it is
the Black community which is the focus. It is Blacks who are being shot, it is Black youth that is unemployed in
excessive numbers, it is Black students who are being inappropriately streamed in schools, it is Black kids who are
disproportionately dropping-out, it is housing communities with large concentrations of Black residents where the
sense of vulnerability and disadvantage is most acute, it is Black employees, professional and non-professional, on
whom the doors of upward equity slam shut. Just as the soothing balm of "multiculturism" cannot mask racism, so
racism cannot mask its primary target.” [sic] Jackson, supra note 78 at para 27. In the case, the judge takes judicial
notice of the history of colonialism (in Canada and elsewhere), including slavery, policies and practices of
segregation, inter-generational trauma, and racism both overt and systemic as they relate to African Canadians.
The sentencing judge also acknowledges how this has led to persistent socio-economic ills and higher levels of
incarceration. Ibid at para 82.
84 Ibid at para 43.
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is clearly connected to their illness. They are not adequately treated while incarcerated, and
when they are released, they get into further trouble. 85 Among the prison population, 27.6%
have an identified mental health need, a rate much higher than in the general population
(which was about 10% in 2012). Suicide, an extremely serious indication of a person who
is mentally unwell, is the reason for about 20% of all deaths in custody each year. 86 Most
inmates who die in segregation, also had a documented history of mental illness, but few,
if any, receive therapeutic interventions. 87 To add insult to injury, the story of Ashley Smith
at the Grand Valley Prison for Women in Kitchener, Ontario, represents a shocking
example of the kind of treatment, or lack thereof, that a suicidal and vulnerable segregated
inmate can receive in a moment of crisis. 88 On October 19, 2007, when 19-year-old Ashley
Smith was segregated in a suicide watch cell, correctional officers observed Smith killing
herself using a ligature that she tied around her neck. The officers did not intervene. Her
death was videotaped. Accordingly, at an inquest, her death in segregation was ruled a
homicide. 89
The standard for criminal responsibility is very low. Hence, instead of being
declared not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR), which would
allow a person with serious mental health issues to get psychiatric help in a hospital, this
individual can find themselves convicted for criminal offences and sentenced to
imprisonment where they are less likely to get adequate care or to become effectively

85 Peter Goffin, “People with mental illness too often landing in prison instead of hospitals, experts say” The Star (29
September 2017), online: <www.thestar.com> [Goffin].
86 Ibid.
87 Kim Pate, “How Canada’s Prisons are Failing Women (And Everyone Else)” Herizons Spring 2016 (2 May 2016)
24 at 29 [Pate].
88 Ibid at 29.
89 Ibid.
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rehabilitated. 90 By contrast, forensic psychiatry units, where people ruled NCR are placed,
provide secure in-patient treatment, employ specialists (i.e., psychiatrists, psychologists,
social workers, and substance abuse counsellors) to provide patients with long-term
rehabilitation, and “manage the risk” of reintegrating NCR individuals into society. 91 The
discriminatory force of the justice system, which is a fundamental concern of the prison
abolition ethic is precisely why I argue that invoking Charter section 15 closely aligns with
this perspective and its call for gradual decarceration.

The Reformist; The Rival
The reformist is traditionally preoccupied with suggestions on reducing the cost and
imposition of incarceration by allowing less serious offenders to serve their sentence
through monitored release, which inevitably leads to incarceration, if terms of release are
violated. Still, for the reformist, criminal law and policy remains a primary response to
crime. 92 According to the abolition perspective, the reformist is too comfortable with
incarceration and punitive policing practices. 93 Unlike the reformist, the abolitionist rejects
the idea that these characteristics of imprisonment are superficial flaws that can be repaired
while still maintaining a heavy use of criminal law administration compared to other social
project administrations, such as the education system, housing, the workforce and labour,
the healthcare system, social supports and programming, and the political arena. 94
Compared to abolitionist scholarship, reformist scholarship generally does not exhibit as
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great of a sense of urgency towards changing these practices, nor does the reformist push
for transformative policies that address the wide range of social problems that the
abolitionist aims to address. 95 Reformist arguments are more modest, as they generally do
not tackle the root of the crime problem, and therefore, do not go far enough to offer
effective ways to improve the way society deals with crime. 96 McLeod contends that prison
abolitionists have better awareness of the transformation that must really take place to
address the problems of criminal law administration. 97 The prison abolition ethic rejects
the vengeance and shrugs off the complacency that commonly attaches to the treatment of
criminals – even vilest of them – in the justice system. 98
Prison reformists and prison abolitionists also differ on the issue of “preventive
justice” – the measures taken to reduce the incidence of harm. For the reformist, the
assumed source of potential harm is the individual, and the reformist aims to reduce an
individual’s potential risk to the public safety. 99 Accordingly, prison reformists tend to be
preoccupied with procedural reforms to the justice system to curb individual risk. For the
prison abolitionist, the assumed sources of harm are adverse social conditions, and the
abolitionist promotes a substantive overhaul on preventive measures so there is increased
funding for social programming that reduces criminal behaviour. 100 The abolitionist is
calling for a strengthening of the social arm rather than the criminal arm of the State
through grounded justice, that is, abolition plus social-based preventive measures. 101
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Prison abolition may seem to an average person, today, as unrealistic, but McLeod suggests
that this is no reason to believe it will never become our reality. She ascribes to the notion
that “There has never been a major social transformation in the history of mankind that has
not been looked upon as unrealistic, idiotic, or utopian by the large majority of experts even
a few years before the unthinkable became reality.” 102 This is a quote that McLeod takes
from Sebastian Scheerer, a German abolitionist criminologist. McLeod says that the
abolition of slavery is a classic example to illustrate what is said in this quote.

The Retributivist; The Opponent
With that said, the prison abolitionist’s biggest contender is not the prison reformist.
Although, I perceive that the mainstream reformist’s modest demand for changes to the
justice system can be quite a barrier for an abolitionist who advocates for bolder, broadbased changes. This is especially true, since the relatively larger community of reformists
already faces much resistance on criminal justice issues, underscoring the perceived
unthinkable idea of prison abolition. The biggest contender for the prison abolitionist – and
ultimately for an advocate of the abolition of solitary confinement – is the retributivist.
This is due to the retributivist’s popular, ‘common-sense-like’ perspective. 103
McLeod says the retributivist objection to prison abolition is that the State must
punish an individual who commits a wrong or illegal act – within the constraints of
procedural fairness – for three main reasons. Firstly, the victim must receive a remedy for
the harm suffered. Secondly, punishment recognizes and honours the moral agency of the

102 Ibid at 1238.
103 Ibid at 1233.

Cracking Down on Cages | 32

victim and the perpetrator. And lastly, punishment is the State’s response to the challenge
to the rule of law exhibited by the perpetrator’s wrongdoing. 104 The State’s punishment
meted out to the perpetrator must be proportional to the blameworthiness of the perpetrator
and the degree of harm experienced by the victim. 105 Pre-trial detainees, the legallyinnocent, make up about 70% of individuals placed in solitary confinement in provincial
correctional institutions.106 The majority of people held in pre-trial detention are charged
with non-violent offences. This very statistic undermines the common assumption that
solitary confinement is reserved for the “worst of the worst” convicted criminals. 107
Admittedly, I would say that the retributivist logic advocates a perspective that is
fairly attractive and resonates with instinctive notions of what is ‘just’. The fact that
Western societies, like Canada, or America, generally ascribe to retributivist ideals for
criminal law administration indicates that the people of these societies generally believe in
the idea that ‘you reap what you sow’. If you do good, then you will be rewarded with good.
If you do something bad, then you are punished for your bad behaviour. Simply, you get
what you deserve. This renders an individual-based assessment of one’s conduct, which I
would point out, is consistent with the prison reformist approach to criminal law
administration. This kind of assessment also assumes each person is a free and independent
agent, who is uninfluenced and unfazed by problematic social settings, or under-serving
public institutions, or a troubled upbringing. Essentially, the retributivist logic assumes that

104 Ibid at 1232.
105 Ibid at 1233.
106 Ontario, Independent Review of Ontario Corrections Team, Segregation in Ontario: Independent Review of
Ontario Corrections (Ontario: Independent Review of Ontario Corrections Team, 2017) at 41, 65 [Ontario,
Segregation in Ontario].
107 Ibid.
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an individual’s social environment is free of any moral or legal failings, meaning that if an
individual does wrong, it is really his or her fault. The individual deserves full blame. That
individual is the ‘bad guy’. And the State is supposed to be the ‘good guy’. Neither the
State, nor society, owes anything to the wrongdoer, except a punishment. The individual’s
choice to do bad must be addressed at the individual level. It’s a contrived, symbolic act of
moral purging. McLeod explains that the retributivist sees imprisonment as the primary
means of meting out a just punishment, since it avoids the State engaging in overt brutality
that denies the perpetrator human agency or objectifies the perpetrator as a spectacle of
violence, as in the case of the death penalty or flogging. Moreover, McLeod explains there
is a democratic consensus that supports incarceration as a criminal sanction. 108
The prison abolitionist takes issue with the fact that the retributivist, like the
reformist, believes that the brutal violence, dehumanization, and racial subordination in the
criminal justice system are incidental facts that have no substantial impact on the
legitimacy of punishment.

109

The abolitionist argues that these facts should be

contemplated in our pursuit of what we call ‘justice’. 110 The abolitionist wants the
retributivist to come to terms with the wrongs that the justice system – guided primarily by
retributivist aims – is doing, rather than holding fast to a vision of retribution in society
that is unattainable due to the historical and societal flaws contributing to crime in the first
place. 111

108
109
110
111

McLeod, supra note 57 at 1232.
Ibid at 1233.
Ibid at 1234.
Ibid.

Cracking Down on Cages | 34

Solitary Confinement as a Stepping Stone for Prison Abolition
“How can we subject prisoners to unnecessary solitary confinement,
knowing its effects, and then expect them to return to our communities as
whole people? It doesn’t make us safer. It’s an affront to our common
humanity.”
- Former President of the United States of America, Barack Obama 112
In line with the contentions made by McLeod, I contend that the abolition of solitary
confinement is on the cusp of our reality. And it’s a change that is an important step towards
the movement of gradual decarceration. 113 The State’s decision to place an inmate in
solitary confinement is plagued with the familiar kinds of sociological, historical,
institutional, and moral problems that apply to the State’s initial determination that a person
deserves to be incarcerated. 114 Solitary confinement has become a normalized part of
prison life, even though it entails heightened levels of violence and dehumanization, and
has been described by a growing body of critics and survivors as a form of torture. 115
McLeod says, “Solitary confinement’s justification and presumed efficacy flows from the
assumed legitimacy of prison confinement in the first place.” 116 The initial justification or
logic behind incarceration is that, due to the seriousness of an individual’s alleged or
proven criminal conduct, that individual deserves to be removed from society. Moreover,

112 Kevin Liptak, “Obama bans solitary confinement for juveniles in federal prison” CNN Politics (26 January 2016)
online: <www.cnn.com>.
113 I wish to stress that abolishing solitary confinement is not a sufficient end in itself, but a step towards a greater
goal. As Parkes cautions, “If prisoner rights litigation is not accompanied by a critique of carceral logics: if, for
example, we seek only to abolish those smaller cages (solitary confinement) but leave intact the logic of caging
people in the first place, then some other correctional tool or practice will take the place of solitary and we will
soon be fighting that.” In America and Canada, there has been a tendency to repackage and rename the idea of
isolating prisoners when its disturbing conditions in correctional institutions are exposed and challenged. Parkes,
“Solitary”, supra note 62 at 179.
114 McLeod, supra note 57 at 1178. For more information, see the following thought-provoking documentary series,
elaborating on some of the racial injustices perpetrated by the American criminal justice system, including the
problematic use and consequences of solitary confinement: Jenner Furst, “Time: The Kalief Browder Story”
(USA: Roc Nation, The Weinstein Company & Cinemart, 2017) on Netflix.
115 McLeod, supra note 57 at 1178.
116 Ibid at 1179.
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that individual deserves to be detained in a setting where they are denied the ability to do
as one pleases, socialize with whom one pleases, and control various details of one’s life.
Once the initial decision to incarcerate and deprive a person of basic liberties has been
legitimized by the State, McLeod explains that the justification of solitary confinement
adopts this same logic of the initial decision to incarcerate to life within prison walls. 117
Parkes, who also ascribes to the prison abolition ethic, says this:
Imprisonment itself creates its own logic and imperative for the use of
solitary. When people are put in cages, many of them will not respond well
to that environment. They will act out. They will harm themselves or others.
Consequently, they are put in smaller cages (segregation cells) and they do
even less well, but they are contained. The fundamental carceral logic of
punishing and caging goes unchallenged. 118
In the context of solitary confinement, the initial justification for incarceration is granted,
and may also buttress why an individual is placed in solitary confinement. 119 The initial
justification is granted because, at that point, the State has already satisfied itself through
police discretion or by due process that an individual deserves to be held in custody. I
gather that the State’s decision to incarcerate an individual can also buttress a decision to
place that individual in solitary confinement, for example, when the nature of the crime
alleged or proven against the individual is such that the individual would either pose a
safety risk to other inmates, or may be targeted by other inmates (e.g., crimes related to
child sexual abuse, gang or drug related offences, or seriously violent offences).

117 Ibid. Within prison walls, the concept of “prison-backed punishment” would essentially mean punishing an inmate
by placing them in solitary confinement in a smaller prison.
118 Parkes, “Solitary”, supra note 62 at 179.
119 Ibid.
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For a moment, I want to focus on McLeod’s point that the justification of solitary
confinement applies the same logic of prison confinement to life within prison walls. I
think this is a crucial point, as McLeod reveals that, like general public life, there are
aspects of prison life that contribute to the rising trend in solitary confinement. The inmate
population is a microcosmic society. It is a brutish and violent one filled with individuals,
who from the prison abolitionist account, have not received adequate resources in society
to promote human flourishing (e.g., education, employment, mental and physical
healthcare, social supports, and political empowerment). As a result, McLeod explains
there is constant tension among inmates to exert the remnants of power and domination
they have left in prison as a means of improving their social condition and protecting
themselves while in prison. 120 This leads to incidents of murders, assaults, and sexual abuse;
many inmates are placed in solitary confinement for offending the prison rules or for their
own protection. 121 In some instances, it has been found that solitary confinement is used to
terrorize members of the prisoner population in Canada. 122 Yet, neither this nor threats of
physical force that correctional guards impose is enough to maintain order in an
environment where inmates are confined against their will, and are also feared by their
jailers. 123 Correctional guards fail to adequately protect all inmates. 124 No doubt, prison
life is a hard life.

120 McLeod, supra note 57 at 1180. British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v Canada (Attorney General), 2018
BCSC 62 at paras 100-101 [BCCLA v Canada].
121 McLeod, supra note 57 at 1180.
122 Parkes, “Solitary”, supra note 62 at 180.
123 McLeod, supra note 57 at 1180.
124 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 571. Section 31(3) of the CCRA identifies three categories of inmates
who may be placed in administrative segregation. The first two categories are clearly involuntary. Category (c) is
“allowing the inmate to associate with other inmates would jeopardize the inmate’s safety.” Historically, inmates
segregated for this reason were referred to as “voluntary”. This terminology has recently ceased to be used because
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Now, I want to unpack McLeod’s explanation of how solitary confinement is
justified in society. She says the “presumed efficacy” of solitary confinement flows from
the State’s initial decision to incarcerate. I contrast these words with McLeod’s description
of the initial decision to incarcerate as having “assumed legitimacy”. McLeod’s words
“assumed legitimacy” suggest that despite a whole sophisticated machinery designed to
investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate crimes, a decision to convict and imprison a person
carries a false sense of legitimacy – or a false sense of ‘justice’ – because of the
machinery’s fundamentally flawed design that is premised on racial degradation,
dehumanization, and inherent violence. So, it’s peculiar how solitary confinement is
presumed effective, when the practice borrows its legitimacy from a system that is deemed
illegitimate in the first place. And the words, “presumed efficacy”, suggest that the State
takes the position that there is evidence or reason to believe that solitary confinement,
contextualized by a flawed system, is beneficial despite the long-established and welldocumented deteriorating impact of solitary confinement on inmates. As was articulated
by Canada’s Office of the Correctional Investigator, 125 “Segregation is the most onerous
and depriving experience that the State can legally administer in Canada”. 126 Solitary
confinement makes people worse off. That’s irrefutable. To presume that the practice has
efficacy – or to choose not to question it, which was the approach taken in recent Charter

there was a perception that these inmates needed to be segregated because of CSC’s inability to keep them safe in
the general prison population.
125 The Office of the Correctional Investigator has the following Mission Statement: “As the ombudsman for federally
sentenced offenders, the Office of the Correctional Investigator serves Canadians and contributes to safe, lawful
and humane corrections through independent oversight of the Correctional Service Canada by providing
accessible, impartial and timely investigation of individual and systemic concerns.” Office of the Correctional
Investigator, “Home” (4 July 2018) online: <www.oci-bec.gc.ca/index-eng.aspx>.
126 Canada, Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator 20142015 (Ottawa, OCI, 2015) at 31 [2014-2015 Annual Report].
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challenge cases – is to be wilfully blind to the human suffering that is perpetrated by the
State, and to keep the moral agency of the State intact.
The conditions of jails and prisons are inherently conducive to inmate deterioration
and are ineffective. This is evident when the State resorts to isolating inmates to address
problems that occur within the prison population, where State control is already at its
highest degree, and the effectiveness of the State’s actions can be observed plainly,
provided one gets access to observe the State’s operation of prisons. I would say this is
precisely why it is an awry notion that the State would place individuals in solitary
confinement for “their own protection”, considering the destructive effects of the practice.
‘Protective’ solitary confinement reveals the problematic nature of prison life, suggesting
that the prison society that the State creates and controls is worse than the mental battle
that takes place in an inmate’s mind. Inevitably, the fact that the State uses the practice of
solitary confinement reveals the State’s poor management of inmates and exemplifies the
State’s poor criminal justice administration. Litigation strategies that leave the State
practice of solitary confinement in tact are simply accommodating the State’s poor
administration.
What the correctional system also fails to do is that it fails to prepare inmates for
living productive lives when they are released in the general public, which the vast majority
will. Jails and prisons lack educational opportunities, sufficient mental and physical
healthcare, proper nutrition, and productive social programming. Inmates continue to lack
the very things that they needed prior to their incarceration. Jails and prisons fail to offer
inmates adequate opportunities for self-improvement or to improve social conditions
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outside prison, which is ironic, because one might expect an institution that is described as
‘correctional’ to really invest in these kinds of opportunities. It is no wonder inmates
deteriorate under these conditions. Adopting the prison abolition logic, I argue that in an
environment where there are deficient resources for inmates held captive against their will,
the increased number of placements in solitary confinement is an expected result. And in
solitude, inmates experience the greatest limitations to their free will, ability to socialize,
and control minute details of their lives. In the ‘Carceral State’, the inmate in solitary
confinement has been failed by general society, and once again failed by the prison society.
With that considered, one might better understand why these isolated individuals might be
full of rage when they are released from prison and are met with a merciless world that
labels them as criminals.
The trauma caused by the experience of solitary confinement is inherent to the
practice and is fuelled by the perilous and hostile environment of correctional facilities.
Tweaking certain aspects of the practice of solitary confinement, such as the time periods,
the seriousness of prison violations that warrant isolation, or the physical conditions of
solitary confinement misses the mark on the issue at stake – that is, addressing the socialbased problems that lead to an individual being placed in solitary confinement. As will be
demonstrated in this paper, many courts, advocates, and policymakers have acknowledged
the plight of different marginalized groups in society (i.e., Aboriginal peoples, Black
people, and mentally unwell people), as they are funnelled into the criminal justice system
in higher proportions than the rest of society. But, their reformist approaches have not
effectively addressed the problem. The effective approach is decarceration of the Carceral
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State and obtaining a court decision that prompts the State to implement social
programming that addresses the various needs of marginalized and criminalized groups.

Challenging the “Carceral State” in Canada through Prison Abolitionist Lawyering
I found solitary confinement the most forbidding aspect of prison life. There
is no end and no beginning; there is only one's mind, which can begin to play
tricks. Was that a dream or did it really happen? One begins to question
everything.
– Mr. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, Late President of South Africa 127
Parkes encourages a fusing of prison abolition ethic with prisoner litigation
strategies and articulates that when deciding to litigate, it’s important to understand the
“carceral logic” that informs and legitimizes the practice of solitary confinement and other
forms of isolation in correctional facilities. 128 The prevailing carceral logic in Canada is
that these correctional facilities are rehabilitative and solitary confinement is necessary for
inmates who do not adjust to the correctional environment, or who are dangerous and must
be caged. 129
I would venture to say that this carceral logic also applies to immigration holding
centres and the justification of many instances of solitary confinement that are imposed
while detained for immigration purposes. Immigration holding centres have been

127 Rachelle Larocque, Independent Review of Ontario Corrections Team, Segregation Literature Review (Ontario:
Independent Review of Ontario Corrections, January 2017) [Larocque].
128 Parkes, “Solitary”, supra note 62 at 183. Critics argue that the history of prisoner litigation is instructive in that
litigation has not been very effective in creating social change and has instead led to “band-aid reforms at best”.
Yet at the same time, it is noted that "Like a biblical flood, the age of mass incarceration is finally ebbing,” and
litigation has played a significant role, along with activism and reform efforts to reveal “the depth of depravity” of
this practice. Ibid at 178. I argue that the prison abolition ethic, and more specifically, an anti-carceral logic
approach, can be used to leverage from the progressive strides achieved through reformist efforts, but also create
more meaningful, broad-based changes that will benefit the quality of life for society overall.
129 Ibid at 183.
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characterized as a positive experience for foreign nationals seeking asylum in Canada.
Immigration detainees specifically are often extremely vulnerable: they can be asylumseekers, pregnant women, minors, elderly, victims of torture, and persons with mental or
physical disabilities. 130 Jason Kenney, former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
Canada between 2008 and 2013, reportedly described the conditions of an immigration
holding centre for a news outlet, saying “It’s basically like a two- or three-star hotel with a
fence around it.” 131 All the while, these immigration holding centres operate as mediumsecurity facilities. 132 Dawson critiqued that this kind of reference to hotel conditions, and
implicitly, the comforts and privileges of a hotel, depicts to the public an idea of Canadian
hospitality, suggesting that Canada was detaining asylum-seekers in hotel-like conditions,
because Canada is a benevolent nation. 133 The former Minister also pointedly stated that
“they are not jails”, 134 even though there were, and still are, many immigration detainees
held in provincial jails awaiting a determination of their immigration matters. 135 They also
tend to wait in jail for longer periods. 136 Dawson also explains this precise characterization
of immigration detention, coupled with the rhetoric that Canada’s hospitable reputation
makes the country vulnerable to abuse of the immigration system, enables the State to

130

Hanna Gros & Paloma van Groll, “We Have No Rights”: Arbitrary imprisonment and cruel treatment of migrants
with mental health issues in Canada (Toronto: International Human Rights Program, University of Toronto
Faculty of Law, 2015) at 13 [Gros & van Groll].
131 Carrie Dawson, “Refugee Hotels: The Discourse of Hospitality and the Rise of Immigration Detention in Canada”
(2014) 83:4 University of Toronto Quarterly 826 [Dawson].
132 Gros & van Groll, supra note 130 at 75.
133 Dawson, supra note 131 at 826.
134 Ibid at 826, 829.
135 Ibid at 826.
136 Ibid at 829. The groups most commonly subject to immigration detention are new arrivals awaiting hearings to
determine their admissibility; new arrivals who have been refused permission to enter Canada and are awaiting
removal; rejected asylum-seekers awaiting deportation; undocumented people awaiting decisions about their
admissibility; and people who have violated the terms of their visas. Ibid at 828.
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legislate and create policies that hold asylum-seekers for lengthy periods while their
immigration status is being determined. 137
In her article, Carrie Dawson, a professor at Dalhousie University, contrasts the
Minister’s reference to hotel conditions, and the implicit comforts and privileges of a hotel,
with an excerpt from a submission prepared by Janet Cleveland, Cecile Rousseau, and
Rachel Kronick for the House of Commons, suggesting a contrary representation of these
facilities:
Immigration Holding Centres are run as medium-security prisons, with
fences topped with razor wire, centrally controlled locked doors, security
guards, and surveillance cameras everywhere. Men and women are held in
separate wings, with a special section for children detained with their
mothers. There are regular searches with metal detectors, and sometimes
body searches. Personal effects are confiscated on arrival. Wake-up times,
meal times and all other activities are regulated by rigid rules. For example,
one of our study respondents was placed in 24-hour solitary confinement
because he refused to get up at the 6AM wakeup call. There are virtually no
activities except TV, so people have nothing to do except wait and worry...
Suicidal detainees are either placed under 24/7 individual surveillance,
usually in solitary confinement, or transferred to a provincial prison. 138
The description of life in an immigration holding centre, and particularly, the examples of
circumstances when solitary confinement was employed (i.e., not cooperating with the
facility’s schedule and suicidal ideation) also reflect the logic that their confinement is
necessary, because they are not adjusting well to the carceral environment.

137 Ibid at 827.
138 Ibid at 829-830. For more information on solitary confinement in the context of immigration detention see as
examples, Gros & van Groll, supra note 130. Hanna Gros, Invisible Citizens: Canadian Children in Immigration
Detention (Toronto: International Human Rights Program, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 2017) [Gros].
Hanna Gros & Yolanda Song, “No Life for a Child” A Roadmap to End Immigration Detention of Children and
Family Separation (Toronto: International Human Rights Program, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 2016)
[Gros & Song].
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Understanding this carceral logic can assist with dismantling unconstitutional
aspects of the criminal justice system, by targeting and challenging the legitimacy of this
logic. 139 Yet, as cautioned by Parkes, without awareness of this carceral logic, prison
advocates may inadvertently entrench correctional logics in constitutionalized form, which
create barriers to prisoners in need of constitutional protections. 140 In fact, a failure to
challenge the carceral logic has the effect of expanding and proliferating carceral sites. 141
This is explained by Parkes when she offers the example of what transpired after federal
Correctional Investigator, Howard Sapers, conducted a review of segregation practices
across Ontario; the Ontario government decided to build two new and improved prisons,
with expanded capacity, in response to recommendations to impose hard time limits on the
use of segregation and to incorporate independent oversight. 142 The recommendation by
the Correctional Investigator was a reformist critique that implicitly affirmed and
legitimated the practice of segregation, because these recommendations articulated ways
to make segregation more tolerable, rather than rejecting the use of segregation altogether.
An anti-carceral framework adopts a focus on strategies to get people out of prison instead
of making prisons better; it also encourages coalition-building and connections to
abolitionist and other critical social movements, which are fighting for like-minded
causes. 143

139 Parkes, “Solitary”, supra note 62 at 180.
140 Ibid at 178, 180.
141 Ibid at 183.
142 Ibid at 183-184.
143 Ibid at 183, 185.

Cracking Down on Cages | 44

CHAPTER FIVE: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT – THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
CONCEPTUALIZATION
[My] cell was as long as me, as tall as me, as fat as me. There’s a light on you
all the time, you know, like one of these bright lights all the time. And you just
got a mattress on the floor and a toilet. There’s no sink to wash your hands.
And it’s infested with bugs; you sleep with them and eat with them. And there’s
no windows for sunlight – you don’t know if it’s light or dark out.
– Marie, a segregated women inmate sharing her experience 144

According to the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (The
Nelson Mandela Rules), 145 solitary confinement is the “the confinement of prisoners for 22
hours or more a day without meaningful human contact."

146

Prolonged solitary

confinement is "solitary confinement for a time period in excess of 15 consecutive
days” 147. 148 The Mandela Rules prohibit indefinite and prolonged solitary confinement,
and this State practice is absolutely prohibited in the case of women, children, and those
with mental and physical disabilities who would be worsened by enduring such an
experience. 149 This rule is peculiar, because solitary confinement almost invariably has a
worsening impact on every individual subjected to it, not just those who have disabilities.
This is especially since destructive psychological and physiological effects can manifest in
as soon as 48 hours, and individuals placed in solitary confinement are frequently held in
these isolating conditions for longer than 2 days. While the international community

144 Joane Martel, “Telling the Story: A Study in the Segregation of Women Prisoners” (2001) 28:1 Social Justice 196
at 196.
145 The Nelson Mandela Rules, supra note 4.
146 Ibid, r 44.
147 Ibid.
148 The period of 15 days for prolonged segregation comes from a Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Convention
Against Torture in 2011, that provided evidence of mental and physical harm found in studies of people who
experienced solitary for lengthy periods. Corporation of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association v Her Majesty
the Queen, 2017 ONSC 7491 at para 54 [CCLA v The Queen].
149 The Nelson Mandela Rules, supra note 4 at r 45(2).
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promotes implementing constraints on how, when, and how long solitary confinement
should be imposed, as I have indicated earlier, the more appropriate policy decision to
make is to completely abolish the practice of solitary confinement. The Nelson Mandela
Rules specify that the concept of solitary confinement focuses on the lived reality of
isolation, or the nature of isolating conditions, while placed in a prison cell for 22 to 24
hours. It matters less what policies govern the practice or what terminology a State uses
instead of “solitary confinement” to describe the practice. 150
In Canada, “segregation” is the key term used throughout correctional law and
policy which is captured by the discourse on solitary confinement. Throughout this paper,
I plan to use the term “solitary confinement”, even though Canadian legislation and
literature use more benign-sounding terminology for the practice (i.e., segregation). 151
There are several justifications for this. Many provincial correctional institutions confine
some of the custodial population for 22 or more hours per day in cells that are not
designated as a “segregation area”, and are therefore, not included in official segregation
statistics. 152 Isolated individuals placed in these ‘non-segregation cells’ are denied the
same level of oversight and review of their confinement, and are denied the same level of
mental health services by correctional staff. 153 Nevertheless, individuals in this situation

150 Parkes, “Solitary”, supra note 62 at 167.
151 The term “administrative segregation”, in particular, has been criticized by Michael Jackson, professor of law at
University of British Columbia, as a “benign semantic camouflage” for the most extreme form of incarceration.
Michael Jackson, Justice Behind the Walls: Human Rights in Canadian Prisons (Vancouver/ Toronto: Douglas &
McLntyre, 2002) at 287 [Jackson, “Justice”].
152 Ontario Ombudsman, “Segregation: Not an Isolated Problem: Submission in response to the Ministry of
Community Safety and Correctional Services’ consultation on its review of policies related to segregation of
inmates” (27 April 2016) at 4 [Ontario Ombudsman, “Segregation”].
153 Ibid at 20.

Cracking Down on Cages | 46

would still be considered subjected to solitary confinement under the Mandela Rules.
Those subjected to these conditions still suffer the associated harms of this State practice. 154
Notably, in Corporation of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association v Her Majesty
the Queen 155 (CCLA), the Ontario Superior Court of Justice stated that if Canada wishes
that the solitary confinement discourse does not apply to the practice of administrative
segregation, it must change the nature of the confinement that administrative segregation
entails. 156 This includes changing the amount of time an inmate is held within a cell and
the amount of human contact they have access to while in segregation. Until this happens,
the Court said that the practice of administrative segregation is considered solitary
confinement as defined in The Nelson Mandela Rules. 157
The Nelson Mandela Rules are not binding international law since the nation states
had not agreed as to whether the Rules will bind them. Yet, the Court in CCLA found it
noteworthy to point out that Canada participated in drafting The Nelson Mandela Rules.158
It is also noteworthy that in 2016, the Ontario Ombudsman, in its review of the practice of
segregation in Ontario jails, endorsed The Nelson Mandela Rules on prolonged segregation
to urge the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services to end indefinite
segregation. 159 With that said, I contend that Canada, as a human rights role model in the
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Parkes, “Solitary”, supra note 62 at 167.
CCLA v The Queen, supra note 148.
Ibid at paras 45-46.
Ibid.
Ibid at paras 48-49.
Ontario Ombudsman, “Segregation: Not an Isolated Problem: Submission in response to the Ministry of
Community Safety and Correctional Services’ consultation on its review of policies related to segregation of
inmates” (27 April 2016) at 3, 16 [Ontario Ombudsman, “Segregation”].
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international community and a participant in drafting The Nelson Mandela Rules, must be
held against the same standards that it helped to set for the rest of the world.
At the same time, The Nelson Mandela Rules represent a reformist approach to
practising solitary confinement. While these Rules appear to allow for, and even support,
the idea of completely abolishing the practice, these Rules still acquiesce to the notion that
solitary confinement is otherwise a legitimate practice, by creating limits on how it can be
used. In line with an abolitionist perspective, I would refute the legitimacy of solitary
confinement, however, I would ascribe to the conceptualization of solitary confinement
provided in The Nelson Mandela Rules. Doing this enables my paper, which contends for
abolition, to remain a part of the conversation about all forms of solitary confinement and
maintain a large audience for this paper.
While the works cited in this paper discussing the practice of “segregation” may be
making observations and commentary based on the ‘official segregation statistics’ or the
designated ‘segregation areas’ of correctional facilities, I use the term of solitary
confinement to call into question the potential discriminatory nature of various forms of
isolation that are very well missing in segregation statistics. And, I contend that the issue
of discrimination may be more pervasive and more damaging than what is suggested by
‘official’ sources of information. The experience of solitary confinement does not simply
end where classifications of “segregation” to an “area” end.
While solitary confinement is traditionally associated as a practice imposed on
incarcerated individuals charged or convicted of criminal offences, 160 I seek to highlight

160 CCLA v The Queen, supra note 148 at paras 38-46. Parkes, “Solitary”, supra note 62 at 167.
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that the practice is also imposed on immigration detainees, who find themselves in
provincial jails or who are placed in designated immigration holding centres. Hence, I also
use the general term of solitary confinement to capture the experiences of isolation endured
by immigration detainees. Indeed, it is true that solitary confinement is a real and common
phenomenon in Canada, in more ways than the State may be willing to acknowledge, and
the individuals impacted are therefore enduring the harms of this practice. 161 A final reason
for using the term solitary confinement is to use as much uniformity throughout my paper
as reasonably possible, as a convenience for the reader. However, whenever the focus of
the discussion requires a deliberate use of the term “segregation” due to governing law and
policy, then this term will be used.

161 Parkes, “Solitary”, supra note 62 at 167.
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CHAPTER SIX: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN CANADA – A BRIEF
HISTORY
Twenty years ago, I was often called and asked to assist, even permitted into
segregation cells to provide human contact and to intervene when women
were self-injuring or threatening suicide. Now, in only the most desperate
cases, I may be permitted to plead through meal slots with women as they
smash their heads against walls, try to gouge out their own eyes or smear
blood and feces on their bodies and surroundings.
- Canadian Senator and long-time feminist prisoner advocate, Kim Pate 162

In keeping with the prison abolition ethic, it is worthwhile to consider the history
behind solitary confinement to understand its origins and recognize trends in the way this
correctional practice has been implemented by the State. Solitary confinement in Canada
was a practice borrowed from the United States. 163 Solitary confinement was devised by
the Philadelphia Quakers, as part of operating what they conceptualized as “the
penitentiary”, an institution that would replace the harsh punishments, which offenders
were traditionally subjected to, such as flogging. 164 When solitary confinement was first
introduced in America 200 years ago in the 1820s, the American penitentiary system
attracted international attention, particularly from European countries, whose delegates
would visit for prison tours and return to Europe with principles to adopt in the European
prison systems. 165
Penitentiaries, where solitary confinement was imposed, were created to make
offenders “penitent”. 166 Solitary confinement was considered an innovative way to compel

162 Pate, supra note 87 at 28.
163 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 19.
164 Correctional Service Canada, “History of the Canadian Correctional System” online: <www.cscscc.gc.ca/educational-resources/092/ha-student-etudiant-eng.pdf> [CSC, “History”].
165 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 19.
166 CSC, “History”, supra note 164.
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prisoners to rehabilitate by spending the entire day alone, primarily confined in a cell, so
they could repent and reflect on their transgressions in silence. 167 It was also an opportunity
to remove the offender from the negative influences of general society as well as prison
society. 168 The idea of solitary confinement was conceived with positive, even redemptive,
intentions. Yet, as more countries adopted the practice of isolating prisoners, an increase
in mental health issues, physical disease, and death among the isolated prisoners, was
documented in America and Europe. 169 Nevertheless, the practice continued and spread
across the globe.
The practice of isolating prisoners was first sanctioned in Canadian law with the
enactment of the Penitentiary Act of 1834 170. 171 In Canada, the first penitentiary was built
in Kingston, Ontario, in 1835. 172 For over 30 years, Kingston Penitentiary operated as a
provincial jail until the passage of the British North America Act,1867 173 (i.e., the
Constitution Act, 1867), which established federal and provincial responsibilities for justice.
Hence, prior to Confederation, Kingston Penitentiary represented the beginning of the
practice of solitary confinement in the Province of Ontario, just as much as it was for
Canada as a whole. The Penitentiary Act (1868) 174 provided the federal government with
the responsibility of operating Kingston Penitentiary and two other pre-Confederation
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CCLA v The Queen, supra note 148 at para 1.
BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 17.
Ibid at paras 20-22.
An Act to Provide for the Maintenance by the Government of the Provincial Penitentiary, (1834) 4 Will. Iv,c.37, s
36 (British North American Legislative Database, 1758-1867, online: <bnald.lib.unb.ca/node/3862>).
CCLA v The Queen, supra note 148 at paras 1-2.
CSC, “History”, supra note 164.
British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Vict, c 3 (UK) [Constitution Act, 1867].
Penitentiary Act (1868), 39 Vict c 75.
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prisons in Saint John, New Brunswick, and Halifax, Nova Scotia. 175 This created a federal
system "for the establishment, maintenance and management of penitentiaries for offenders
sentenced to two years or more." 176 Since penitentiaries – which first implemented the
practice of solitary confinement – were reassigned to the care of the federal government,
and since the history and practices of the federal system are more thoroughly documented
and scrutinized than the provincial systems, my remaining discussion of the history of
solitary confinement will be dominated by events arising in the federal correctional system.
“Dissociation” was a former name for segregation in Canada. It was governed under
section 2.30 of the Penitentiary Service Regulations, 177 which authorized the warden to
isolate a prisoner if the warden was satisfied it was necessary for “the maintenance of good
order and discipline in the institution” or was in “the best interests of an inmate”. These
criteria were vague, enabling placement decisions to be determined based on rumours,
hunches, and intangible feelings about the inmate’s reputation or attitude. 178
A history of alarming government reports, constitutional challenges, violent and
deadly prison riots in the 1970s, and then the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (Charter) 179 in 1982, created a culminating moment to reassess regulations
on dissociation. A Correctional Law Review was appointed to conduct a general review of
federal laws on corrections and concluded that the criterion for placement and release from
dissociation – that is, “for the good order of the institution” – was overly vague and broad.

175 Correctional Service Canada, “Penitentiaries in Canada” (20 October 2014) online: </www.csc-scc.gc.ca/aboutus/006-1006-eng.shtml> [CSC, “Penitentiaries”].
176 Ibid.
177 Penitentiary Service Regulations, PC 1962-302, SOR/62-90.
178 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 24.
179 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (UK), 1982 c 11.
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Based on the constitutional review, provisions on dissociation needed to establish the right
to a hearing, a requirement to provide reasons, restrictions for the time period of
dissociation, and a right to be seen by a health professional. 180
In 1992, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) 181 was enacted, two
years after Ontario’s Ministry of Correctional Services Act 182 (MCSA) was enacted.
“Dissociation” was now called “segregation”. Many features of the practice contained in
the federal prison rules – “the Commissioner Directives” (CD) 183 – were now legally
binding under the CCRA and its subordinating regulations. As documented in several
internal and external reports, problems persisted in the implementation of the practice of
segregation. 184 Most notable was the report by Justice Louise Arbour, the Commission of
Inquiry into certain events at the Prison for Women in Kingston, released in 1996, where
she noted there was a prevalent corporate culture within the Correctional Service Canada
as high as the ranks of management of a lack of regard to the rights of prisoners. 185
In 2007, the suicide death of 19-year-old female, Ashley Smith, who had been held
in continuous segregation for over a year in federal correctional institutions was another
highly publicized incident that reignited a discussion, and prompted additional reports, on
the problematic use of segregation. 186 The Coroner’s Inquest Touching the Death of Ashley
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BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 33.
Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 20 [CCRA].
Ministry of Correctional Services Act, RSO 1990, c M22 [MCSA].
Commissioner’s Directives comprise of the Correctional Service Canada’s national policies concerning the
operation of federal prisons. BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 73.
184 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 40.
185 Solicitor General of Canada, Commission of Inquiry into certain events at the Prison for Women in Kingston
(Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1996) at 39 [Arbour Report].
186 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 41.
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Smith 187 was completed in 2013. The jury at the inquest articulated 11 reformist-based
recommendations concerning the issue of segregation. These included the abolition of
indefinite solitary confinement; 188 long-term segregation should not exceed 15 days for
women; 189 until the abolition of all segregation and seclusion in all CSC institutions,
inmates should not spend more than 60 cumulative days in segregation within a calendar
year; 190 restrictive conditions of segregation should be reduced to a minimum; 191 and both
the institutional head and a mental health professional should visit all segregated inmates
at least once a day, but never simply attend visits by communicating through the food slot
in the cell door 192. 193
In December 2014, Correctional Service Canada (CSC) 194 released a Response to
the Coroner’s Inquest Touching the Death of Ashley Smith 195 to address the jury’s
recommendations. Along with other refutations, CSC rejected the term of “solitary
confinement” to refer to practices of administrative segregation, stating it is not a form of
punishment. In so many words, CSC stated it was “an interim population management
measure resulting from a carefully considered decision made by the Institutional Head to
facilitate an investigation or to protect the safety and security of individuals and/or the

187 Correctional Service Canada, Coroner’s Inquest Touching the Death of Ashley Smith (19 December 2013) online:
<www.csc-scc.gc.ca/publications/005007-9009-eng.shtml>.
188 See Recommendation number 27.
189 See Recommendation number 28.
190 See Recommendation number 29.
191 See Recommendation number 30.
192 See Recommendations numbers 31 and 32.
193 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 45.
194 Federally-sentenced prisoners are held in a correctional facility operated by the Correctional Service Canada. “The
Correctional Service Canada (CSC) is the federal government agency responsible for administering sentences of a
term of two years or more, as imposed by the court. CSC is responsible for managing institutions of various
security levels and supervising offenders under conditional release in the community.” Correctional Service
Canada, “Our Role” (31 October 2016) online: <www.csc-scc.gc.ca/about-us/006-0001-eng.shtml>.
195 Correctional Service Canada, Response to the Coroner's Inquest Touching the Death of Ashley Smith (11
December 2014) online: <www.csc-scc.gc.ca/publications/005007-9011-eng.shtml>.
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institution”.196 However, I would again highlight that the focus of the definition of solitary
confinement, as provided by the Mandela Rules, is not on meting out a punishment. The
focus of the definition is on the experience of the individual subjected to the practice and
the conditions the individual endures while subjected to the practice. The Office of the
Correctional Investigator (OCI) described CSC’s response to the Ashley Smith Inquest as
“frustrating and disappointing”, 197 and further described the persistent overuse of
administrative segregation as “the most commonly used population management tool to
address tensions and conflicts in federal correctional facilities” and manage inmates who
have mental health issues, are self-injurious, and are suicide risks. 198 According to the OCI,
about half (48%) of federal inmates were placed in administrative segregation at least one
time during their sentence. 199
In 2015, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau recognized the importance of addressing
the challenges with the practice of segregation in his mandate letter to the Minister of
Justice and Attorney General of Canada, Jody Wilson-Raybould. 200 The letter read, in part:
In particular, I will expect you to work with your colleagues and through
established legislative, regulator, and Cabinet processes to deliver on your
top priorities: . . . [including] implementation of recommendations from the
inquest into the death of Ashley Smith regarding the restriction of the use of
solitary confinement and the treatment of those with mental illness. 201
I note that Prime Minister Trudeau, acknowledged the practice of segregation as a form of
solitary confinement in his mandate letter, contrary to the representations that have been
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BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 46.
2014-2015 Annual Report, supra note 126 at 15.
Ibid at 26-27.
Ibid at 26.
BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 46.
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, “Mandate Letter: Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada Mandate
Letter” (November 12, 2015) online: <pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-justice-and-attorney-general-canada-mandate-letter>.
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asserted by other members of the government (i.e., ministry officials and legal counsel at
the provincial and federal levels), as they advocate for the constitutionality and legitimacy
of segregation.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE LEGAL REGIME OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
A General Summary
Solitary confinement is prescribed in law and policy. The CCRA has provisions for
administrative segregation in CCRA sections 31-31 and disciplinary segregation under
CCRA sections 38-44 with tests for placement and release and details addressing due
process and conditions of confinement. 202 In the federal system, the CCRA determines the
grounds for placing an inmate in administrative segregation under subsection 31(3), 203
which are the same grounds that the institutional head (the Warden) must refer to when
determining whether to continue or end a placement in administrative segregation. 204
Commissioner’s Directive (CD) 709

205

also stipulate rules and conditions for

implementing administrative segregation. The CCRA includes a statutory definition of
“administrative segregation”: “to maintain the security of the penitentiary or the safety of
any person by not allowing an inmate to associate with other inmates”. 206
The CCRA and its subordinating regulations require periodic review of an inmate’s
placement in administrative segregation at an institutional segregation review board
(“ISRB”) after 5 days by the Deputy Warden, and at 30 days and every 30 days thereafter
by the Warden. 207 The Regulations direct regional reviews of placements in administrative
segregation by the Regional Segregation Review Board (“RSRB”) if they continue past 60
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BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 34.
Ibid at paras 78-79. CCRA, supra note 181, s 32.
BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 81.
Correctional Service Canada, “Commissioner’s Directives 709 – Administrative Segregation” online: <www.cscscc.gc.ca/acts-and-regulations/709-cd-eng.shtml> [CD 709].
206 CCRA, supra note 181, s 31(1).
207 CCRA, supra note 181, s 21(2). BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 81.
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days. 208 However, CD 709 has reduced this period to 38 days, and every 30 days
thereafter. 209 The CD 709 also requires a national review of cases where an inmate exceeds
60 days in segregation, or has had 4 segregation placements, or spent 90 cumulative days
in segregation within a calendar year. 210
Disciplinary segregation in the federal system can be ordered at a disciplinary
hearing 211 – akin to court within prison walls – pursuant to subparagraph 44(1)(f), where
an inmate is guilty of a serious disciplinary offence under CCRA section 40. CD 580
provides rules for disciplining inmates, which include rules for the segregation of inmates
for disciplinary offences.
Regulation 778 under Ontario’s Ministry of Correctional Services Act, (“MCS
Regulations”) 212 also prescribe “administrative segregation” under section 34 and “close
confinement” (also known as “disciplinary segregation”) under section 32. There is no
definition of segregation prescribed in statute or regulations for the Ontario’s correctional
system. Instead, a definition is provided in policy drafted by the Ministry of Community
Safety and Correctional Services (MCSCS). 213 According to the Independent Review of
Ontario Corrections, the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Service’s policies
regarding segregation are only available through an onerous freedom of information
request. 214 The definition is provided in section 413 of the policy document:
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BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 82.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See CCRA, supra note 181, ss 38-44.
Ontario, RRO 1990, Reg 778: GENERAL [MCS Regulations].
Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, “Institutional Services Policy and Procedures Manual:
Placement of Special Management Inmates, Government of Ontario” (6 December 2016) [MCSCS, PSMI].
214 Ontario, Segregation in Ontario, supra note 107 at 4.
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Segregation: An area (for administrative segregation or close confinement
housing, inmates are confined to their cells, limited social interaction,
supervised/restricted privileges and programs, etc.) designated for the
placement of inmates who are to be housed separate from the general
population (including protective custody, special needs unit(s). etc.)
Interestingly, “segregation” refers to a physical “area”, even though those who are
subjected to the practice describe it as both a physical and mental experience. 215 The
definition focuses on a physical area, as opposed to the treatment of an inmate, or the form
of confinement. 216
The Ontario Ministry’s regulations and policy requires a Superintendent or his or
her designate to review administrative segregation placements within the first 24 hours,
and every five days. 217 A review must also take place every 30 days, and the Ministry’s
policy states what review obligations apply to inmates in segregation or “other area
designated as an extension of segregation.” 218
Under subsection 32(2) of the MCS Regulations, an inmate can be placed in “close
confinement” or “disciplinary segregation”, if the Superintendent “determines that an
inmate committed a misconduct of a serious nature”. 219 No statutory definition of
“misconduct of a serious nature” exists. But, this misconduct will typically include
assaulting another inmate or staff member, assault with a weapon, possession of contraband,
significantly damaging property, or inciting a riot or disturbance. 220 The “Discipline and

215 Michael Jackson, “Reflections on 40 Years of Advocacy to End the Isolation of Canadian Prisoners” (2015) 4:1
Canadian Journal of Human Rights 57 at 66 [Jackson, “Reflections”].
216 Ontario Ombudsman, “Segregation”, supra note 159 at 4.
217 MCSCS, PSMI, supra note 213, s. 6.6. Ontario, Segregation in Ontario, supra note 107 at 30.
218 MCSCS: PSMI, supra note 213, s. 6.6. Ontario, Segregation in Ontario, supra note 107 at 30-31.
219 MCS Regulations, supra note 212, s 32(2). Debra Parkes, “A Prisoner’s Charter?: Reflections on Prisoner
Litigation Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2007) 40:2 University of British Columbia Law
Review 629 at 644 [Parkes, “Prisoner’s Charter?”]. The provincial governments have not followed suit with
incorporating independent chairpersons for disciplinary proceedings. Ibid.
220 Ontario, Segregation in Ontario, supra note 107 at 26.
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Misconduct Policy” also governs close confinement. 221 Close confinement can be
sanctioned when correctional staff files a Misconduct Report and this punishment is
ordered following a four-step adjudicative process: (1) the initial description of the
misconduct, (2) the investigation, (3) a distinct inmate interview, and (4) the determination
of the disposition. 222
Inmates who (1) are self-injurious; (2) are suicidal; or (3) have a serious mental
illness with significant impairment, may be subjected to solitary confinement under CD
843, which instructs correctional staff to place identified inmates in observation cells (e.g.,
“High Watch”, “Modified Watch”, “Suicide Watch”, clinical isolation or seclusion). 223
The point of this and other means of managing inmates with mental health issues also
governed by CCRA sections 85-88 is “using observation or restraint as a last resort for the
purpose of preserving life and preventing serious bodily harm, while maintaining their
dignity in a safe and secure environment”. 224 The Ontario system also has policy, not law,
which instructs correctional staff to place inmates in other forms of restricted housing that
can be equivalent to “segregation” (i.e., medical isolation and a special needs unit). 225
Medical isolation is “[t]he isolation (segregation) of an inmate for health care purposes
(e.g., to prevent the spread of infection).” 226 Special needs units (SNUs) are a “dedicated
or allocated physical location … used to assess, stabilize, treat and house special needs

221 Ibid at 28.
222 Ibid at 28-29. MCSCS, PSMI, supra note 213, s. 6.4.4.
223 Correctional Service Canada, “Commissioner’s Directive 843 – Interventions to Preserve Life and Prevent Serious
Bodily Harm” online: <www.csc-scc.gc.ca/acts-and-regulations/843-cd-eng.shtml> [CD 843]. Office of the
Correctional Investigator, “Risky Business: An Investigation of the Treatment and Management of Chronic SelfInjury Among Federally Sentenced Women” (30 September 2013) at 31 [OCI, “Risky Business”].
224 CD 843, supra note 223.
225 Ontario, Segregation in Ontario, supra note 107 at 27.
226 Ibid. MCSCS, PSMI, supra note 213, s 4.9.
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inmates.” 227 The policy governing SNUs defines an inmate with a special need(s) as an
individual who meets one or more of the following criteria:
•
•
•

Presentation of a severe and/or persistent mental illness (e.g.
schizophrenia, affected disorder, organic brain syndrome, borderline
personality disorder, dementia, etc.);
An intellectual disability; and/or
A significant physical disability (e.g., restricted mobility, deaf, blind,
etc.) 228

While inmates with mental illness and/or intellectual disability are not supposed to be
placed in segregation, the Ministry can still segregate these inmates if it “can demonstrate
and document that all other alternatives to segregation have been considered and rejected
because they would cause an undue hardship.” 229
Many important executive powers in the Ontario system are prescribed in
regulation and policy, as opposed to a statue, public and political scrutiny in drafting these
powers of correctional staff is reduced. Further, amendments to a regulation are
considerably easier to achieve than they are for a statute. Accordingly, I argue that the ease
with which powers for Ontario correctional staff can be added and modified with limited
scrutiny, contributes to the lack of accountability and close monitoring of the provincial
system, compared to the federal system. This has been repeatedly identified by critics as a
problem. Notably, the MCS Regulations provide that if an inmate is held in administrative
segregation, “as far as practicable”, that inmate will have access to “the same benefits and
privileges as if the inmate were not placed in segregation”. 230 The federal system also has
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MCSCS, PSMI, supra note 213, s 4.16.
Ibid, s 4.15.
MCS Regulations, supra note 212, s 3.1.3. Ontario, Segregation in Ontario, supra note 107 at 28.
MCS Regulations, supra note 212, s 34(4).
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a comparable provision in the CCRA statute. 231 However, for the federal legislation, it has
been noted in court that the omnibus nature of one of the qualifications to retaining equal
rights and benefits (i.e., “limitations specific to the administrative segregation area”), plus
the limitations of the existing infrastructure in prisons, means that the operational reality is
such that life in segregation is significantly different from life in the general prison
population. 232

A Focus on Solitary Confinement and Immigration Detainees
Under this sub-heading I will answer two questions: (1) How do immigration
detainees find themselves in provincial jails in the first place?; and (2) How do they end up
in solitary confinement? To start with the first question, the Canada Border Services
Agency (CBSA) 233 may choose to detain a foreign national arriving to Canada pursuant to
subsections 55(2)-(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), 234 While

231 CCRA, supra note 181, s 37 states the following: An inmate in administrative segregation has the same rights and
conditions of confinement as other inmates, except for those that
(a) can only be enjoyed in association with other inmates; or
(b) cannot be enjoyed due to
(i) limitations specific to the administrative segregation area, or
(ii) security requirements.
232 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 110.
233 The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) ensures Canada's security and prosperity by facilitating and
overseeing international travel and trade across Canada's border. Canada Border Services Agency “About the
Canada Border Services Agency” (2 December 2016) online:<www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/menueng.html>.
234 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].
Subsection 55(2) reads as follows:
An officer may, without a warrant, arrest and detain a foreign national, other than a protected
person,
(a) who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe is inadmissible and is a danger to the public or
is unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing, removal from Canada, or at a
proceeding that could lead to the making of a removal order by the Minister under subsection 44(2);
or
(b) if the officer is not satisfied of the identity of the foreign national in the course of any procedure
under this Act.
Subsection 55(3) states the following:
A permanent resident or a foreign national may, on entry into Canada, be detained if an officer
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some immigration detainees are detained due to past criminality, most of them are not.235
Rather immigration detainees are more often detained because they are considered a flight
risk, their identity cannot be confirmed, or are broadly considered a “danger to the
public”. 236
According to the International Human Rights Program at the University of Toronto,
Faculty of Law, 60% of all immigration detention takes place in Ontario, and 53% of all
immigration detention takes place in the Greater Toronto Area alone. 237 In the Greater
Toronto Area, once a CBSA officer decides to detain a foreign national, the CBSA, with
delegated authority from the Ministry of Public Safety, determines the site of detention of
the foreign national: (1) a designated immigration holding centre run by the CBSA; (2) or
a provincial correctional facility run by Ontario’s Ministry of Correctional Services (MCS),
which is enabled through an agreement between the CBSA and the MCS. 238 Immigration
detainees do not have a say in this decision. In 2013, over 7370 foreign nationals were
detained in Canada, and it was calculated that about 30% of all immigration detainees were
placed in provincial jails. 239 In the 2016-2017 fiscal year, there was a total of 1212
immigration admissions to Ontario jails. 240
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(a) considers it necessary to do so in order for the examination to be completed; or
(b) has reasonable grounds to suspect that the permanent resident or the foreign national is
inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality,
criminality or organized criminality.
Gros & van Groll, supra note 130 at 13.
Ibid.
Ibid at 14.
Ibid at 75. Ontario, Independent Review of Ontario Corrections Team, Corrections in Ontario: Directions for
Reform (Ontario: Independent Review of Ontario Corrections Team, 2017) at 94 [Ontario, Directions for Reform].
Gros & van Groll, supra note 130 at 14.
Ontario, Directions for Reform, supra note 238 at 94.

Cracking Down on Cages | 63

The CBSA also has the discretionary power to transfer an immigration detainee
from an immigration holding centre, which is a medium-security facility, to a maximumsecurity provincial jail. 241 A key motivation for the CBSA to send immigration detainees
to provincial jails is to reduce the federal agency’s own costs for detaining the foreign
nationals, in addition to a lack available space to hold all the foreign nationals that the
CBSA detains. 242 Outside of Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec, there are no
immigration holding centres, and all immigration detainees are placed in provincial jails,
where they are exposed to the criminal population. 243 Although they have not committed a
crime in Canada, immigration detainees in provincial jails are treated the same members
of the criminal population, without much distinction. 244
To respond to the second question, as is true in immigration holding centres, when
immigration detainees are placed in provincial jails, they can be subject to solitary
confinement. 245 This explains why I have decided to raise awareness to the unique issues
concerning solitary confinement that arise in the provincial correctional system, even as
other literature tends to focus on practices of the federal system. If detainees are in distress,
become difficult to deal with, start screaming in their cells persistently, display signs of a
mental health issue, or express suicidal ideation, then they will be placed in solitary
confinement in provincial jails. 246
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Gros & van Groll, supra note 130 at 75.
Ibid at 14, 75.
Ibid at 75.
Ontario, Directions for Reform, supra note 238 at 94.
See for example: Anna Mehler Paperny and Patrick Cain, “A severely sick man spent 400 days in solitary. This
isn’t an anomaly: In Canada, it’s common”, Global News (29 April 2016) online: <globalnews.ca>.
246 Gros & van Groll, supra note 130 at 18. Dawson, supra note 131 at 829-830.
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The Crimmigration Trend
While most Canadians are immigrants or descended from immigrants, an era has
emerged in Canada where foreign nationals coming to the country are treated as criminals
or national security threats with no basic rights. 247 This era is dubbed the “crimmigration”
era. In developed countries, such as Canada, migration is becoming synonymous with risk,
leading to a securitization of borders in response to contemporary anxieties and fears
increasing in a globalized world. 248 Canada, among other Western nations, avoid the
immigration of unwanted migrants by criminalizing their activities. 249 Mainstream media
regularly depicts refugees, in particular, as a source of chaos and disorder, whose troubled
backgrounds and cultural differences make them unsuitable for Canada. 250
A recent example of this emerging trend in modern Canadian society is the
increasing number of foreign nationals entering Canada from the United States through
unofficial border crossings after Donald Trump was elected as President in November 2016.
News reports and political discourse described asylum-seekers as “illegal migrants”. 251
Moreover, politicians indicated that enhanced detention measures are needed to screen
whether any of the “hundreds of illegal migrants” or “bogus” refugees coming to Canada
have “paid criminal networks tens of thousands of dollars to come here in violation of
several Canadian laws.” 252 This commentary from politicians reflects a predisposition to

247 Gros & van Groll, supra note 130 at 14.
248 Wayne Antony, Gillian Balfour, C. Lesley Biggs, Carolyn Brooks, Lynn Caldwell, Elizabeth Comack, Pamela J.
Downe, Susan Gingell, Margot A. Hurlbert, Carrianne Leung, Darryl Leroux, Les Samuelson, and Bernard
Schissel, Gender, Race & Canadian Law (Black Point, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing Company) at 81
[Antony et al].
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid at 82.
251 See for example Robert Benzie, “Ford government is ending co-operation with Ottawa on resettlement of asylumseekers” TheStar (5 July 2018) online: <www.thestar.com>.
252 Dawson, supra note 131 at 833, 837.
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criminalize migrants rather than recognize their international right to leave their country of
origin to flee from persecution under the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees 253. 254 As these political views gain popularity, critics have warned that “refugees
are vanishing”. 255
Ironically, this crimmigration trend is developing even though Canada’s
multicultural ideals are enshrined in law and are so cherished in Canadian society. 256
Crimmigration has become the policy-making marriage of criminal law and immigration
law, and the marriage is a peculiar one, as the two fields of law do not necessarily have
congruent functions within society. 257 While criminal law aims to prevent and address
personal evils and proprietary harms suffered by individuals and society, immigration law
determines who may or may not cross Canada’s borders, and who may or may not reside
on Canadian land. 258 But, one academic source by Raquel Aldana, Won Kidane, Beth Lyon,
and Karla McKanders, inspires my research by making the following important
connections between criminal law and immigration law:
1. Both systems govern the relationship between the federal State and the
individual.
2. Both are preoccupied with attributing a label to each individual navigating
their respective systems. Each label determines the State’s dealings with that
individual, reaping potentially life-changing outcomes (e.g., “not-guilty”
versus “guilty”; “admissible” versus “inadmissible”). 259
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Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN General Assembly, 28 July 1951, Treaty Series, vol 189, p 137.
Dawson, supra note 131 at 833, 837.
Ibid at 833.
Canadian Multiculturalism Act, RSC, 1985, c 24 (4th Supp).
Raquel Aldana, Won Kidane, Beth Lyon, & Karla McKanders, Global Issues in Immigration Law: Cases and
Materials (St Paul, MN: West Academic Publishing, 2013) at 321 [Aldana et al].
258 Ibid.
259 Admissibility in Canadian immigration law refers to whether a foreign national is allowed to enter to Canada.
There is a list of reasons why a foreign national may be deemed inadmissible or prohibited from entering Canada,
and these reasons are prescribed in IRPA, supra note 234, ss 34-42. The main reasons for inadmissibility can be
any of the following: security; human or international rights violations; criminality; organized criminality; health
grounds; financial reasons; misrepresentation; non-compliance with the IRPA; or having an inadmissible family
member.
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3. Both systems, at their core, are systems of inclusion and exclusion. They create
“insiders” and “outsiders,” determining if, how, and when, a person will be
included as part of society. That said, when policymakers seek to entrench
barriers for immigrants to attain citizenship or membership in society, it is
convenient for them to draw upon another area of law that is also designed to
exclude. 260
Bringing immigration detainees into the domain of the criminal justice system through
correctional facilities – co-mingling them with the criminal population often without any
distinction – squarely exemplifies this crimmigration trend. Criminal law practices are
infused into the immigration system, and migrants are increasingly criminalized. 261 Insofar
as immigration detainees are affected by solitary confinement in jails and in immigration
holding centres, I recognize the links that my research topic has with the “crimmigration”
trend – the nexus between criminal law and immigration law in policy-making and State
practices. Further, the use of solitary confinement – a practice born out of corrections
institutions – in immigration holding centres also demonstrates a reciprocal influence of
the immigration and criminal justice systems, to the disadvantage of migrants to Canada.
The criminalization of immigration detainees in these ways among others enables the State

260 Aldana et al, supra note 257 at 321. For example, non-citizens who have been convicted of a crime and sentenced
to six months of imprisonment or more will be deported without access to an appeal process. This is true, even for
an individual who immigrated to Canada at a young age, grew up and became acclimatized in Canada, have
possibly diminished or non-existent social ties to the country they emigrated from, but never applied for Canadian
citizenship. Antony et al, supra note 248 at 82.
261 Dawson, supra note 131 at 833. According to Koskie Minsky LLP’s website: “Koskie Minsky LLP and Henein
Hutchison LLP have commenced a class action against the Government of Canada and the Province of Ontario
alleging human rights violations relating to the treatment of immigrant detainees in Ontario’s prisons. The
statement of claim issued on August 11, 2016 alleges, among other things, that the Canada Border Services
Agency and the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services have been negligent, have
breached their fiduciary duties and have breached the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in incarcerating
immigrant detainees in Ontario’s correctional facilities.” Koskie Minsky LLP, “Immigrant Detainee Class Action”
(2015) online:<kmlaw.ca/cases/immigrant-detainee-class-action/>. As of November 27, 2017, a certification of the
class of immigration detainees, who will be the plaintiffs, has successfully been ordered by the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice. Ibid. For more information, see Dadzie v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, 2017 ONSC
7101.
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to exclude these detainees from participation in the general Canadian public, and to
determine when and under what circumstances these detainees may integrate with society.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT – WHAT’S
THE HARM IN IT?
If you know you are going to spend a long time in the hole and you keep on hoping
that you will get out and keep thinking about what you are missing, it slowly drives
you mad. Alternatively, it makes you so angry and desperate that you either run
into problems with the guards or you take it out on yourself, which is what I used
to do by slashing up. Now what I do is to withdraw from the world as you know
it, so that the world is like wrapped in a fog, you can't see it and so you forget
about it. Then it becomes possible to do the time because the world really stops.
- Mr. Donnie Oag, recounting his experience of 1,000 days in solitary
confinement 262
In line with the prison abolition ethic, it’s important to raise awareness to the Statesanctioned harm that is inflicted when isolating immigration detainees and criminal
inmates, to help establish why the State should no longer play a part in this practice.
Solitary confinement has become a normalized part of prison life, even though it entails
heightened levels of violence and dehumanization, and has been described by a growing
body of critics and survivors as a form of torture. 263 A Senator from the United States, John
McCain, articulated the experience as such: “It crushes your spirit and weakens your
resistance more effectively than any other form of mistreatment.” 264 This is a particularly
powerful statement comparing forms of suffering, since Senator McCain was a prisoner of
war in Vietnam and “was beaten regularly; denied adequate medical treatment for two
broken arms, a broken leg, and chronic dysentery; and tortured to the point of having an
arm broken again”. 265
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The immediate consequence of solitary confinement is that an inmate is denied
meaningful human contact except through a food slot built into the cell door. 266 This
deprivation of social contact is the source of the greatest psychological pain for isolated
inmates. 267 The harmful effects of sensory deprivation can develop as quickly as 48 hours,
altering brain activity. 268 Studies on the effects of solitary confinement mention the
following as the potential adverse effects to the psychological, social, and spiritual health
of inmates after extended periods of time: delirium, psychosis, major depression,
hallucinations, paranoia, aggression, rage, loss of appetite, self-harm, disruption of sleep
patterns. 269 Psychiatrist, Dr. Stuart Grassian was featured in the recent decision of BCCLA
v Canada describing the effects of solitary confinement, and he is also featured in Professor
Allegra McLeod’s article on prison abolition ethic. Dr. Grassian has conducted research on
the effects of solitary confinement both in Canada and America, and shared additional
effects from his research. Inmates can also develop hypersensitivity to external stimuli, 270
panic attacks, difficulty with thinking or concentration or memory, intensive obsessional

266 Kevin Griffin, “Aboriginal woman settles lawsuit that claimed she was treated inhumanely in B.C. jail” Vancouver
Sun (22 May 2013) online: <www.vancouversun.com> [Griffin].
267 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 185.
268 CCLA v The Queen, supra note 148 at paras 123, 126. The College of Family Physicians of Canada also concluded
that solitary confinement can alter brain activity and result in symptoms within days. Ibid at para 126.
269 Piché & Major, supra note 5 at 24. BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at paras 160, 185. McLeod, supra note 57 at
1178. Canadian Civil Liberties Association, “Submission to the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional
Services Review of Segregation in Ontario Adult Correctional Facilities” (5 May 2016) online:
<ccla.org/cclanewsite/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2016-05-05-CCLA-Submission-re-MCSCS-SegregationReview.pdf> at 4 [CCLA “Submission”].
270 According to research conducted by Dr. Grassian, some inmates report a progressive inability to tolerate ordinary
stimuli. BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 165.
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thoughts, 271 overt paranoia, problems with impulse control, 272 and suicidal ideation and
behaviour 273.
Self-mutilation and suicide are more prevalent in solitary confinement, due to
environmental stresses: the isolation, punitive sanctions, and severely restrictive living
conditions related to their confinement. 274 Sadly, suicidal behaviours are often regarded by
correctional staff as a manipulative tactic of the inmate, and is met with punishment,
typically more administrative segregation. Ironically, segregation is the very thing that
encourages incidents of suicide attempts. 275 Inmates with mental health issues or a suicide
risk spend 30% more time in segregation than other inmates placed in segregation. 276
The reduced environmental stimulation and social isolation in solitary confinement
can be “strikingly toxic” to mental functioning, producing a stuporous condition associated
with perceptual and cognitive impairment and affective disturbances. 277 In more severe
cases, segregated inmates have developed florid delirium, a confusional psychosis with
intense agitation, fearfulness and disorganization.

278

Inmates who are more

psychologically resilient eventually suffer severe psychological pain, especially when
isolation is prolonged and/or the inmate views the isolation as an arbitrary exercise of
power and intimidation by staff. 279

271 Ibid. Dr. Grassian stated that some inmates report the emergence of primitive aggressive fantasies of revenge,
torture and mutilation of the prison guards. In each case the fantasies were described as entirely unwelcome,
frightening and uncontrollable.
272 Ibid. Dr. Grassian found that some inmates reported episodes of loss of impulse control with random violence,
such as throwing things around, “snap[ping] off the handle over absolutely nothing”, and even impulsive selfmutilation.
273 Ibid at para 185.
274 Ibid at para 186.
275 Piché & Major, supra note 5 at 15.
276 Ontario, Segregation in Ontario, supra note 107 at 100.
277 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 164.
278 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
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For women, the effects of solitary confinement may be compounded. 280 Female
inmates tend to experience their confinement as a form of rejection, abandonment,
invisibility, and a denial of their existence, which exacerbates any pre-existing distress
resulting from a history of trauma or abuse before becoming incarcerated. 281 Female
inmates report that they feel re-traumatized by their placement of solitary confinement,
which often involves violent extractions from their cells by male guards, strip searches
witnessed by male guards, and a lack of privacy going to the washroom while in solitary
confinement. These concerns are again compounded by disadvantages these women face
as inmates with mental illness, or with Indigenous or racialized ethnicities. The fact that
solitary confinement is disproportionately used on vulnerable (i.e., inmates with mental
health issues, Aboriginal inmates and other racialized inmates) is therefore especially
disturbing. 282 Sometimes women are incarcerated in a segregated maximum security unit
inside a men’s prison, reflecting a lack of State resources to incarcerate women, which
again, can disadvantage women greatly due to their often tumultuous backgrounds. 283
Detention subjects foreign nationals to ongoing risk of facing the harms of solitary
confinement. 284 Contrary to the general experience of the criminal custodial population,
immigration detainees usually cannot be certainty as to when their detention will end.
Anxiety over the outcome of their matters in the immigration system and the hardship of
detention has severe mental health effects on immigration detainees. 285 The uncertainty of
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when detention will end also exacerbates levels of stress, which trigger or worsen mental
health issues. This uncertainty is a serious problem; while some are detained for days,
weeks, or months, others are detained for many years. One male detainee, named Kashif
Ali, was released into society in Ontario after 7 years in detention, mainly in solitary
confinement. 286 Yet, Ali still has precarious immigration status. 287 Another male detainee,
named Michael Mvogo, was detained for 9 years, much of this time in solitary confinement,
before deportation from Canada. 288 Even while detained for much shorter periods of time,
foreign nationals, such as Lucia Vega Jimenez who was detained for a total of three weeks,
have been among the number of suicide deaths occurring in solitary confinement or
immigration holding cells.

289

For inmates who endure solitary confinement, the

psychological harm can eventually become a prolonged or permanent disability, greatly
affecting an inmate’s capacity to reintegrate with society after release. 290 When these
isolated inmates find themselves released into society, many are “mentally destroyed” and
“full of rage”. 291
This is a humble attempt to capture some of the harms produced by the experience
of solitary confinement carried out by the State.

286 Kate McGillivray, “Immigration detainee freed after being held in Canada for 7 years due to ‘legal limbo,’” CBC
News (1 May 2017) online: <www.cbc.ca>.
287 Ibid.
288 Nick Logan, “‘Man with no name’ detainee deported from Canada” Global News (25 August 2015) online:
<globalnews.ca>.
289 Andrea Woo, “Woman who died in CBSA custody feared returning to domestic trouble in Mexico” The Globe and
Mail (31 January 2014) online: <theglobeandmail.com>.
290 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 164.
291 McLeod, supra note 57 at 1179, n 95.
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CHAPTER NINE: WHY LITIGATION?
Solitary confinement does one thing: it breaks a person’s will to live... If
you’re not broken when they put you into a hole, you’re broken when they
take you out . . . It makes no sense to hurt people so badly that they can’t
function when they come out.
- Ms. BobbyLee Worm, survivor of the CSC Management Protocol 292

It is worthwhile to discuss why I would support litigating the legitimacy of solitary
confinement, as opposed to solely employing other methods of social change, such as
lobbying, public awareness campaigns, making a human rights complaint, entertaining
settlements or negotiations with the State regarding the use of the practice, and other means
of social justice advocacy. I will breakdown my explanation for this viewpoint into the
following sub-issues: (1) why all forms of solitary confinement, including administrative
segregation, disciplinary segregation, and the isolation or seclusion of individuals with
mental health issues, need to be abolished; (2) the corporate culture in corrections that is
resistant to change; (3) the lack of public support to lobby or campaign against solitary
confinement; (4) the failings of a settlement for a human rights complaint launched by
Christina Jahn, who was isolated in an Ontario provincial jail; (5) the settlement failings of
a Charter and tortious legal action launched by BobbyLee Worm, who was isolated in a
federal prison; and (6) why launching a human rights complaint to a tribunal would not
provide a satisfactory result.
Ultimately, what I intend to do with each of these sub-issues is support the
argument that seeking a court order that abolishes the practice of solitary confinement will

292 Griffin, supra note 266.

Cracking Down on Cages | 74

provide stronger authority to establish constitutional protections as well as enforce humane
treatment for inmates. Further, litigation using an anti-carceral or prison abolition ethic,
offers the benefit of a forum – the courtroom – where the imbalance of power between the
State, who jails, and the inmates and detainees, who are jailed, is diminished; the Stateperpetrated harm can be displayed in a public fashion; and the adversarial process enables
an opportunity to put the State to task in justifying such a destructive practice.

Abolishing All Forms of Isolation
All forms of solitary confinement must be abolished. The safety and well-being of
the most vulnerable in prisons and jails are overwhelmingly at stake. Regarding the
provincial correctional system, the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) expressed
concerns regarding the rights of prisoners held in segregation. More specifically, the
OHRC stated that segregation “is disproportionately used on, and has particularly harmful
effects for, Code-protected groups such as Black and Indigenous prisoners, prisoners with
mental health disabilities, and women”. 293 Similar concerns have also been raised by the
Ontario Ombudsman and the OCI. 294 The Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC)
disapproves the use of solitary confinement on mentally ill inmates in particular, 295 to the
extent where the CHRC Chief Commissioner has recently called for a complete end to all
solitary confinement in federal prisons. 296 Former Supreme Court Justice, Louise Arbour,

293 Larocque, supra note 127 at 14.
294 Ibid.
295 Canadian Human Rights Commission, “Solitary confinement violates human rights of the mentally ill: CHRC”
Cision Newswire (12 December 2014) online: <www.newswire.ca>.
296 Marie-Claude Landry, “We Must Put An End To The Use Of Solitary Confinement in Federal Prisons” The
Huffington Post (16 January 2017) online:<huffingtonpost.ca>.
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who was commissioned in the widely influential Prison For Women inquiry in 1996, has
more recently expressed disapproval of the manner in which solitary confinement is
utilized in prisons and jails, in light of the deaths occurring in solitary confinement and
coroner’s inquests that fail to compel the State to meaningfully change its ways. 297 Support
for the abolition of solitary confinement is on the rise.
The practice of administrative segregation is wreaking havoc on the prison and jail
populations. Called the “steel-door solution” by some critics, administrative segregation is
used to separate, punish and deal with the most difficult and vulnerable prisoners. 298
Among federal prisons, inmates who have been identified in their correctional plans as
having mental health issues are 63.2% more likely to have been placed segregation than
those without mental health issues at a 48% likelihood. 299 The OCI also reported that
administrative segregation is commonly used to manage mentally ill inmates, self-injurious
inmates, and inmates at risk of suicide. 300 Over 85% of federal inmates with a history of
self-injury have been subjected to segregation. 301 As explained by expert witnesses, the
greater vulnerability of mentally ill inmates when placed in stressful, traumatic conditions,
such as segregation, the greater the risk of harm that they face.

297 The House, “Former Supreme Court Justice Louise Arbour argues that it's time to reconsider the practice of
solitary confinement” (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 9 July 2016) online:
<www.lib.uwo.ca/cgibin/ezpauthn.cgi?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1802673522?accountid=15115>
[The House].
298 Larocque, supra note 127 at 14.
299 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 493.
300 Ibid at para 494.
301 Ibid.
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Inmates with mental health issues should not be incarcerated where they will face
the high likelihood of isolation in conditions that will only exacerbate mental illness. 302 As
the CHRC endorses, inmates with mental illnesses should instead be placed in a treatment
facility or a hospital where they can receive the appropriate, much-needed healthcare. The
status of a mental disability means that these inmates have an entitlement to
accommodations for their specific needs.
Aboriginal inmates were disproportionately impacted as rates of their placement in
segregation increased by 31% between 2005 and 2015, while rates of non-Aboriginal
inmates being placed in segregation increased only by 1.9% in the same period. 303 Among
the Aboriginal prison population, while Aboriginal women make up a very low proportion,
they comprise of 50% of segregation placements, and hence, are greatly overrepresented. 304 Aboriginal inmates also remain in segregation for longer periods on
average compared to Black and Caucasian inmates. 305 Despite a tumultuous social history,
which should encourage CSC to make conscious efforts to alleviate the systemic
disadvantages Aboriginal inmates face, CSC has been poor at acknowledging and
documenting the ways they consider this social history and its impact on Aboriginal
inmates who become segregated. 306 Culture-sensitive programming for inmates is lacking,

302 Canadian Human Rights Commission, “Treat people with serious mental disabilities in hospitals, not jails: CHRC”
Cision Newswire (19 December 2013) online: <www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/treat-people-with-seriousmental-disabilities-in-hospitals-not-jails-chrc-236605441.html>.
303 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 467.
304 Ibid at para 470.
305 Ibid at para 468.
306 Ibid at paras 478-481.
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particularly for Aboriginal inmates, and this contributes to instances of violence and
behavioural challenges that lead to segregation placements. 307
Additional problems arise with the practice of administrative segregation among
the Ontario provincial system. Staff of the Ontario Ministry struggles greatly to accurately
track its segregation placements and to clearly understand what conditions count as
segregation under the governing regulations and what do not. 308 A 2016 report by the
Ontario Ombudsman uncovered that on many occasions, inaccurate and inconsistent
information was used to justify and explain lengthy placements of segregation for
vulnerable inmates. Moreover, there were many superficial and inadequate review
exercises carried out without meaningful assessment of the circumstances of each
inmate. 309 One Ministry official was quoted as saying: “We probably tracked livestock
better than we do human beings.” 310
Interestingly, disciplinary segregation tends not to be the focus of debate or
litigation regarding solitary confinement, which reveals how the carceral logic prevails and
retributivist assumptions remain unquestioned, even among those who profess themselves
to be prisoner advocates. Michael Jackson, a law professor at University of British
Columbia, poignantly remarks that trends in “the practices around solitary confinement are
a litmus test of the legitimacy of state punishment.” 311 In that vein, I argue that it is
important to consider how disciplinary segregation is administered by the State and discuss
whether this specific practice represents legitimate State punishment.
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Generally, courts seem to be satisfied with allowing the practice of disciplinary
segregation, because there are legally prescribed limitations for the duration of isolation,
compared to administrative segregation, which courts admonish as a practice whose
relevant provisions enable prolonged solitary confinement. 312 Moreover, disciplinary
segregation already includes a level of independent oversight and procedural protections
for inmates that administrative segregation is lacking. 313 In fact, much of the controversy
associated with disciplinary segregation among courts and prison reformers has been how
it ultimately affects numbers of administrative segregation placements. As remarked by the
British Columbia Supreme Court, the OCI noted in its 2014-2015 Annual Report on federal
corrections that one alarming aspect to the use of administrative segregation, is that it is
“used as a punitive measure to circumvent the more onerous due process requirements of
the disciplinary segregation system”. 314 During the reporting period, there were 209
placements in disciplinary segregation, which accounted for 2.5% of the total segregation
placements in federal prisons.

315

Meanwhile, there were 8,309 placements in

administrative segregation. 316 The OCI found that the cumbersome procedural safeguards
for placements in disciplinary segregation explained the significant discrepancy in
numbers. 317
However, even disciplinary segregation has shown to be a problematic practice.
Black inmates are consistently over-represented in placements for disciplinary and

312 CCLA v The Queen, supra note 148 at para 5.
313 Debra Parkes, “Ontario solitary confinement ruling hardly counts as a victory” The Globe and Mail (19 December
2017) online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>.
314 2014-2015 Annual Report, supra note 126 at 30. BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 95.
315 Ibid.
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involuntary segregation. 318 It has been reported concerning Black women inmates that they
are held against a different standard compared to Caucasian women inmates in prison; for
example, a Caucasian woman received 24 hours in segregation for the same action that
resulted in a Black woman being segregated for three weeks. 319 This is contextualized by
other challenges that Black inmates face, including poorer outcomes on other important
correctional indicators (i.e., classifications to maximum security; use of force incidents by
correctional staff; and being labelled as gang affiliated). 320 Segregation can only be used
as a last resort and for as short a period as possible. It has become a standard tool of
population management to maintain the safety and security of the institution; however, this
approach may be disproportionately impacting Black inmates. 321

Lobbying and Campaigning Against Solitary Confinement
Lobbying or launching public awareness campaigns to end the practice of solitary
confinement may be more financially feasible and easier means of social justice advocacy
that be employed against this State practice. However, they should not be employed just
on their own. Even among Canada, retributivist values are strongly rooted in society, which
is demonstrated by the State’s large financial investment in criminal justice administration.
There is not very much widespread desire among the public to show concern for the

318 Canada, Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2012-2013 of the Office of the Correctional
Investigator, (Ottawa: OCI, 2013) at 7, 10 [2012-2013 Annual Report]. Jackson, supra note 78 at paras 53-54.
319 Canadian Human Rights Commission, “Protecting Their Rights: A Systemic Review of Human Rights in
Correctional Services for Federally Sentenced Women” (December 2003) online: <www.chrcccdp.gc.ca/eng/content/protecting-their-rights-systemic-review-human-rights-correctional-services-federally>
[CHRC, “Protecting”].
320 Jackson, supra note 78 at para 54.
321 Office of the Correctional Investigator, “A Case Study of Diversity in Corrections: The Black Inmate Experience
in Federal Penitentiaries Final Report” (28 February 2014) online: <www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/oth-aut/othaut20131126-eng.aspx>.
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treatment of prisoners. And the public will less likely feel compelled to urge their elected
representatives to reconsider this State practice, as compared to other policy issues that
may directly affect their lives (i.e., healthcare, education, labour and employment), for
which they are more likely to demand political response.

A Corporate Culture Resistant to Change
Senior officials and policymakers may be motivated to change policies around how
segregation is practised. However, this in itself is an obstacle to achieve due to the
persistent lack of recognition and cooperation displayed by the State regarding rather basic
issues, such as acknowledging that segregation is a form of solitary confinement according
to international standards. But, even if senior officials and policymakers make the required
acknowledgements and policy changes, another obstacle lies in the corporate culture that
exists among correctional front-line staff, which will likely undermine these policy changes.
Correctional institutions are closed spaces and they lack the transparency that is conducive
for accountability. 322 This lack of transparency is especially true for the Ontario provincial
system, as it is not as closely monitored as the federal system is through legally-prescribed
yearly reporting by the OCI watchdog. 323 Lisa Kerr, a law professor at Queen's University,
stated, “jails are among ‘the least-scrutinized institutions in our society’ and too often use
solitary confinement as a tool to manage prisoners.” Professor Debra Parkes, who writes
on carceral logic and prison abolitionist lawyering, commented that “Bringing a case to
court — which can be costly or out of reach for many inmates — is often the only effective

322 Parkes, “Solitary”, supra note 62 at 177.
323 See CCRA, supra note 181, Part III, titled “Correctional Investigator”.
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way to compel documents and information from the system.” 324 Correctional institutions
are also described as the antithesis of fundamental values, including liberty and human
dignity. 325
While policymakers declare strong commitments to upholding human rights and
the rule of law, frequent instances of grave abuses and violations persist. The Ontario
Ombudsman receives 4,000 complaints every year concerning correctional matters. 326
During the 2014-2015 fiscal year, the Ontario Ombudsman noted a significant increase in
segregation-related complaints, including one where an inmate was kept in solitary
confinement for over three years, and was only released to join the rest of the jail population
after the Ontario Ombudsman intervened in the matter. 327
The culture of abuse and non-compliance among correctional staff has historically
been a problem in Canada, lagging progress for both the provincial and federal correctional
systems. This is demonstrated by recurring litigation over the manner in which solitary
confinement is implemented against inmates and the numerous reports that have studied
the trends regarding this State practice. 328 Recurrent recommendations calling for reform
are ignored, reaffirming the Government’s poor reputation for human rights compliance in

324 Lucas Powers, “Solitary confinement reform in Canadian jails hindered by secretive system” CBC News (3 March
2016), online:<www.cbc.ca>.
325 Parkes, “Prisoner’s Charter?”, supra note 219 at 675.
326 Ontario Ombudsman, “Segregation”, supra note 159 at 2, 10.
327 Ibid.
328 An early example of a case constitutionally challenging the practice of solitary confinement and manner in which
it is implemented is McCann et al v The Queen et al, [1976] 1 FC 570 (TD). In this case, the Federal Court
recognized that the conditions of isolation that the Plaintiffs were subjected to amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment, yet the Court did not determine it was necessary to impose due process requirements in decisions to
isolate prisoners. An early example of a report that was commissioned to study trends in the use of solitary
confinement (specifically, dissociation) is Solicitor General of Canada, Report of the Study Group on Dissociation,
(Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1975). This report was released several months after the
McCann decision was released by the Federal Court, and the report recommended that decisions to isolate
prisoners should be overseen by review boards chaired by the Warden at every correctional institution to review
administrative segregation placements at fixed intervals. BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 30.
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the correctional system. 329 This feeds a dangerous and dysfunctional correctional culture
which produces a perpetual risk of harm to inmates, as a result of a stark power imbalance
between the jailers and the jailed. 330 This corporate culture also means that correctional
staff, who dare to report the misconduct and abuses of fellow correctional staff – and
therefore break the unofficial code of silence – become social pariahs. 331 Staff who report
others are subjected to verbal abuse and harassment at work. 332 They are called “rats”. 333
And they face risks to their personal safety while interacting with the prisoners at the
correctional facilities. One correctional officer in the provincial correctional system
disclosed to the Ontario Ombudsman that in response to her involvement in disclosing the
misconduct of her peers, she would be left to her own devices without backup. When she
requested for assistance, she would sometimes be ignored by her colleagues. 334 The work
environment becomes intolerable for many employees and they choose to leave their
jobs. 335 As a result, correctional staff are conditioned to follow this unofficial code of
silence. 336 The corporate culture emboldens and insulates staff who engage in rogue acts

329 Parkes, “Solitary”, supra note 62 at 177. For example, the Canadian Human Rights Commission, Justice Louise
Arbour’s report recommended judicial supervision and reviews of segregation decisions by an independent
adjudicator. Arbour Report, supra note 185 at 255-256. These same recommendations were echoed by
Correctional Service Canada’s own Task Force on Administrative Segregation and the Office of the Correctional
Investigator. However, no reasonable efforts have been made to follow these recommendations or to reform the
practice of solitary confinement in a way that addresses the particular needs of female inmates. CHRC,
“Protecting”, supra note 319 at 45.
330 For more information see Ontario Ombudsman, “‘The Code’: Investigation into the Ministry of Community Safety
and Correctional Services’ response to allegations of excessive use of force against inmates” (June 2013) at 9
[Ontario Ombudsman, “The Code”].
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333 Ibid at 47.
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335 Ibid.
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of violence against inmates with the help of others to conspire to lie or destroy or falsify
records. And incidents of brutalized inmates occur time and again. 337
Justice Louise Arbour, for instance, commented on this over 20 years ago when she
investigated the violent strip searches and cell extractions conducted by male guards on
eight female inmates in Kingston, Ontario’s federal Prison for Women. 338 She stated these
grave incidents that were “symptomatic of a culture that did not respect the rule of law” as
opposed to “individual examples of a failure to respect the law”. She also stated the
following:
. . . significantly in my view, when the departures from legal requirements in
this case became known through this inquiry’s process, their importance was
downplayed and the overriding public security concern was always relied upon
when lack of compliance had to be admitted. This was true to the higher ranks
of the Correctional Service management, which leads me to believe that the lack
of observance of individual rights is not an isolated factor applicable only to the
Prison for Women, but is probably very much part of CSC’s corporate
culture. 339

On the issue of non-compliance under the CCRA and the abuse of administrative
segregation, Michael Jackson, a law professor at University of British Columbia, asserts
that these problems are attributed to three things: (1) the legislation itself; (2) the manner
in which correctional staff administer the legislation; and (3) a lack of effective
enforcement of the legislation. 340 The judiciary, the Office of the Correctional Investigator,
and other reform-oriented critics seem to have tremendous faith in the Government’s

337 Ibid.
338 Soon after the Arbour inquiry, the Prison for Women in Kingston, Ontario, was permanently closed down in 2000.
Correctional Service Canada, “The Closing of the Prison for Women in Kingston July 6, 2000” (6 March 2008)
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willingness to change. Time after time, they produce lengthy legal decisions,
recommendations, and arguments on how to make solitary confinement more tolerable
through reform-based safeguards against extreme degrees of deprivation. 341 Regrettably,
this has all proven to make little difference. Ridding the practice of solitary confinement
altogether removes the opportunity for correctional staff, management, or policymakers to
rely on excuses for failing to follow reform-based safeguards that were hard fought through
constitutional litigation and strenuously advocated by reformists. Ridding the practice is
also the better way to recognize and redress the racial discrimination, dehumanization, and
disadvantage that this practice causes.

Why the Jahn settlement with the Ontario government was, and still is, ineffective
The story and legal settlement arising from the human rights complaint of Christina
Jahn is instructive for why litigation is appropriate. In 2012, Jahn filed a human rights
complaint against the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services for
discriminating against her on the ground of disability by holding her in segregation for over
200 days at the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre, rather than providing her the treatment
she needed for her mental health issues. 342 At the time of the complaint, Jahn suffered from
mental health issues, addictions, and cancer. 343

341 Some legal scholars perceive the correctional system as not being receptive of judicial admonitions addressing
instances of abuse of discretion and a persistent contempt for inmate rights. Jackson, “Justice”, supra note 151 at
374.
342 Ontario, Segregation in Ontario, supra note 107 at 53. Public Interest Remedies: Schedule “A” In the matter of
Christine Nadine Jahn v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as represented by the Minister of Community
Safety and Correctional Services before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (24 September 2013) online:
<www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/Jahn%20Schedule%20A_accessible.pdf>. [Jahn Public Interest Remedies].
343 Ontario, Segregation in Ontario, supra note 107 at 53.
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In September 2013, a settlement was reached between the Ministry, 42-year-old
Christina Jahn, and the Ontario Human Rights Commission.344 The Ministry committed to
providing Jahn with compensation, but the settlement also included 10 public interest
remedies that the Ministry agreed to implement to improve segregation practices involving
inmates with mental health issues. 345 Further, the settlement included commitments to
introduce mental health screenings, and to study improvements in mental health services
at correctional facilities with female inmates. 346 Deadlines were included in the settlement
and were monitored by the Ontario Human Rights Commission.347
Deadlines were not met. This was partly because the timelines to achieve certain
policy changes were overly ambitious and there was lack of coordination on the part of the
Ministry to bring together a team to start working on implementing the commitments made
in the settlement. 348 This led to a Contravention of Settlement application for failing to
distribute information about inmates’ rights while in segregation. This was ultimately
settled, as well. 349 Eventually, as a result of the settlement, the Ministry created a revised
version of policy, which was released on September 24, 2015. 350 Pursuant to the Ontario
Human Rights Code, 351 the revised policy focuses on the Ministry’s duty to accommodate
inmates with mental health issues to the point of undue hardship. 352 Regarding the Jahn
settlement, the Ontario Ombudsman stated that it will be difficult for the Ministry to
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implement its recent amendments to policy on segregation, since the Ministry has failed to
implement simpler procedural requirements under previous policy. 353 Indeed, the Ministry
has still not followed through with all the commitments it made during settlement and,
according to the Independent Review of Ontario Corrections, policies around mental health
services for inmates have not been sufficiently updated. 354 The status quo effectively
remains unchallenged for inmates with mental health issues, and they remain extremely
vulnerable.

Why the Worm settlement with the federal government didn’t help either
BobbyLee Worm, a Cree woman from Saskatchewan, was 19-years-old when she
was sentenced to 6 years and 4 months of imprisonment, as a first-time offender, for
offences that included robbery. 355 She was first admitted to Edmonton Institution for
Women in Alberta, but was later transferred to Fraser Valley Institution for Women in
British Columbia. 356 Like many Indigenous women caught in the criminal justice system,
prior to incarceration, Worm had a troubled background, consisting of trauma and abuse. 357
Many of her family relatives had attended residential schools. During her childhood and
adolescence, she suffered extreme physical, emotional and sexual abuse. Her past led her
to develop Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and depression, which both required
close monitoring and ongoing treatment. 358 Worm started using drugs and became addicted

353 Ibid at 13.
354 Ontario, Segregation in Ontario, supra note 107 at 54-55.
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at a young age, but by the time of the legal action, she accomplished three years of
institutional sobriety. 359
While Worm was incarcerated at Fraser Valley Institution, she was subjected to a
policy regime – not legally prescribed – that began in 2005, called the “Management
Protocol”. 360 The CSC created this regime to strategize how the Warden would handle
female prisoners who were deemed as high risk. 361 This practice features prolonged and
indefinite administrative segregation with three phases, which CSC indicated should take
a minimum of six months before an inmate returns to general population. 362 Depending on
the inmate’s conduct, the inmate would be subject to different levels of physical liberty and
access to prison services or programming – graduating to a less restrictive phase of the
Protocol for ill-defined ‘good behaviour’ and regressing to a more restrictive phase for bad
behaviour, which could include something as minor as swearing or being disrespectful to
staff. 363 Women in the most restrictive phases had no contact with other inmates, often for
many months at a time. Regardless of the phase, life for women subjected to the Protocol
was extremely structured and regulated, and a judicial officer did not review these
placements. 364 The Protocol itself stirred up aggressive and anti-social behaviours due to
the harmful physical, psychological, and social effects of solitary confinement. 365 Due to
the zero-tolerance model of this regime that punished a broadly-defined concept of
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aggressive behaviour, it was very difficult for a woman to earn their way out of the
Management Protocol and return to the general prison population. 366 Affected women
could also return to segregation for actions that would not warrant segregation if they were
in the general prison population. 367
Worm was deemed as one of the small number of "difficult to manage", mostly
Indigenous, women prisoners subjected to this prolonged segregation. 368 Following several
fights with other prisoners, Worm spent three-and-a-half years, the majority of her sentence,
in solitary confinement, which included two instances of segregation for almost a year. 369
She was denied access to programs, treatment for her pre-existing PTSD, Aboriginal
spiritual services, and basic legislative protections.

370

She suffered considerable

psychological and emotion harm.
In 2011, Worm sued for damages arguing that staff at Fraser Valley Institution, who
subjected her to this regime, did so without lawful authority and without due regard to the
harm Worm would suffer as a result. 371 She argued that although the staff owed her a duty
of care, they breached the expected standard of care, and therefore, were negligent. 372 She
also sought a declaration that CCRA sections 31, 32, and 33 enabling indefinite
administrative segregation, and the policy authorizing the Management Protocol, are of no
force and effect under Constitution Act, 1982, section 52 due to violations against Charter
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sections 7 and 12. 373 By the time Worm commenced the legal action, she was 24-years-old.
In 2013, the CSC settled the lawsuit with Worm. While the settlement led to the formal
abolition of the Management Protocol, prolonged solitary confinement continues for
female prisoners under new policies and procedures. 374
What the Jahn and Worm settlements reveal is that, relative to a settlement, a court
order recognizing the practice of solitary confinement as a discriminatory practice provides
stronger authority to provide constitutional protection and enforce humane treatment of
inmates.

Why not go to a Human Rights Tribunal?
The available remedies within the human rights legal framework have a
determining factor on whether it is worthwhile to undergo the process of the Ontario
Human Rights Tribunal or Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. The remedies also determine
whether the discriminatory way solitary confinement is used can be avoided in the future.
In line with the compensatory focus of human rights legislation, under the Ontario Code,
an inmate in the provincial correctional system (i.e., immigration detainee or inmate in
criminal custody) could potentially receive damages to remedy injuries to one’s dignity,
feelings and self-respect from the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional
Services. 375 An immigration detainee could obtain similar remedies at the Canadian
Human Rights Tribunal.

373 Ibid at para 29.
374 Parkes, “Solitary”, supra note 62 at 172.
375 Ontario Code, supra note 351, ss 34 and 45.2(1).
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The Federal Tribunal can order Canada Border Services Agency to cease its
discriminatory practice and take measures to prevent future discriminatory practices from
happening. 376 Further, the federal tribunal could compensate an immigration detainee up
to $20,000 for any pain and suffering experienced as a result of the discrimination. Further
still, the federal tribunal could compensate an immigration detainee up to $20,000 for
discrimination that was wilful or reckless. 377
The Ontario Tribunal could also order the Ministry to do anything that, in the
opinion of the Tribunal, the Ministry ought to do to comply with the Ontario Code. 378 This
remedy can address future practices, even if such an order was not requested, 379 and this
remedial power serves to ensure that the Ontario Code’s systemic public interest objectives
are achieved.

380

Public interest remedies, aim to promote greater awareness to

discrimination and can include orders for creating non-discriminatory policies and
procedures, internal human rights complaint procedures, and education and training
programs. An immigration detainee could obtain similar remedies at the Canadian Human
Rights Tribunal. 381
Regarding public interest remedies, as indicated from the Jahn settlement and
independent reports on the correctional corporate culture, this will not likely reform the
status quo of placing seriously vulnerable individuals in solitary confinement. The lack of
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compliance with the Jahn public interest remedies also demonstrates that the Government
generally does not take human rights cases – and the anti-discrimination principles they try
to achieve – seriously. In addition, while pursuing a human rights complaint may be useful
for seeking damages that can help an inmate who experienced discrimination based on
disability, for example, seek counselling and psychiatric treatment, the result is primarily
that only one individual benefits from making the human rights complaint, usually through
compensation. Abolishing solitary confinement is the desired result, and I would contend
that a constitutional case, would be more effective at achieving this desired result. Due to
the principle of constitutional supremacy, which is embodied and protected under
Constitution Act, 1982, subsection 52(1), in constitutional cases, the foremost objective is
on comporting federal and provincial statutes, regulations, and policies with the Canadian
Constitution, 382 rather than compensating a complainant, and figuratively throwing money
at a problem that really needs to be eradicated.

382 Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 4th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2009) at
374 [Sharpe & Roach].
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CHAPTER TEN: JUSTIFYING THE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
I think the thing to remember is that a sentence of imprisonment, the
punishment is the depravation of liberty, it's not an opportunity for further
abuse, that's not the point of imprisonment.
- Former Canadian Supreme Court Justice, Louise Arbour 383

As discussed earlier, prison abolition ethic is motivated by fully unearthing the
State-sanctioned dehumanization, violence, and racial degradation that gave birth to, and
is perpetuated by, incarceration practices and punitive policing measures, such as solitary
confinement. 384 The historical and ongoing discriminatory force of the justice system
against already vulnerable persons is a fundamental concern of abolitionists. Accordingly,
I argued that legal principles of Charter section 15 most closely aligns with the abolitionist
perspective compared to any other legal tool at one’s disposal to officially abolish the
practice of solitary confinement. However, compared to other Charter provisions that have
been relied upon to advocate for the interests of the incarcerated (i.e., sections 7 and 12),
subsection 15(1) is the more unconventional basis to litigate the constitutionality of solitary
confinement practices. In this Chapter, I wish to argue why Charter subsection 15(1) is the
most appropriate constitutional right to effectively challenge carceral logics as a prisoner
advocate and to advance the prison abolitionist vision for how we deal with crime.
I aim to do this by discussing the protections provided by subsection 15(1);
explaining why it is worthwhile to use the Charter as the means to achieve the abolition of
solitary confinement by commenting on the history of Charter litigation regarding this
practice; offering a critique of the most recent decisions on solitary confinement –

383 [sic]. The House, supra note 297.
384 McLeod, supra note 57 at 1172.
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specifically, administrative segregation – that have been released by the courts to date;
articulating what I believe are the benefits of advancing a discrimination claim; and finally,
arguing why a multi-ground of discrimination framework should be employed for the
Charter challenge.

The Statutory Interpretation of Subsection 15(1) of the Charter
Subsection 15(1) of the Charter states as follows:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
Section 15 involves the two-step analysis of proving, firstly, that a law, in its purpose or
effect, creates a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground, and secondly,
that the impugned law creates a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping. 385
The Supreme Court of Canada provides a definition for understanding what
“discrimination” means under the Charter in the decision, Andrews v Law Society of British
Columbia, which still resonates today. 386 Justice McIntyre says the following in Andrews:
I would say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether
intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of
the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations,
or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or
which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages
available to other members of society. 387

385 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at paras 452-453. R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 at paras 17, [2008] 2 SCR 483
[Kapp].
386 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 [Andrews].
387 Kapp, supra note 385 at paras 16, 18.
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To combat discrimination, the Supreme Court explains that section 15 is intended to
promote substantial equality, as opposed to formal equality. 388 Formal equality refers to an
understanding of equality commonly associated with the “similarly situated” test, which is
akin to the American equal protection jurisprudence and is also rooted in Aristotle’s
philosophical view that “things that are alike should be treated alike”. 389 In determining
similarities or differences, some criterion is used, which tends to be the purpose of the rule,
policy, or law in place. The focus of formal equality becomes an individual’s situation, and
the relevance his or her personal characteristics at issue to the purpose of the challenged
rule, policy, or law. 390 Critique of the similarly situated test highlighted that the test was
inherently unreliable since the exercise of determining the purpose is uncertain and subject
to manipulation, defining a purpose too narrowly and uncritically, and rendering a personal
characteristic irrelevant in a discrimination case. Further, the test provides no guidance for
determining that a certain legislative purpose is discriminatory. 391 Substantive equality, by
contrast focuses on the impact of laws on members of groups subject to stereotyping and
historic disadvantage. 392 Substantial equality fundamentally endorses the view that the
work of promoting equality involves promoting a society in which everyone can feel secure
in knowing that, under the law, they are recognized as human beings who are equally
deserving of concern, respect, and consideration. 393

388
389
390
391
392
393

Ibid at para 15. Andrews, supra note 386 at 171.
Sharpe & Roach, supra note 382 at 312.
Ibid.
Ibid at 312-313
Ibid at 313.
Andrews, supra note 386 at 171.

Cracking Down on Cages | 95

On the History of Litigating Solitary Confinement: Why bother with the Charter then?
Interestingly, Professor Michael Jackson articulates that the major benefit of the
enactment of the Charter, as it pertains to prisoners, is not the litigation that it encourages,
but rather “the climate and culture of respect” that the Charter produces among both
governments and citizens for fundamental human rights and freedoms. 394 When the
Charter was enacted in 1982, one would have reasonably thought that prisoners would
substantially benefit, as it was difficult to conceive of a class of vulnerable people subjected
to the most extreme level of State control in a society of majoritarian indifference. 395 The
incident where female prisoners at the Prison for Women, were strip-searched by male
correctional officers and illegally detained in segregation for many months exemplified the
culture of abusive power that prison advocates were hopeful that the Charter would
address. 396 Moreover, historically, inmates were treated as people without any rights. 397 In
effect, they were sentenced to a “civil death” as they lost all civil and property rights, and
this phenomenon continued until the practice of the “civil death” was abolished by British
legislation in the late 1800s. Still, throughout the 1900s, leading up to the Charter, the
legislature and judiciary adopted a “hands off” doctrine that allowed a broad delegation of
administrative power to correctional officials, a lack of an interventionist approach, and a
deference to these officers’ judgment in their treatment of the inmates. 398
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The enactment of the Charter encouraged Canadians to envision a liberal, human
rights-focused nation. 399 The media reported a narrative that Canada's new human rights
approach led the nation to become “soft on crime”. 400 This ignited a public sentiment of
“new punitiveness”, countering the emergence of the human rights era, and the public
endorsed criminal justice measures, such as longer sentences, “no frills” imprisonment,
shaming, and “three strikes” laws. 401 But prisoners and their allies were before courts in a
few instances to fight for their rights. 402 A small number of Charter claims were
successful. 403 The most significant of these successful cases, with the exception of prisoner
voting rights, 404 focused on affording prisoners more procedural rights under Charter
section 7, rather than substantive rights for prisoners to increase their residual liberty
interests. 405
The Charter section 12 right against cruel and unusual punishment or treatment
may naturally give the impression of being the ideal provision for challenging the practice
of solitary confinement. 406 This is especially because the international community,
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including Canada, determined that 15 continuous days of isolation is torture under the
Mandela Rules. The legal test for a violation of section 12 is that a treatment or punishment
must be “so excessive as to outrage the standards of decency”. This has proven very
difficult for prisoners to establish. 407 I would argue that the wording of this test encourages
courts to hold unnecessarily high expectations for what will cross the line as excessive
mistreatment of inmates, because of the prevailing carceral logic. Thus, this legal test
enables courts to dismiss complaints against State conduct that is nevertheless abusive,
oppressive, and harmful to the well-being of inmates. 408
Two recent notable cases – one from December 2017 and one from January 2018 –
have been stirring up public attention while arguing for the constitutional rights of
federally-sentenced prisoners subjected to the practice of administrative segregation. In
December 2017, the Applicants – the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) –
sought a declaration that CCRA sections 31-37 are invalid for violations under Charter
sections 7, 11(h), and 12, because of a lack of independent review for administrative
segregation placements. 409 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice only recognized a section
7 violation. In January 2018, the Plaintiffs – the British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association (BCCLA) and the John Howard Society of Canada – sought a declaration that
CCRA sections 31-33 and 37 sanctioning administrative segregation in Canadian

407 Ibid.
408 Strategically, most of the analytical work for Charter claims regarding prison conditions is done through section 7.
For example, section 12 and gross disproportionality – a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 – are
closely connected, hence, courts may address their reasoning on gross disproportionality under either a Charter
section 7 analysis or section 12 analysis when they are both invoked. For example, see CCLA v The Queen, supra
note 148 at para 83. But, again, the scope of section 7 litigation heavily focuses on procedural fairness, and this
tends not to be particularly helpful for making significant improvements for prison conditions.
409 CCLA v The Queen, supra note 148 at para 3.
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penitentiaries, are invalid as the provisions enable indeterminate and prolonged solitary
confinement within the international law meanings, which ultimately violate Charter
sections 7, 9, 10(b), 12, and 15. 410 The Supreme Court of British Columbia recognized a
violation of section 7 and 15, yet relied on the section 7 violation – not the section 15
violation – to determine that the provisions enabling indeterminate and prolonged
administrative segregation failed the section 1 reasonable limits test. Section 7 once again
led the constitutional debate around solitary confinement, yet not much progress was
achieved from prison abolitionist perspective.
What these two recent cases, and past Charter cases, illustrate is that the
preoccupation with addressing procedural problems with the corrections system has been
an impediment to making greater strides in prisoner advocacy and dismantling the
“Carceral State”. The modest, reformist approach of tweaking procedural rights of
prisoners ultimately enables a discriminatory practice to continue that is contextualized by
a prison system and a justice system plagued by racial discrimination, dehumanization,
lack of social supports, and a perpetuation of disadvantage. Past Charter cases have not
adequately addressed the root problems of the injustices prevalent in prison society and
general society, which lead to the prevalence of solitary confinement and other destructive
features of the correctional system. Rather, these Charter cases focus on the symptomatic
consequences of the “Carceral State” – namely, the procedural problems and the imbalance
of power that exists between the jailers and the jailed.

410 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 2.
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Despite my critique of past Charter litigation, I do not contend that all hope in the
Charter’s utility for protecting prisoners is lost. I contend that the way past cases have
framed their Charter claims – with the reformist rather than an abolitionist mindset – have
not been conducive to effectively advancing the interests of prisoners. Prisoner advocates
have not yet made the best use of the Charter to their advantage. And I argue that solitary
confinement is an example where a shift in the litigation approach can make the real
difference.

The Two Recent Decisions: The Civil Liberties Associations Cases
These two cases on the practice of solitary confinement in Canada left much desired.
It certainly would not have been foolish for a person, superficially informed that two civil
liberties associations were spearheading constitutional challenges against the practice of
solitary confinement, to expect the litigation to target the practice in its entirety. And,
abolishing this source of harm in an already damaging social institution. One would less
likely expect that this litigation would take the more modest approach of focusing on how
to make solitary confinement a more tolerable experience. Surely, this might come as a
deflating realization to anyone sympathetic to the dismal experience of prison life.
The Judge in CCLA, for instance, poignantly remarks that the focus of this case is
not a question of whether the initial decision to place an inmate in administrative
segregation complies with the Charter, as the Judge noted that courts have already ruled
that the Warden must be allowed wide discretionary power to enable quick responses,
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which may take the form of placing an inmate in administrative segregation. 411 And while
the Judge in the BCCLA decision showed much concern for the detrimental effects of
prolonged and indeterminate solitary confinement, which are prevalent in federal prisons,
he did not go far enough to say that solitary confinement in general should no longer be
practised. These two cases reaffirmed the legitimacy of solitary confinement, keeping in
tact the discretionary power given to correctional staff to place an inmate in solitary
confinement.
Notably, in contrast to the CCLA case, the Judge in the BCCLA case heard
arguments on the issue of a violation under Charter section 15, and the Judge ruled that
the Plaintiffs successfully established a violation. The Plaintiffs argued that administrative
segregation has a disproportionately negative impact on women, Aboriginal inmates, and
the mentally ill.

412

But, the Judge found that administrative segregation had a

discriminatory impact on mentally ill inmates and Aboriginal inmates and he declined to
declare discrimination against women alone. 413 Aboriginal inmates face discrimination due
to the recognized historical trauma and disadvantage that the Aboriginal community has
endured. The Judge found that this is neither adequately nor consistently considered by
correctional staff in decisions to place Aboriginal inmates in administrative segregation,
even as the Aboriginal community is over-represented in the criminal justice system,
including in administrative segregation placements. 414 Moreover, since Aboriginal inmates
are placed in segregation more often and for longer periods, they have limited access to
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programming, which impacts their ability to later on transfer to a lower security institution,
or obtain conditional release, or fulfill a correctional plan to demonstrate rehabilitation.415
Mentally ill inmates face disadvantage, because the correctional staff use unreliable
instruments to detect the mental health status of an inmate (i.e., Computerized Mental
Health Intake Screening System (ComMHISS) and the Suicide Risk Checklist) 416 and also
follow an under-inclusive policy (i.e., CD 709) for determining which inmates cannot be
placed in administrative segregation according to the manifesting nature of their mental
illness. 417
Unlike the BCCLA case, the Judge in the CCLA decision did not engage with a
section 15 analysis. Surely, this was largely the result of the limited scope of arguments
and evidence presented before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice by the lawyers
representing the Applicant, the CCLA, and what they saw fit as the effective way to
challenge the practice of administrative segregation. Ultimately, if a party bringing a claim
fails to raise a key issue, then the judge has no opportunity to meaningfully consider the
issues with the relevant evidence and make a determination of its merits. In that regard, the
CCLA decision was a missed opportunity to bring awareness to the discriminatory use of
the practice, which is a critical consideration, and I would contend, should have been the
primary focus of the case.

415 Ibid at para 484.
416 Ibid at paras 521-523.
417 Ibid at paras 500-504.
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In the BCCLA case, the Judge began his reasonable limits analysis under Charter
section 1 by explaining how he would address the section 15 violation that the Plaintiffs
established with evidence. The Judge said the following:
I will state at the outset that my analysis principally addresses the s. 7
infringements. Given my ultimate conclusion that those infringements
cannot be justified in this case, there is little purpose in undertaking a
detailed analysis with respect to the infringements of s. 15, although I do
refer to the treatment of inmates with mental illness as an alternative to
administrative segregation. Moreover, the parties, including the Government
who bears the onus on this issue, did not meaningfully address the s. 15
infringements in the context of s. 1. 418

The BCCLA decision recognized a violation of Charter section 15 concerning
discrimination against Aboriginal inmates and inmates with mental health issues. Yet, the
Judge in this case also explicitly stated that his reasonable limits analysis under Charter
section 1 focused on the section 7 violation more so than the section 15 violation. 419 The
Judge says, “Given my ultimate conclusion that those infringements cannot be justified in
this case, there is little purpose in undertaking a detailed analysis with respect to the
infringements of s. 15.” 420 This wording reflects the Judge’s view that the established
section 15 violation has lesser importance compared to the section 7 violation. The Judge
buttresses his approach for his section 1 analysis, stating that “the parties, including the
Government who bears the onus on this issue, did not meaningfully address the s. 15
infringements in the context of s. 1”. This also reflects the lesser importance that was
attributed to the section 15 violation by the parties in the case. The fact that the government

418 Ibid at para 547.
419 Ibid.
420 Ibid.
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did not make full submissions concerning how the section 15 violation could be salvaged
under section 1 indicates that the CCLA and the John Howard Society of Canada, failed to
effectively put the State to task in demonstrably justifying its section 15 violation in the
context of Canada’s free and democratic society. Essentially, the State got away with this
discriminatory practice by simply not giving a meaningful explanation for its
discriminatory policies and conduct.
Hence, we see that while counsel in the BCCLA case provided the Judge with the
opportunity to assess the issue of discrimination on its merits, counsel and the Judge
involved in the case did not regard the violation of section 15 to be the primary focus of
the case. This is demonstrated by the fact that much attention was given to litigating the
legal regime for review hearings of administrative segregation placements – which centred
on procedural safeguards – as opposed to the practice of administrative segregation as a
whole – which prompts a fundamentally more critical analysis. This enabled the Judge to
set aside the section 15 issue, saving himself the task of reconciling one pertinent issue –
the pink elephant in the courtroom, if you will: how can we justify the State practice of
administrative segregation in the correctional system of Canada’s free and democratic
society, knowing with proof that it is wielded in a discriminatory manner? I argue that this
is a question that should have rendered administrative segregation a constitutionally invalid
practice altogether. Arguing more broadly against the practice of solitary confinement, I
will engage in the analysis in Chapter 11, titled “Arguing the Discrimination Claim” to
demonstrate how the State would not succeed in justifying this discriminatory practice.
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It is perplexing how the Judge in BCCLA would acknowledge that inmates with
mental health issues are disproportionality subjected to administrative segregation and
suffer more when placed in segregation, yet allow a practice to continue that is recognized
as triggering serious psychological harm. 421 The Judge’s decision essentially enables
inmates to remain in harm’s way and mentally deteriorate. Another perplexing issue is how
the Judge in BCCLA acknowledged that the sentencing terms and rehabilitative
programming for Aboriginal inmates are disproportionately adversely affected by the
practice of administrative segregation, but moved on to allow this racially discriminatory
practice. Procedural safeguards for the review process of administrative segregation will
not amount to safeguards against discrimination, especially if the courts do not feel
compelled to impose safeguards against discrimination, specifically.
For the CCLA and BCCLA decisions, shifting the focus of the constitutional
analysis from concerns about procedural fairness to discrimination, essentially means a
paradigm shift in the constitutional analysis where a prison reformist perspective is
replaced with a prison abolition perspective. These two cases reflect a prison reformist
approach in that they are preoccupied with tweaking certain aspects of the practice of
solitary confinement under the assumption that the flaws that exist in this practice, and our
justice system generally, are superficial in nature and can be remedied while maintaining
a heavy use of criminal justice administration. 422 Parkes, commenting on the BCCLA case,

421 According to the OCI, administrative segregation is “the most commonly used population management tool to
address tensions and conflicts in federal correctional facilities” and manage inmates who have mental health
issues, are self-injurious, and at risk of suicide. 2014-2015 Annual Report, supra note 126 at 26-27. Often,
correctional staff use segregation as a behaviour modification tool. It’s been described by the segregated as “a test
to break your spirit, to bend your will. The longer you resist, the longer the enemy tries.” Piché & Major, supra
note 5 at 17.
422 McLeod, supra note 57 at 1207.
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also agrees that the reformist approach is apparent in this litigation. 423 The very fact that
these cases took on a reformist approach – which the parties advancing these constitutional
challenges enabled – is problematic as this means that the carceral logic underlying the
practice of solitary confinement remains in tact. I argue that by failing to push Charter
section 15 as the core constitutional issue, the prisoner advocates in each case failed to
tackle the root of the problems concerning solitary confinement and the justice system as
a whole, and thus, were too modest in their demands for change. Through public interest
standing, prisoners are able to benefit from allies, such as the CCLA, the BCCLA, and the
John Howard Society of Canada, as these organizations can advocate knowledgeably,
strategically, and in prisoners’ interests. 424 However, they missed a precious opportunity
to take a meaningful step in dismantling the Carceral State. The two cases do not reflect as
much urgency to transform how various social problems – such as mental illness or racism
or sexism – are regulated through the criminal justice system. 425

What a Discrimination Focused Analysis Can Do
Here I want to discuss in more detail why section 15 is the superior Charter
provision for challenging and abolishing the practice of solitary confinement. Further, I
posit that arguing this discrimination claim, with women – not men – as the party launching
the Charter challenge will bolster the chances of abolishing solitary confinement. In
Canada, female inmates have been described as “too few to count” in the correctional

423 Parkes, “Solitary”, supra note 62 at 183.
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system. 426 They face unique disadvantages in a system that is designed for a mainly male
population. Ironically, the only sex discrimination case heard by the Supreme Court
concerning the correctional system, involved treatment of male prisoners. 427 Specifically,
the CSC policy allowed for female correctional officers to work on the front lines in men’s
prisons, which included conducting frisk searches and cell surveillance. This sex
discrimination claim was ultimately not successful mainly because the historical trend of
male violence against women is not matched by a comparable trend of female violence
against men, hence the CSC policy in question was not discriminatory in a substantive
sense. 428 However, I have several reasons for the litigation approach that I am proposing,
which I think will bring a fresh perspective by litigating solitary confinement using a
feminist and prison abolitionist approach.
First, using women as the complainants, as opposed to men, would allow for a more
nuanced and fuller discrimination claim using intersectional analysis 429 (i.e., considering
the axes of sex, 430 race, national or ethnic origin, 431 disability, 432 aboriginal reserve
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with them or giving them away to family members in Canada or child protective services. See Gros & Song, supra
note 138. See also Gros, supra note 138.
431 National or ethnic origin is implicated due to the over-representation of Indigenous, foreign national, and
racialized women who are more likely to be placed in solitary confinement. National or ethnic origin in the case of
Indigenous peoples, particularly, can showcase how persistent colonial trauma in Indigenous communities
ultimately play a role in rates of solitary confinement.
432 Disability is implicated due to the disproportionate effect of solitary confinement on inmates with mental health
issues and the vicious cycle of re-entry into solitary confinement as a result of triggered or worsening
psychological, social, and physical problems in solitary confinement.
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status, 433 and citizenship 434) and would highlight the compounded damaging impacts that
solitary confinement has on women, compared to men.
Second, there has been significant amount of interdisciplinary research, as well as
studies, coroners inquests, and reports on the provincial and federal systems that have
documented for many years the unique forms of discrimination that incarcerated women
face, which include discriminatory uses of solitary confinement. 435 Counsel and courts
alike could rely on this body of research, and the experts producing this research, to unearth
the extent of constitutional violations using the help of expert evidence.
Third, through recent litigation it has already been found that Indigenous women
are especially disadvantaged by the practice of solitary confinement. Due to the deeply
insightful intersectional perspective of women’s experiences of solitary confinement and
the body of research that has documented this, the courts should be less likely to find
outright that solitary confinement is not a discriminatory practice. As a result, courts would
likely have no other choice but to find that the practice is unconstitutional and should no
longer be used. 436
Fourth, from a legal realist perspective, the courts are likely to show more empathy
for the traumatic experiences that women face while subjected to solitary confinement, as

433 This is an analogous ground recognized in Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2
SCR 203. Aboriginal inmates, especially Aboriginal women inmates, can be incarcerated or subjected to solitary
confinement in institutions far from their reserve communities, where many Aboriginal inmates may have lived
prior to imprisonment. Aboriginal cultural traditions may accord strong connections between lands and identity.
This can be negatively impacted by imprisonment or solitary confinement.
434 This is an analogous ground recognized in Andrews, supra note 386. Again, like the ground of national or ethnic
origin, this ground is engaged because foreign nationals are subjected to solitary confinement and this can have
adverse impact on them as they navigate the Canadian immigration system.
435 See for example: Arbour Report, supra note 185. “Timeline: The Life & Death of Ashley Smith” CBC News (12
November 2010) online: <www.cbc.ca>. Debra Parkes, “Cruel and unusual punishment: It’s time to end solitary
confinement” The Globe and Mail (6 June 2016) online: <theglobeandmail.com>.
436 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at paras 470-471. CHRC, “Protecting”, supra note 319 at 45. Ontario
Ombudsman, “Segregation”, supra note 159 at 3, 9. MCS Regulations, supra note 212, s 34(4).
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opposed to men. Influenced by the social context of progressive human rights country like
Canada, courts are likely to err on the side of the female claimants and their unique rights
interests to ameliorate disadvantage. 437 Legal realists posit that judges are key legal actors
who have significant discretion. Realists are interested in analyzing the personalities,
political assumptions, economic preferences, idiosyncrasies and other non-rational factors
that affect actors within the legal system. Further, realists contend that formal legal rules
alone often cannot provide determinative right answers, and judicial decision-making often
means thinking beyond the law for insight (e.g., criminology, psychology, sociology,
economics). Those involved in the legal system, whether as parties or officials, are strongly
influenced by the larger social forces operating around them. 438
Fifth, even though the complainants of the discrimination claims would be women,
a court’s finding that solitary confinement is unconstitutional based on discrimination
would still mean that men, the larger group of incarcerated individuals would benefit from
such a favourable decision from the courts. This is especially since Aboriginal men and
men with mental health issues are disproportionately impacted by solitary confinement.
While the provincial jail population is larger than the federal prison population, the benefit
of a favourable decision respecting provincial jails could similarly benefit the federal
prison population. And lastly, inmates who are less adversely affected by solitary
confinement, usually Caucasian men, would still benefit from having the practice abolished
altogether, because they would never be at risk of experiencing solitary confinement.

437 Richard F Devlin, “Jurisprudence For Judges: Why Legal Theory Matters For Social Context Education” (2001)
27 Queen's Law Journal 161.
438 Ibid.

Cracking Down on Cages | 109

Sixth, settlements or negotiations proposed by the State will effectively mean an
invitation to maintain the status quo of continuing the discriminatory practice of solitary
confinement. Counsel advocating for prisoners must be cautious of this. Despite this, it is
likely that a strong discrimination case would likely dissuade counsel from accepting any
settlements or negotiations, anyway.
Seventh, a denial that solitary confinement is not a discriminatory practice, along
with the State’s poor reputation of implementing reformist-oriented recommendations,
settlements, and court decisions, could mean that Canada will continue to fail its
international obligations under various treaties, including the Mandela Rules, the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 439 The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 440 The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and its
Optional Protocol: Handbook for Parliamentarians, 441 and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights 442.

Building the Case: Using a Multiple Ground Framework
Not only is it important to frame a Charter challenge against solitary confinement
as a case of discrimination. It’s important that the discrimination case is crafted based on a
multi-ground framework, inspired by the intersectional analytical approach. Using a ‘single

439 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December
1984, Treaty Series, vol 1465, p 85.
440 The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 4 January 2009, HL Paper 9 / HC 93 [incorporating
HC 1204-i of Session 2007-08].
441 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and its Optional Protocol:
Handbook for Parliamentarians, 2003.
442 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,16 December 1966, Treaty Series, vol 999, p 171.
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ground’ framework of discrimination, such as just sex, or just race, or just ethnic and
national origin, is an insufficient way to fully capture the magnitude of the discrimination
faced by women in these unique situations, and can actually pose a barrier to meeting the
evidentiary burden for a discrimination case, which means the interests of protecting these
women’s basic rights are dismissed. 443 The Ontario Human Rights Commission is
instructive in that it has long embraced the idea of adopting an intersectional analytical
approach for human rights complaints against discrimination. The Commission states this
approach comprises of two features. 444 First, there is a shift from the assumption of
working with a single ground framework to the assumption that an individual’s experiences
are linked to more than one ground. Second, there must be consideration for contextual
factors: discriminatory stereotypes; the purpose of legislation, regulation and policy; the
nature and/or position of the individual concerned; and the social, political, and legal
history of the person’s treatment in society. 445 Decisions 446 from the Supreme Court of
Canada are encouraging, as they show it is acceptable to assert a Charter discrimination
claim based on a combination of enumerated or analogous grounds. 447
The two recent civil liberties associations cases challenging provisions on
administrative segregation, are illustrative for why a multi-ground framework is crucial for
putting together a discrimination claim. An intervenor of the BCCLA decision, West Coast
LEAF, argued on the issue of intersecting axes of discrimination. Before ultimately
dismissing the importance of the section 15 violations in his section 1 analysis, the Judge
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Policy and Education Branch, supra note 16 at 5.
Ibid at 28.
Ibid at 28.
Law, supra note 18 at 554-555. Withler, supra note 19 at 63.
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remarked that as a result of finding that mentally ill inmates (both men and women) and
Aboriginal inmates (both men and women) are entitled to section 15 relief, it was not
necessary to give “special consideration” for how women belonging to either group of
inmates face discrimination. 448 Interestingly, however, the Judge remarked that Aboriginal
women endure more severe disadvantage from the practice of administrative segregation
compared to men. 449 In making this remark, the Judge stated that Aboriginal women, as a
group, are significantly over-represented in placements in administrative segregation. This
over-representation is particularly detrimental, because they commonly have pre-existing
distress from past experiences of physical or sexual abuse, more so than other inmates, and
this distress is exacerbated in segregation. 450
As highlighted by feminist critical legal scholars, the cumulative and compounding
impact of discrimination derived from belonging to multiple groupings of identity can
create a situation of multiple discrimination. 451 Hence, it can be difficult to untangle the
complex nature of this kind of discrimination according to the multiple bases of
discrimination. 452 Moreover, it can be difficult to prove a rights violation without the
benefit of arguing an experience of this compounded discrimination. Kimberlé Crenshaw,
a law professor at Columbia University and the University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA), articulates powerfully that the multiple facets of a woman’s identity that count as
a discrimination ground, do not necessarily mean that a woman has multiple opportunities
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BCCLA, supra note 120 at para 524.
Ibid at para 470.
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to establish a discrimination claim. 453 These facets of her identity collectively shape her
experience – her single experience – her unique challenges – and by describing the ways
in which they compound her vulnerability should not be obstructed by a rigid, regressive
framework of how discrimination law works. The law on discrimination, itself, must also
be inclusive. 454
Often women’s experiences of navigating the criminal justice system are made
indistinct and invisible due to the larger group of men who are navigating the system.455
By forgetting women we become ignorant to the more deleterious effects that the criminal
justice system have on women. By failing to recognize these effects, we allow for these
women to continue to suffer in silence, ironically in a country where we boldly tout our
progressive constitutional and human rights reputation on the international stage. The fact
that the Judge acknowledged that Aboriginal women in segregation, for example, endure
more significant disadvantage compared to their male counterparts, but did not further
explore the nuance of this form of intersecting disadvantage was another letdown of the
discrimination analysis conducted in the BCCLA decision. The unique experience of
Aboriginal women in administrative segregation was diminished and subsumed with the
larger group of Aboriginal male inmates.
Other experiences of discrimination in the context of administrative segregation
were not addressed by counsel or the judges in either of the two recent cases, which could
have further emphasized the State practice of solitary confinement as a discriminatory

453 Crenshaw & Dobson, supra note 429.
454 Ibid.
455 Belknap, supra note 7 at 3-4.
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practice. Black inmates are consistently over-represented in placements especially for
disciplinary and involuntary segregation. 456 Specifically, it has been reported that Black
female inmates are held against a different standard compared to White female inmates in
prison; for example, a White woman received 24 hours in segregation for the same action
that resulted in a Black woman being segregated for three weeks. 457
Since, immigration detainees are detained in provincial jails, the recent civil
liberties associations cases on the federal system could not have reasonably engaged with
any evidence on the disadvantages suffered by immigration detainees when they are
subjected to solitary confinement. As explained earlier, immigration detainees are gripped
with stress and anxiety over the outcome of their immigration matters and uncertainty about
the length of their detention. 458 They often may suffer from physical and psychological
trauma from persecution they may have faced in their country of origin and are retraumatized by the conditions of their immigration detention in Canada. All of this is
exacerbated by solitary confinement, triggering or worsening severe mental health issues.
Female immigration detainees are specifically impacted, as oftentimes they must choose
between allowing their children to be detained with them or giving them away to family
members in Canada, or child protective services. Female detainees may face solitary
confinement along with their child in order to provide their child with a product deemed as
contraband in the general population of the immigration holding centre (e.g., humidifier).
Regardless, they will also feel the psychological pain as they stress over the care and well-

456 2012-2013 Annual Report, supra note 318 at 7, 10. Jackson, supra note 78 at paras 53-54.
457 CHRC, “Protecting”, supra note 319 at 45.
458 Gros & van Groll, supra note 130 at 14, 18.
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being of a child and whatever traumas they endured prior to detention, while in detention
and in isolation, specifically.
All these intersectional experiences of discrimination must be presented and
intently advocated by counsel before courts and the courts should do well to recognize the
nuanced forms of compounded discrimination that significantly affect women.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: ARGUING THE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
Instead of continuing to support institutions that manufacture and exacerbate
mental health problems, Canada should abolish the practice of segregation
and rethink prisons altogether . . . Let’s remember that jails are the least
effective and most expensive non-responses to social justice issues. For
women, these archaic institutions have distinctly gendered effects upon those
whose lives have been marked by victimization long before they end up behind
bars. Around the globe, nation states are revisiting the rush to incarcerate.
We need to join those ranks.
- Canadian Senator and long-time feminist prisoner advocate, Kim Pate 459

In Chapter 10, titled “Justifying the Discrimination Claim”, I discussed reasons why
Charter section 15 is the ideal rights provision to launch a case seeking to abolish the
practice of solitary confinement. Importantly, I also discussed two recent constitutional
challenges, specifically against procedural aspects of administrative segregation, that were
spearheaded by civil liberties associations. I described how these cases fell short of
achieving meaningful relief to prisoners subjected to different forms of isolation. Arguably,
these two decisions are representations of society’s current disposition when it comes to
the treatment of prisoners. We might acknowledge that prisons are not helping inmates, but
our reflex is to change peripheral aspects to the practice, hoping that they will translate to
core transformation that legitimizes the practice. We fail to question the legitimacy of the
State’s decision to incarcerate or to isolate.
As I explained earlier, a critical failing from the two civil liberties associations cases
is their analyses, or lack thereof, of Charter section 15. The Judge in the BCCLA decision

459 Pate, supra note 87 at 24, 30.
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stated that “In the present, however, I am satisfied that the impugned provisions do not
have a disproportionate effect on women.” 460 And he also stated the following:
In my respectful view it is not necessary to give special consideration to
mentally ill women inmates in light of my finding that mentally ill inmates
(including both men and women) are entitled to s. 15 relief. I believe that the
same is true with respect to Aboriginal women; having found an entitlement
to s. 15 relief for Aboriginal inmates (including both men and women), no
further consideration of West Coast LEAF’s submissions is necessary. 461

Of the section 15 analysis that was provided, it was void of an intersectional approach.
Hence, the Judge failed to fully explore how a discrimination analysis would apply to the
greater disadvantages endured by Aboriginal women and mentally ill women in solitary
confinement, as encouraged by West Coast LEAF. The Judge pointed out the following in
his analysis on discrimination against Aboriginal inmates:
I am satisfied that administrative segregation has a small, but significant,
disproportionate effect on Aboriginal men. The disproportionate effect on
Aboriginal women is more severe. Consequently, Aboriginal inmates satisfy
the first stage of the s. 15 test. 462

It was disappointing that the Judge acknowledged that Aboriginal women in segregation,
for example, endure more severe disadvantage compared to their male counterparts, but
did not further explore the nuance of this form of intersecting disadvantage through a
focused and complete section 15 analysis. The unique experience of Aboriginal women in
administrative segregation was diminished and subsumed with the larger group of
Aboriginal male inmates, and it appears the plight of Aboriginal women was what bolstered

460 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 463.
461 Ibid at para 524.
462 Ibid at para 471.
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the Judge’s finding that Aboriginal inmates, as a whole group, both men and women,
experience disadvantage from administrative segregation.
Seeing the shortcomings of recent litigation regarding section 15, with this Chapter,
I seek to illustrate a more comprehensive application of section 15, guided by an
intersectional feminist analysis. Instead of being overshadowed and subordinated by the
experience of male inmates in the BCCLA decision, I will highlight and expand on the
example and experience of Aboriginal women. I will create an opportunity out of the
Judge’s acknowledgement of Aboriginal women’s unique disadvantage in solitary
confinement to explore what could have been the outcome of giving the “special
consideration” that the Judge determined was unnecessary for Aboriginal women. I aim to
answer: What could this discrimination claim look like? My analysis will broadly capture
solitary confinement and will not be limited to any particular form of solitary confinement,
as was the situation in BCCLA. The basis of the subsection 15(1) claim that I will advocate
is to establish adverse impact discrimination (i.e., “indirect discrimination”), as opposed to
proving a sanctioned discriminatory purpose of solitary confinement (i.e., “direct
discrimination”). 463

The Rights Analysis Stage: Establishing the Subsection 15(1) Violation
At this stage, a Charter breach must be established on a balance of probabilities.
Subsection 15(1) involves the two-step analysis of proving, firstly, that a law, in its purpose

463 Withler, supra note 19 at para 64.
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or effect, creates a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground, and secondly,
that the impugned law creates a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping. 464
Again, the Supreme Court’s definition of “discrimination” under the Charter was
provided in Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, 465 and it is interpreted as the
following:
I would say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether
intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of
the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations,
or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or
which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages
available to other members of society. 466
Section 15 seeks to advance substantial equality which endorses the view that equality
involves promoting a society in which everyone can feel secure in knowing that, under the
law, they are recognized as human beings who are equally deserving of concern, respect,
and consideration. 467 The legal concept of equality generally represents the notion that the
law should apply to all even-handedly. 468

1. Distinction is based on enumerated or analogous grounds
Cognizant of Charter subsection 32(1), which limits the application of the Charter
to State breaches of rights and freedoms, the State action that is the focus of this Charter
challenge under subsection 15(1) is the practice of solitary confinement. The first criterion
in the subsection 15(1) analysis is to satisfy this question: Does the law create a distinction

464
465
466
467
468

BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at paras 452-453.
Andrews, supra note 386.
Kapp, supra note 385 at paras 16, 18.
Andrews, supra note 386 at 171.
Sharpe & Roach, supra note 382 at 307.

Cracking Down on Cages | 119

based on an enumerated or analogous ground? 469 One way of demonstrating that the
practice of solitary confinement has an adverse distinction is to show how the State practice
imposes a burden on Aboriginal women that is not imposed on others. 470 Or, the State has
failed to consider the already disadvantaged position of Aboriginal women within the
context of Canadian society, resulting in substantively different treatment based on
personal characteristics. 471 The issue of whether the State intends to cause the adverse
distinction is irrelevant in these kinds of analyses. 472 In Charter cases of successful adverse
impact claims, claimants leveraged their case on self-evident societal patterns that were
amenable to judicial notice. 473 Yet, the claimant has the onus to make sure the court is fully
informed of the relevant historical, social, political, and legal context of the claim, 474
which is a task that is very much welcomed by an advocate aligned with the prison abolition
ethic who seeks the opportunity to unearth the State’s discriminatory conduct.
Intersecting grounds of discrimination in this claim, 475 it is argued that Aboriginal
women subjected to solitary confinement experience an adverse distinction based on the
following enumerated grounds: race, national or ethnic origin, mental disability, and sex.
Aboriginal women also experience a distinction based on the analogous ground of
“Aboriginal reserve status”, which was recognized as an available ground of discrimination
in the decision of Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs). 476

469 Withler, supra note 19 at para 61.
470 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 78, [2004] 3 SCR 657.
471 Department of Justice Canada, “Section 15 – Equality rights” Charterpedia (2 January 2018)
online:<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/check/art15.html> [DOJ, “Section 15”].
472 Law, supra note 18 at para 80.
473 DOJ, “Section 15”, supra note 471.
474 Law, supra note 18 at para 83.
475 Ibid at 554-555. Withler, supra note 19 at para 63.
476 Corbiere supra note 433.
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Regarding the analogous ground of Aboriginal reserve status, this provides protection
against discrimination to a member of an Indian Band living off a reserve. 477 Once a ground
has been determined to be analogous, it will always remain as such. 478 I will address how
Aboriginal women in solitary confinement have a claim to each of these grounds in turn.

(a) Race and National or Ethnic Origin
The law, regulations, and policy on the State practice of solitary confinement, may
purport to treat all inmates the same. However, they have an adverse distinction or indirect
distinction against Aboriginal women based on the grounds of race and national or ethnic
origin, because the State fails to take into account the current-day colonial trauma affecting
Aboriginal people. 479 The State also fails in accounting for the racially-biased manner in
which the criminal justice system and other social administrations by the State operate.
And these failures by the State have affected the higher rates in which Aboriginal women
are subjected to solitary confinement.
For centuries, Aboriginal peoples have sustained the harshest brunt of racism in the
historical development of Canada. In a 2016 article, fervent feminist prisoner advocate,
Senator Kim Pate, who is intimately familiar with the disadvantages of Aboriginal peoples,
discussed some of the early colonial assaults perpetrated on the Indigenous peoples that
forever changed the trajectory of their collective progression and well-being in Canada.
Senator Pate highlighted that the European settlers in Canada breached their peacekeeping

477 Ibid.
478 Ibid at paras 13-15 and 58-62.
479 I decided to analyze the grounds of race and national or ethnic origin together due to the strong connections that
both of these grounds have in explaining the disadvantage experienced by Aboriginal women.
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treaties they initially formed with Indigenous communities; the settlers outlawed
Indigenous cultural and spiritual laws, practices, and ceremonies; and the settlers forcibly
dislocated Indigenous communities from lands they originally occupied for hundreds of
years onto poorly managed reservations. 480 In addition, the European settlers imposed their
own definitions of “Aboriginal” identity onto Indigenous peoples. Through statute and
judge-made law, authorized by core legislative provisions, such as subsection 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867, section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 481 and the Indian Act,482
the current-day Canadian State continues to control the conduct of Indigenous peoples and
circumscribe its dealings with Indigenous peoples based on the identities that the State has
attributed to them. 483
In the BCCLA decision, the Judge found that the CSC is aware of the historical
disadvantage of Aboriginal inmates impacting Aboriginal over-representation throughout
the correctional system. So much so that in its Commissioner’s Directives (i.e., CD 702)
the CSC lists many aspects of what they coin “Aboriginal social history” to encourage
awareness among staff of this historical disadvantage. 484 Defining “Aboriginal social
history”, CD 702 states as follows:
. . . the various circumstances that have affected the lives of most Aboriginal
people. Considering these circumstances may result in alternative options or
solutions and applies only to Aboriginal offenders (not to non-Aboriginal
offenders who choose to follow the Aboriginal way of life). These
circumstances include the following (note that this is not an exhaustive list):
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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•
•
•
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effects of the residential school system
sixties scoop into the adoption system
effects of the dislocation and dispossession of Inuit people
family or community history of suicide
family or community history of substance abuse
family or community history of victimization
family or community fragmentation
level or lack of formal education
level of connectivity with family/community
experience in the child welfare system
experience with poverty
loss of or struggle with cultural/spiritual identity

The human potential of Aboriginal peoples have been staggeringly interrupted by severe
social setbacks. 485 Through witness testimony, Ms. Brigitte Bouchard, the Warden at the
Edmonton Institution for Women, attributed the higher representation of Aboriginal
inmates in segregation to the entrenched violence and gang affiliation resulting from such
social history factors. 486 The OCI found through a file review of Aboriginal female inmates
that over half reported that they or a family member attended a residential school; twothirds of their parents had substance abuse issues; 48% had been removed from their family
home; and almost all had previous traumatic experiences, including sexual and physical
abuse, and substance abuse problems. 487 The Judge in the BCCLA decision found that
Aboriginal social history is neither adequately nor consistently considered by correctional
staff in decisions to place Aboriginal inmates in administrative segregation, even as

485 Geraldine Malone, “Why Indigenous Women Are Canada’s Fastest Growing Prison Population” Vice (2 February
2016) online: <ww.vice.com> [Malone].
486 BCCLA, supra note 120 at paras 113, 474.
487 Ibid at para 474.
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Aboriginal peoples are over-represented in all aspects of the criminal justice system,
including in administrative segregation placements. 488
Despite what the CSC might have intended with policies such as CD 702 on
Aboriginal social history, in the BCCLA decision, several of CSC’s witnesses
acknowledged that Aboriginal inmates are still subjected to racism and racial profiling. 489
In an independent review, correctional officers and female inmates alike reported that,
based on their observations, Aboriginal women inmates are singled out for segregation
more frequently and for longer periods compared to other inmates. 490 Studies and
commission reports repeatedly note that Aboriginal inmates fare worse in almost every
correctional decision than non-Aboriginal inmates. 491 According to the OCI, “Between
2007 and 2016, while the overall federal prison population increased by less than 5%, the
Indigenous prison population increased by 39%. For the last three decades, there has been
an increase every single year in the federal incarceration rate for Indigenous people.”492
They are subject to the damaging impacts of the criminal justice system’s heaviest
sanctions.
Indeed, two decades ago, the Supreme Court recognized that “there is widespread
bias against aboriginal people within Canada, and ‘[t]here is evidence that this widespread
racism has translated into systemic discrimination in the criminal justice system’”. 493
Although systemic and background factors can also partially explain rates of crime and
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recidivism for non-aboriginal offenders, the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders differ
from the majority, since Aboriginal people are victims of systemic and direct
discrimination, derived from the deep-seated colonial legacy in Canada. 494 The problem is
so prevalent in Canada, that in interpreting subsection 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code,495
the Supreme Court in R v Gladue encouraged sentencing judges to take judicial notice of
the broad systemic and background factors affecting Aboriginal peoples when they appear
before them for sentencing to reduce the over-representation of Aboriginal peoples in
prisons. 496
In the years that have gone by since R v Gladue in 1999, Canadian courts
apparently still struggle to apply sentencing principles to ameliorate the Aboriginal overrepresentation. 497 In fact, the over-representation regrettably continues to soar. Aboriginal
people are also less likely to become “rehabilitated” since the place of their internment is
often culturally inappropriate, in addition to the “rampant” discrimination they face in
penal institutions. 498 Certainly, the idea of addressing social problems in Indigenous
communities by using criminal justice measures – including “Aboriginal social history” in
segregation decision-making – proves to be gravely ineffective. The dismal social
problems require more State investment in preventive social supports and programming,
other than the criminal justice system, to redress the colonial and racist onslaught on
Indigenous communities. In this regard, the State has failed to address the plight of
Aboriginal peoples, which includes decisions regarding placements in solitary confinement.
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(b) Sex
Distinction based on the ground of race or national or ethnic origin may not be a
contentious issue for anyone who pays attention to the tremendous disadvantage that
Aboriginal peoples face in Canadian society through all facets of life, leading to
particularly adverse outcomes in almost all criminal justice decisions. Yet, in the analysis
of distinction based on sex, we arrive at an opportunity to fill in a gap in the section 15
analysis, left by prior litigation on solitary confinement. Solitary confinement has an
adverse distinction against Aboriginal women based on sex, because the State fails to
consider the acutely traumatized and vulnerable condition in which they enter the
correctional system in comparison to other female inmates. This leads to higher rates of
Aboriginal women in solitary confinement. The Judge in the BCCLA decision briefly noted
that Aboriginal women endure more severe disadvantage from the practice of
administrative segregation compared to Aboriginal men, because they are significantly
over-represented in placements in administrative segregation. 499 The Judge found this
over-representation as particularly detrimental, because Aboriginal women commonly
have pre-existing distress from past experiences of physical or sexual abuse, compared to
other inmates. 500 This distress is exacerbated in segregation. 501
Yet, despite acknowledging this impact on Aboriginal women, the Judge in the
BCCLA decision was not prepared to affirm intervenor submissions concerning

499 BCCLA, supra note 120 at para 470.
500 Ibid at paras 470-471.
501 Ibid.
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intersecting grounds of disadvantage affecting the over-represention of Aboriginal women
in segregation. 502 The Judge indicated that an acknowledgement of discrimination against
Aboriginal women had been satisfied by his finding that Aboriginal inmates, generally, are
discriminated in segregation practices. 503 This Judge’s finding, here, exemplifies the
problem of failing to adopt a contextualized approach to discrimination through
intersectional analysis. Without taking the effort to delve into the unique context of
Aboriginal women’s lives as it pertains to solitary confinement, the remedy that is
ultimately fashioned by a court in discrimination cases will miss the mark. Recognizing
section 15 violations, yet rendering them less worthy of consideration than the section 7
violations in his Charter section 1 analysis, 504 the Judge ordered the following remedies
for the impugned provisions (i.e., CCRA sections 31-33 and 37), subject to a 12-month
suspension of a declaration of invalidity:
On the basis of the findings made in these Reasons, I am prepared to make
the following s. 52 declaration:
1. The impugned laws are invalid pursuant to s. 7 of the Charter to the extent
that:
a) the impugned laws authorize and effect prolonged, indefinite
administrative segregation for anyone;
b) the impugned laws authorize and effect the institutional head to be
the judge and prosecutor of his own cause;
c) the impugned laws authorize internal review; and
d) the impugned laws authorize and effect the deprivation of inmates’
right to counsel at segregation hearings and reviews.
2. The impugned laws are invalid pursuant to s. 15 of the Charter:
a) to the extent that the impugned laws authorize and effect any period
of administrative segregation for the mentally ill and/or disabled; and

502 Ibid at para 524.
503 Ibid.
504 Ibid at paras 545-547.
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b) also to the extent that the impugned laws authorize and effect a
procedure that results in discrimination against Aboriginal inmates. 505

These remedies amount to little benefit to Aboriginal women and their specific needs. As
a result of the Judge’s generalized section 15 analysis, the Judge assumed that the needs of
Aboriginal women and Aboriginal men are the same. 506 While Aboriginal women have
more in common with Aboriginal men than they do with non-Aboriginal inmates in the
correctional system, there are significant differences. 507 These differences should be
considered in decision-making for solitary confinement placements.
The situation for Aboriginal women is distinctly gendered. 508 Before European
settlers arrived in Canada, Aboriginal societies were either matriarchal – power, wealth,
and inheritance passed on through the mother – or they recognized women as equals with
powerful leadership roles. 509 European contact meant the imposing of a patriarchal
worldview and a society that favoured male dominance. 510 In addition to the racist and
colonial legacy affecting all Aboriginal peoples, and the under-serving and damaging,
social institutions operating in Aboriginal communities, Aboriginal women are still met
with misogyny that is specifically tied to society’s perception of them as sub-class
women. 511
Growing up in deeply afflicted and troubled communities, Aboriginal women
continue to endure high rates of physical and sexual abuse, for which they are frequently
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blamed and to which police often fail to meaningfully respond. 512 CSC documented that
91% of Indigenous women (and 86% of all women) serving federal sentences have
experienced physical and/or sexual abuse. 513 This creates a situation where Aboriginal
women, left as easy targets in society, are forced to fend for themselves. 514 Aboriginal
women are 3.5 times more likely than non-Aboriginal women to be victims of violence. 515
Aboriginal women between the ages of 25-44 are 5 times more likely to die from acts of
violence than other women the same age. 516 The vulnerable position of Aboriginal women,
a segment of women who have been ignored by Canadian society, has led to rising numbers
of missing and murdered Indigenous women and girls with little outcry from the general
public. 517 Canada has recently committed to investigating this phenomenon, which is
expected to reveal the extent of victimization and lack of response from law
enforcement. 518
By contrast, when Aboriginal women use force to repel or defend against personal
attacks, they are likely to face swift police response, criminalization, and imprisonment.519
Many who work in and around the criminal and penal systems agree that very few women
pose a risk to public safety and consider it a waste of human and financial resources to
incarcerate them instead of addressing the socio-economic and health challenges that
prompt police response. 520 Women, who are usually poor mothers with low education and

512 Ibid.
513 Ibid.
514 Ibid. Native Women’s Association of Canada, Indigenous Women in Solitary Confinement: Policy Backgrounder
(Ottawa: NWAC, 2017) at 7 [NWAC].
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employability, are often incarcerated after educational, health and social services have
failed them. 521 Incarcerating Aboriginal women continues the cycle of child protection
removals, poverty and homelessness, risk of victimization, substance abuse, low education
attainment, and other social problems afflicting Aboriginal communities. 522
Aboriginal people consist of about 4% of the total Canadian population, yet
Aboriginal women are the fastest growing prison population in Canada, increasing by 109%
between 2001 and 2012. 523 The high and increasing incarceration rate is an indicator of the
health of Canadian society. 524 The distinctly racist and misogynist treatment towards
Aboriginal women echoes within the walls of prisons and jails. Now, about 63% of all
incarcerated women in Canadian prisons are Aboriginal. 525 In provincial custody, 41% of
the women are Aboriginal. 526 Aboriginal women make up 50% of segregation placements
in prisons. 527 Aboriginal women are more likely to be placed in involuntary solitary
confinement. 528 Sometimes women inmates are incarcerated in a segregated maximum
security unit inside a men’s prison, reflecting a lack of State resources to incarcerate
women, which again, greatly disadvantages women due to their tumultuous
backgrounds. 529
After the federal Prison for Women (P4W) in Kingston, Ontario, permanently
closed down, the number of segregation cells for women serving federal sentences
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increased. 530 Now, there are six federal prisons for women located in (1) Abbotsford, B.C.;
(2) Edmonton, Alberta; (3) Nekaneet Reserve, Saskatchewan; (4) Kitchener, Ontario; (5)
Joliette, Quebec; and (6) Truro, Nova Scotia. In addition to federal prisons, there are
segregation units in prisons for men, psychiatric hospitals and provincial jails. The number
of isolation cells has doubled, and the number of maximum-security cells has
quintupled. 531
Instead of rehabilitating Aboriginal women, the correctional system further
oppresses them and reinforces violence against them. 532 The extremely high rates of
physical and sexual abuse among Aboriginal women makes them particularly vulnerable
to the negative impacts of solitary confinement. 533 Female inmates tend to experience
solitary confinement as a form of rejection, abandonment, invisibility, and a denial of their
existence, which exacerbates pre-existing distress resulting from a history of trauma or
abuse prior to incarceration. 534 Female inmates report that they feel re-traumatized by their
placement of solitary confinement, which can involve violent extractions from their cells
by male guards, strip searches witnessed by male guards, and a lack of privacy going to the
washroom while in solitary confinement. 535
Compared to non-Aboriginal women, Aboriginal women are more likely to be
classified as maximum security and more likely to be held in solitary confinement. 536
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Compared to men inmates, women are usually classified as maximum security due to
difficulty with institutional adjustment, as opposed to posing a risk to public safety. 537
Policies, such as the Secure Unit Operational Plan 538 – mainly governing aspects of
custody, care and supervision of maximum security women inmates – focus on how to
control security risks, instead of addressing needs related to institutional adjustment. 539 In
maximum security, not only are Aboriginal women more likely to face solitary
confinement, but they are more likely to be denied access to culturally-appropriate
programming and parole eligibility. 540 Hence, the sanctioned approach for controlling risk
(i.e., physical segregation, controlled movement) promotes more adjustment problems for
incarcerated Aboriginal women and reduces their chances of obtaining a lower security
classification. 541
Despite the well-intended remedies of the Judge in BCCLA decision to reform the
practice of administrative segregation, these remedies simply do not impose the more
appropriate court order that should have been rendered as it concerns Aboriginal women:
abolishing the practice of solitary confinement against Aboriginal women. The very
decision to allow Aboriginal women to be subjected to solitary confinement, even after
acknowledging the particularly severe effect that it has on the well-being of incarcerated
Aboriginal women, means that the State is permitted to continue its systematic practice of
exacerbating violence against Aboriginal women through isolation.

537 CHRC, “Protecting”, supra note 319 at 47.
538 Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Women, Correctional Service of Canada, Secure Unit Operational Plan —
Intensive Intervention in a Secure Environment (Ottawa, CSC, 2003) at 3.
539 CHRC, “Protecting”, supra note 319 at 47.
540 OWJN, supra note 483.
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(c) Disability
Aboriginal women more frequently enter the correctional system in distressed
mental health conditions. As such, the State imposes a burden on Aboriginal women based
on disability by subjecting them to solitary confinement, which further regresses their
mental health conditions. Incarcerated Aboriginal women are almost invariably survivors
of historical abuse from childhood through to adulthood, and they are still mentally unwell,
due to lack of social supports to assist with their past trauma. 542 In fact, some of the most
significant differences between women and men inmates are the prevalence of diagnosed
mental illnesses, self-abuse, and suicide attempts. Federally incarcerated women are 3
times more likely to suffer from depression than their male counterparts. Women are also
more likely than men to take part in escalated self-destructive behaviours, such as slashing
and cutting. 543 The common incidence of self-mutilation and previous suicide attempts,
specifically among Aboriginal women inmates, signify the fundamentally destructive
effect of incarceration on Aboriginal women. 544
As determined in BCCLA, mentally ill inmates generally face disadvantage,
because the correctional staff use unreliable instruments to detect the mental health status
of an inmate (i.e., Computerized Mental Health Intake Screening System (ComMHISS)
and the Suicide Risk Checklist) 545 and also follow an under-inclusive policy (i.e., CD 709)
for determining which inmates cannot be placed in administrative segregation according to
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the manifesting nature of their mental illness. 546 In the midst of the evidentiary portion of
litigation in BCCLA, the CSC changed CD 709 to say the following respecting inmates
with mental health issues as of August 1, 2017:
a prohibition on the use of administrative segregation for inmates with a
“serious mental illness with significant impairment”, and inmates who are
either actively engaging in self-injury that is likely to result in serious bodily
harm or are at elevated or imminent risk for suicide 547 (emphasis added)

CD 709 defines “serious mental illness with significant impairment” as follows:
…[P]resentation of symptoms associated with psychotic, major depressive
and bipolar disorders resulting in significant impairment in functioning.
Assessment of mental disorder and level of impairment is a clinical judgment
and determined by a registered health care professional. Significant
impairment may be characterized by severe impairment in mood, reality
testing, communication or judgment, behaviour that is influenced by
delusions or hallucinations, inability to maintain personal hygiene and
serious impairment in social and interpersonal interactions. This group
includes inmates who are certified in accordance with the relevant
provincial/territorial legislation. 548

The Judge found it was problematic that, according to the federal correctional policy (i.e.,
CD 709), an inmate must display either an active self-injurious behaviour or a “serious
mental illness with significant impairment”, before correctional staff would determine that
an inmate cannot be admitted into administrative segregation. 549 The Judge determined that
this correctional policy, by its very wording, was discriminatory. The two classes of
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inmates identified in CD 709 too narrowly excluded other groups of inmates still struggling
with serious mental health issues that were not visible or ongoing. 550
One expert witness in the case, Dr. Kelley Blanchette listed some of the categories
of people who would be excluded from the two classes mentioned in CD 709:
1. inmates with recent self-injurious histories who were not actively
engaging in self-injury;
2. inmates who emphatically deny suicidal ideation but whose
psychiatric history and behaviour suggests otherwise;
3. inmates afflicted with psychiatric disorders and whose psychotropic
medications have been initiated or recently changed or withdrawn;
4. inmates withdrawing from alcohol or drugs; and
5. inmates with psychiatric and concurrent substance abuse
disorders”. 551

Withal, CD 709 also created a lot of confusion as to how to assess and identify individuals
who fall under the two classes of inmates, meaning that those who fell under either class
could still be at-risk of solitary confinement. 552 The excluded inmates with mental health
issues are equally at-risk of serious harm if they are admitted in administrative
segregation. 553 Thus, the Judge concluded that the CCRA provisions create a more
burdensome effect on mentally ill inmates. 554 The Judge determined that the legal regime,
and the CSC protocols for dealing with mental health issues were inherently
discriminatory. 555 They fail to adequately respond to the prevalence of mental illness in
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correctional institutions. And solitary confinement reinforces, perpetuates, and exacerbates
disadvantage. 556
The flaws revealed in CD 709, as articulated by Dr. Blanchette regarding the
excluded categories of inmates who do not get relief from solitary confinement, ultimately
disadvantage Aboriginal women. Aboriginal women inmates, are consistently high risk for
suicide, self-injurious behaviours, and alcohol and drug abuse. 557 In fact, alcohol and drugs
tend to figure more prominently in the lives and criminal offences committed by
incarcerated women, as income-generating crimes such as fraud, shoplifting, prostitutionrelated offences, and robbery are often perpetrated to support their addictions. 558 As a result,
Aboriginal women will invariably remain a disproportionate sub-group of the excluded
categories of mentally unwell inmates who the State can still deposit in isolation. The
inherently discriminatory State policies concerning solitary confinement for the mentally
ill enable Aboriginal women to remain a sub-group that is disproportionately at-risk of
solitary confinement.

(d) Aboriginal Reserve Status
The State imposes a burden on Aboriginal women through its practice of solitary
confinement, because the State fails to account for the disruptive impact this practice has
on the ability for Aboriginal women to maintain community ties with social supports on
reserves, where many Aboriginal women inmates lived prior to incarceration. In the
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BCCLA decision, the Judge noted that there are fewer institutions for women than there are
for men, and women are on average further away from their home communities. 559 This
can especially be a problem for Aboriginal inmates, because their cultural identity is often
inextricably linked with the land. 560 Already distanced from their reserve communities,
segregation imposes a greater hardship on some Aboriginal women inmates compared to
non-Aboriginal women inmates, as time spent in solitary confinement, leads to weakened
or severed community ties, disrupted healing opportunities, and reduced access to spiritual
and cultural resources, practices, and programming. 561

Bringing This All Together
Having gone through each of the grounds engaged in this discrimination claim, it
is important to emphasize that additional historical problems uniquely impacting
Aboriginal women are not being sufficiently considered by the State when subjecting
Aboriginal women to solitary confinement:
•
•

•
•

The high prevalence of physical, emotional, and sexual abuse
(including while attending residential schools as late as the mid-1990s
and placed in the child welfare system).
The high rates of psychological trauma (i.e., Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, depression, anxiety, suicidality, self-injurious behaviours)
resulting from histories of abuse, which persist and worsen without
professional help.
The lack of concern by law enforcement, and society as a whole, to
the high rates of missing and murdered Indigenous women and girls
in Canada.
The high likelihood of being incarcerated in institutions that are far
from their reserve communities, which has a negative cultural impact
on the identities of Aboriginal women. The place and conditions of
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internment weakens and severs community ties and opportunities for
rehabilitation.

All facets of the personhood of an Aboriginal woman that have been discussed under each
of the mentioned grounds of discrimination – race, national or ethnic origin, sex, disability,
and aboriginal reserve status – multiply compound the vulnerability and burden that
Aboriginal women face in decisions concerning solitary confinement. The problems that
have been described under each of the grounds of discrimination are simultaneously
affecting the experience of Aboriginal women in the context of solitary confinement,
specifically, and the criminal justice system, generally. Focusing on simply one aspect of
Aboriginal women, namely, their race or national or ethnic origin, as was done in the
BCCLA decision, means a discrimination analysis that is devoid of additional contextual
factors that play a parallel role in the disadvantage that Aboriginal women face.
As already determined by experts, studies, commissioned reports, and past
litigation focused on solitary confinement, the intersecting axes of identity have mainly
served to put Aboriginal women at further jeopardy. Their multi-faceted identity has meant
they are farther away from attaining substantive equality, and solitary confinement has
been another State practice that has worsened this problem. In that vein, Aboriginal women
held in solitary confinement cannot reasonably feel secure in knowing that, under the law,
they are recognized as human beings who are equally deserving of concern, respect, and
consideration, as endorsed by the Supreme Court in Andrews. 562

562 Andrews, supra note 386 at 171.
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2. The distinction is discriminatory
The second criterion in the subsection 15(1) analysis is to satisfy this question: Does
the distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping? 563 The
Supreme Court explains that “prejudice” refers to “the perpetuation of prejudice or
disadvantage to members of a group on the basis of personal characteristics identified in
the enumerated and analogous grounds.” 564 Elaborating on “stereotyping”, this refers to
“stereotyping on the basis of these grounds that results in a decision that does not
correspond to a claimant’s or group’s actual circumstances and characteristics.” 565 The
Supreme Court explains that a member of a group that has historically faced greater
disadvantage in Canadian society is less likely to have difficulty establishing
discrimination. 566 As has been discussed in the first stage of this subsection 15(1) analysis,
Aboriginal women are among Canada’s historically and currently most disadvantaged
groups in society. The State has failed to show regard for the heightened vulnerability and
low social positioning of Aboriginal women in decision-making regarding solitary
confinement. Now with the second stage of the subsection 15(1) analysis, the focus is to
demonstrate how solitary confinement perpetuates prejudice or stereotyping against
Aboriginal women.
Solitary confinement is inherently a psychologically harmful practice. A summary
of the health effects of being subjected solitary confinement is key to establishing that
solitary confinement creates a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping. The
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immediate consequence of solitary confinement is that an inmate is denied meaningful
human contact except through a food slot built into the cell door. 567 This deprivation of
social contact is the source of the greatest psychological pain for isolated inmates. 568 The
harmful effects of sensory deprivation can develop as quickly as 48 hours, altering brain
activity. 569 Studies on the effects of solitary confinement mention the following as potential
adverse effects to the psychological, social, and spiritual health of inmates after extended
periods of time: delirium, psychosis, major depression, hallucinations, paranoia, aggression,
rage, loss of appetite, self-harm, disruption of sleep patterns, 570 hypersensitivity to external
stimuli,571 panic attacks, difficulty with thinking or concentration or memory, intensive
obsessional thoughts, 572 paranoia, problems with impulse control, 573 and suicidal ideation
and behaviour 574. Self-mutilation and suicide are more prevalent in solitary confinement,
due to environmental stresses, specifically, the isolation, punitive sanctions, and severely
restrictive living conditions related to their confinement. 575

567 Kevin Griffin, “Aboriginal woman settles lawsuit that claimed she was treated inhumanely in B.C. jail” Vancouver
Sun (22 May 2013) online: <www.vancouversun.com> [Griffin].
568 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 185.
569 CCLA v The Queen, supra note 148 at paras 123, 126. The College of Family Physicians of Canada also concluded
that solitary confinement can alter brain activity and result in symptoms within days. Ibid at para 126.
570 Piché & Major, supra note 5 at 24. BCCLA v Canada, supra note 123 at paras 160, 185. McLeod, supra note 57 at
1178. Canadian Civil Liberties Association, “Submission to the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional
Services Review of Segregation in Ontario Adult Correctional Facilities” (5 May 2016) online:
<ccla.org/cclanewsite/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2016-05-05-CCLA-Submission-re-MCSCS-SegregationReview.pdf> at 4 [CCLA “Submission”].
571 According to research conducted by Dr. Grassian, some inmates report a progressive inability to tolerate ordinary
stimuli. BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 165.
572 Ibid. Dr. Grassian stated that some inmates report the emergence of primitive aggressive fantasies of revenge,
torture and mutilation of the prison guards. In each case the fantasies were described as entirely unwelcome,
frightening and uncontrollable.
573 Ibid. Dr. Grassian found that some inmates reported episodes of loss of impulse control with random violence,
such as throwing things around, “snap[ping] off the handle over absolutely nothing”, and even impulsive selfmutilation.
574 Ibid at para 185.
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In 2012-2013, the OCI reported that a small number of women prisoners (37 of 264
total prisoners) disproportionately accounted for about 36% of all 901 reported self-injury
incidents, which includes both men and women. 576 Aboriginal prisoners accounted for over
35% of all self-harming incidents. Aboriginal women, specifically, accounted for nearly
45% of all self-injury incidents among the women prisoner population. 577
Suicidal behaviours are often viewed by correctional staff as a manipulative tactic
of the inmate, and is met with punishment, typically more solitary confinement. 578
Ironically, this is the very thing that encourages incidents of suicide attempts. 579 Poor
criminal justice outcomes respecting Aboriginal women, including rates of solitary
confinement, arise from prejudice as Aboriginal women are racially profiled, adversely
impacted because of their sex, or singled out for behaviours connected to mental illness.
As they mentally deteriorate in confinement, correctional staff will continue to regard them
as ‘difficult to manage’ inmates, leading to continued confinement, and the vicious and
deadly cycle of stereotyping and prejudice continues.
Solitary confinement perpetuates prejudice. Curiously, the Judge in BCCLA
acknowledged that sentencing terms and rehabilitative programming for Aboriginal
inmates are disproportionately negatively affected by the practice of administrative
segregation. Aboriginal inmates are denied meaningful opportunities to show rehabilitation
and carry out their correctional plan. 580 But, the Judge moved on to allow this racially
discriminatory practice. The Judge allowed a practice that enables the State to deem
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Aboriginal inmates not rehabilitated in disproportionate numbers, even though the State,
by its very doing, has contributed to the lack of rehabilitation. Ultimately the State has
created the public risks, and as a result, has demonstrated an example of poor criminal
justice administration. Procedural safeguards for the review process of administrative
segregation, which the Judge aimed to implement through the remedies he ordered, will
not amount to safeguards against discrimination. This is especially if courts do not feel
compelled to impose safeguards against discrimination, specifically.
The Judge in BCCLA said the following on discrimination against women in general:
Indeed, there have been past injustices in the treatment of women inmates as
detailed in Justice Arbour’s report and, more recently, the existence of the
Management Protocol, which caused one of the witnesses, Ms. Worm, to
spend approximately one half of her five-year robbery sentence in
administrative segregation. After years of protests by the OCI, CSC
terminated the Management Protocol in 2011. In the present, however, I am
satisfied that the impugned provisions do not have a disproportionate effect
on women. 581

However, this pronouncement by the Judge is inaccurate, seeing the unique disadvantage
that Aboriginal women endure when they are subjected to solitary confinement. And the
Judge in BCCLA acknowledged this disadvantage against Aboriginal women, noting that
the disproportionate effect is more severe for Aboriginal women compared to Aboriginal
men. 582 Certainly, this finding concerning the relative effects of solitary confinement as
between Aboriginal men and women played a significant role in the Judge’s conclusion

581 Ibid at para 463.
582 Ibid at para 470.
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that administrative segregation perpetuates or exacerbates disadvantage against Aboriginal
inmates. As such, State discrimination against Aboriginal inmates was established. 583
As the Judge in BCCLA failed to recognize, solitary confinement is a direct threat
to women’s personal security, as the number of women, particularly Aboriginal and poor
women, entering prison with mental health problems increases. 584 Contrary to stereotypes,
these women, who have experienced lifetimes of abuse and suffer with mental health issues,
do not pose a great risk to public safety. To subject them to solitary confinement, including
maximum security classifications, is to treat them in a manner that does not correspond to
their actual circumstances and characteristics. 585 Yet, solitary confinement creates a selffulling prophecy. The deterioration that Aboriginal women undergo in solitary
confinement inevitably makes them a danger to themselves and others, as the number of
women who are housed in isolating or segregated conditions continues to rise. 586 While
Aboriginal women inmates are placed in solitary confinement more often and for longer
periods, they self-destruct and become unable to show themselves worthy of transferring
to a lower security institution, or obtaining conditional release. 587 These women can spend
their entire sentences – and some can even die – in solitary confinement. 588
Correctional staff frequently use solitary confinement as a behaviour modification
tool in a way that defies their principle of implementing the practice when there are no
“reasonable” or “possible” alternatives available. 589 One inmate described solitary
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confinement as “a test to break your spirit, to bend your will. The longer you resist, the
longer the enemy tries.” 590 According to the OCI, administrative segregation is “the most
commonly used population management tool to address tensions and conflicts in federal
correctional facilities” and manage inmates who have mental health issues, are selfinjurious, and at risk of suicide. 591 As long-time critic of solitary confinement and former
Canadian Supreme Court Justice, Louise Arbour, stresses, punishment should not be an
opportunity for the State to engage in further abuse of its inmates. 592
The Supreme Court says, “In determining whether there is discrimination on
grounds relating to the personal characteristics of the individual or group, it is important to
look not only at the impugned legislation which has created a distinction that violates the
right to equality but also to the larger social, political and legal context.” 593 The practice of
solitary confinement is counter-productive to achieving the healing and reconciliation in
Canadian society that is spearheaded by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
Canada, 594 which has highlighted the need to eradicate Aboriginal over-representation
throughout the criminal justice system among its 94 Calls to Action.595 Instead, the practice
is an affront to the ameliorative work in social, political, and legal contexts, that
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governments in Canada must do to eradicate the rampant social problems persisting in
Aboriginal communities as a result of poor State social administrations.
The idea that solitary confinement is not discriminatory, because those who are
subjected it are simply the individuals who find themselves incarcerated – meaning the
State is not intentionally trying to disadvantage Aboriginal women – holds no weight.
Intention is not necessary to prove to show that a State practice imposes a burden on a
claimant. Discrimination can still be established based on adverse impact on a person or
group as a result of personal characteristics. Yet, at the same time, solitary confinement,
along with other criminal justice practices are fundamentally State-controlled decisions.
The fact that Aboriginal women are more frequently placed in solitary confinement and for
longer periods reflects what the Supreme Court judicially noted in Gladue, 596 that is, there
is a culture of racial-bias in all stages of the criminal process, as systemic and systematic
decision-making repeatedly disadvantages Aboriginal peoples.

The Balancing Test: Disputing the State’s Reasonable Limits Claim Under Section 1
Competing societal interests may at times require that a claimant’s Charter rights
be limited. 597 Entrenching this principle, Charter section 1 states the following:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

596 Gladue, supra note 76 at para 61.
597 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 548.
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This results in two criteria that must be satisfied by the State after a Charter violation is
established: 598
1. Is the purpose for which the limit is imposed pressing and substantial?
2. Are the means by which the legislative purpose is furthered
proportionate?
(a) Is the limit rationally connected to the purpose?
(b) Does the limit minimally impair the Charter right?
(c) Is the law proportionate in its effect? 599

Without the benefit of assessing the State’s justifications for the Charter subsection 15(1)
violation against Aboriginal women, I will nevertheless provide reasons why continued
practice of solitary confinement must fail under a Charter section 1 analysis.

1. The Pressing and Substantial Objectives
At this stage, the State’s law, policy, or action – whose measures causing the
Charter violation are claimed to advance – must have sufficient importance to justify
overriding the Charter violation. 600 The Supreme Court rules that the standard to override
a Charter violation must be high to prevent objectives that are trivial or discordant with
principles of a free and democratic society becoming salvaged under Charter section 1. 601
In CCLA, the Judge articulated the purposes of administrative segregation in the federal
prison system: “The purposes of administrative segregation are the preservation of the
security of the penitentiary, the safety of the people working in the penitentiary, the safety
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of the inmates housed there and the integrity of serious investigations.” 602 Notably, CCRA
subsection 31(1) provides a statutory purpose for administrative segregation, which is “to
maintain the security of the penitentiary or the safety of any person by not allowing an
inmate to associate with other inmates.” It appears the provincial correctional systems
would ascribe to similar objectives for the practice of administrative segregation, especially
since the grounds for which an inmate can be placed in administrative segregation are
similar under both the federal and Ontario provincial laws. Subsection 31(3) of the federal
CCRA says the following:
The institutional head may order that an inmate be confined in administrative
segregation if the institutional head is satisfied that there is no reasonable
alternative to administrative segregation and he or she believes on
reasonable grounds that
(a) the inmate has acted, has attempted to act or intends to act in a
manner that jeopardizes the security of the penitentiary or the safety
of any person and allowing the inmate to associate with other inmates
would jeopardize the security of the penitentiary or the safety of any
person;
(b) allowing the inmate to associate with other inmates would
interfere with an investigation that could lead to a criminal charge or
a charge under subsection 41(2) of a serious disciplinary offence; or
(c) allowing the inmate to associate with other inmates would
jeopardize the inmate’s safety.
Concerning administrative segregation, section 34 of Ontario’s MCS Regulations, reads as
follows:
The Superintendent may place an inmate in segregation if,
(a) in the opinion of the Superintendent, the inmate is in need of protection;
(b) in the opinion of the Superintendent, the inmate must be segregated to
protect the security of the institution or the safety of other inmates;
(c) the inmate is alleged to have committed a misconduct of a serious nature;
or
(d) the inmate requests to be placed in segregation.
602 CCLA v The Queen, supra note 148 at para 159.
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As for disciplinary segregation, the federal CCRA articulates the intended purpose of
disciplinary segregation, under section 38, which is “to encourage inmates to conduct
themselves in a manner that promotes the good order of the penitentiary, through a process
that contributes to the inmates’ rehabilitation and successful reintegration into the
community”. In the Ontario provincial system, disciplinary segregation is known as “close
segregation”. Again, it is inferred that the provincial system would ascribe to the same
legislative objective, since segregation for disciplinary reasons in the federal and provincial
systems is imposed when an inmate commits a serious “disciplinary offence” under CCRA
sections 40 and 44(1)(f) or “misconduct” under subsection 32(2) of the MCS Regulations.
Solitary confinement can also be used on inmates with mental health issues. In the
federal system, inmates who (1) are self-injurious; (2) are suicidal; or (3) have a serious
mental illness with significant impairment, may be subjected to solitary confinement under
CD 843, which instructs correctional staff to place identified inmates in observation cells
(e.g., “High Watch”, “Modified Watch”, “Suicide Watch”, clinical isolation or
seclusion). 603 The point of this and other means of managing inmates with mental health
issues pursuant to CCRA sections 85-88 is “using observation or restraint as a last resort
for the purpose of preserving life and preventing serious bodily harm, while maintaining
their dignity in a safe and secure environment”. 604 The Ontario system also has policy that

603 CD 843, supra note 223. OCI, “Risky Business”, supra note 223 at 31.
604 CD 843, supra note 223.
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enables correctional staff to place inmates in forms of “segregation” for similar legislative
purposes (i.e., medical isolation 605 and special needs units 606). 607
It is admitted that the legislative objectives for solitary confinement identified
above are pressing and substantial concerns for the State in the operation of correctional
institutions.

Refuting an Ameliorative Object for Solitary Confinement
Charter subsection 15(1) is aimed at preventing discriminatory distinctions that
adversely impact members of groups identified by the grounds enumerated in section 15
or analogous grounds determined by courts. 608 Contrarily, subsection 15(2) preserves the
right for the government, without fear of a Charter subsection 15(1) challenge, to create
programs that operate to help disadvantaged groups improve their situation. 609 It is
ultimately the State’s responsibility to prove that solitary confinement falls within the
scope of achieving an ameliorative object under subsection 15(2), and as such, is not
discriminatory. 610
To entertain the idea that any form of solitary confinement has an ameliorative
purpose simply represents a lack of awareness of the State violence that is perpetrated
through this practice. I will venture to argue why a court should not accept representations
by the State that solitary confinement has an ameliorative object.
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As articulated by legal scholars, such as Professor Debra Parkes at the Law Faculty
of University of British Columbia, Canadian society generally assumes a “carceral logic”
that correctional facilities are rehabilitative, and solitary confinement is necessary for
inmates who do not adjust to the correctional environment, or who are dangerous and must
be caged. 611 Parkes makes this poignant explanation:
Imprisonment itself creates its own logic and imperative for the use of
solitary. When people are put in cages, many of them will not respond
well to that environment. They will act out. They will harm themselves
or others. Consequently, they are put in smaller cages (segregation cells)
and they do even less well, but they are contained. The fundamental
carceral logic of punishing and caging goes unchallenged. 612

This carceral logic has informed and legitimized the practice of solitary confinement
throughout Canadian history. 613 The fallacy of this carceral logic is most apparent when
reviewing the health effects of solitary confinement. The Judge in BCCLA acknowledged
that inmates with mental health issues are disproportionality subjected to administrative
segregation and suffer more when placed in segregation. He recognized that “psychological
harm [is] inherent in the segregation experience”. 614 The State cannot reasonably expect
for a practice that has been determined as inherently psychologically harmful, to advance
an ameliorative purpose for inmates, who are already vulnerable and suffer from higher
rates of mental health issues.
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The conditions of jails and prisons are also inherently conducive to inmate
deterioration and are ineffective. 615 This is evident when the State resorts to isolating
inmates to address problems that occur within the prison population, where State control
is already at its highest degree, and the effectiveness of the State’s actions can be observed
plainly, provided one gets access to observe the State’s operation of prisons.
This is precisely why it is also an awry notion that the State would place individuals
in solitary confinement for “their own protection”, considering the destructive effects of
the practice. ‘Protective’ solitary confinement reveals the problematic nature of prison life,
suggesting that the prison society that the State creates and controls is worse than the
mental battle that takes place in an inmate’s mind. Inevitably, the fact that the State uses
solitary confinement reveals the State’s poor management of inmates and exemplifies the
State’s poor criminal justice administration. As the Judge in BCCLA stated in reference to
the old concept of “voluntary segregation”, “This terminology has recently ceased to be
used because there was a perception that these inmates needed to be segregated because of
CSC’s inability to keep them safe in the general prison population.” 616 The 2014-2015
Annual Report from the OCI supports this judicial finding: “Most inmates who voluntarily
request administrative segregation would return to the general inmate population if the risk
to their physical integrity was removed and their safety assured by the CSC.” 617 It is clear
that the State must do better with administering corrections. A court must not allow for the
prevailing carceral logic of incarceration and solitary confinement to crystallize in
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constitutionalized form, creating barriers to vulnerable prisoners in desperate need of basic
protections that will recognize their human dignity and show they are deserving of
concern. 618

2. The Proportionality Analysis
At this second stage in the Charter section 1 analysis, the State must satisfy that the
way in which the State aims to further its legislative purposes is proportionate. 619 This
involves addressing three sub-issues: (a) rational connection; (b) minimal impairment; and
(c) a comparison of salutary and deleterious effects.

(a) Rational Connection
To establish a rational connection, the State must show “a causal connection
between the infringement and the benefit sought on the basis of reason or logic.” 620 The
measures must be carefully designed to achieve the objective. The rational connection
requirement is aimed at preventing limits being imposed on rights arbitrarily. 621 The State
must show that it is reasonable to suppose that the limit may further the goal, not that it
will do so. 622
In BCCLA, the Judge recognized that there is no rational connection between
prolonged segregation, which the provisions concerning administrative segregation allow,
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and its legislative objective. 623 Saving “temporary segregation” as rationally connected to
the objectives of security and safety, the Judge found that indefinite segregation and
prolonged segregation (i.e., solitary confinement for more than 15 days under rule 44 of
the Nelson Mandela Rules) 624 inflicts harm on inmates and ultimately undermines
institutional security. 625 This practice of keeping inmates segregated for months or even
years is unnecessary and undermines the objectives, as inmates lose the ability to interact
with other human beings; are deprived from rehabilitative and educational group
programming; and descend into mental illness. 626 Professor Michael Jackson, whose
evidence was relied on by the Judge stated that in segregation, inmates generate “a
powerful and toxic mix of bitterness, resentment and anger that undermines respect not
only for correctional authority but also for lawful society to which most inmates will
return”. 627 Inmates become more dangerous in prison society and general society. 628
Countering the ingrained carceral logic that was kept intact in BCCLA and the line
of cases in the past that have touched on solitary confinement, I argue that the very act of
isolating or secluding inmates is not rationally connected to the objectives of administrative
segregation (i.e., to maintain security and safety) or disciplinary segregation (i.e., to
promote the good order of the penitentiary, through a process that contributes to the inmates’
rehabilitation and successful reintegration into the community”). The rational connection
requirement is aimed at preventing limits being imposed on rights arbitrarily. 629 But, as
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recent as the BCCLA decision in January 2018, a number of the CSC’s witnesses agreed
that Aboriginal inmates in particular may be racially profiled within prison walls. 630
Meanwhile in the Ontario correctional system, placement in specialized units,
which includes mental health units, special needs units, and segregation, is often
determined by correctional staff’s personal intuitions and unverified information from
previous custodial terms. 631 This decision-making process easily reinforces stereotypes,
which results in individualized and systemic discrimination. 632 A former corrections staff
member who spoke to the Independent Review of Ontario Corrections Team was moved
to tears while recalling the stereotypes of Indigenous peoples that were expressed by
colleagues at a ministry-delivered cultural sensitivity training course. 633 Racial profiling –
targeting inmates based on a Charter-protected ground of identity – does not reflect a
corporate attitude among correctional staff of imposing limits on vulnerable inmates
without arbitrariness.
Worse still, the 2014-2015 Annual Report from the OCI uncovered the following
concerning women inmates:
The women reported to the Office that they saw no difference between
administrative segregation, disciplinary segregation, suicide watch or
clinical isolation or seclusion. They perceived these placements, regardless
of their name or purpose, as punishment for their self-injurious behaviour.
Further, as the Office’s prison suicide investigation noted, segregation was
found to be an independent factor that elevated the risk of suicide. 634
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Another OCI report, which considered the phenomenon of chronic self-injury in women’s
prisons, revealed as follows:
The Office heard from a number of women that they routinely refrain from
discussing their self-injury ideations or behaviour with either mental health
staff or other support staff (e.g., Elders) out of fear that these individuals
will inform security staff and the women will be segregated as a result. 635

This finding by the OCI reveals that solitary confinement does not promote security for
women inmates, as they feel reprimanded when they demonstrate signs of distress in the
correctional environment, which could very well discourage them from seeking help. In
isolation, without meaningful human contact, women inmates are relegated to suffer in
tortuous silence. Solitary confinement does not promote safety, as it is the very institutional
practice that boosts the risk of suicide among inmates. Solitary confinement does not
promote “good order”, because it is the very institutional practice that obstructs the
rehabilitation of inmates and impedes the process of successful integration with the
community. The State cannot reasonably suppose a practice that has been determined as
inherently psychologically harmful, or that is wielded in a racially-biased way, or that is
perceived by women inmates as punishment for having legitimate and serious health issues,
furthers the legislative objectives that the State promotes.

(b) Minimal Impairment
This inquiry in the proportionality analysis focuses on whether there are alternative,
less drastic means of achieving the State’s objective in a real and substantial manner.636

635 OCI, “Risky Business”, supra note 223 at 26.
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The means that are chosen by the State should violate a Charter right or freedom "as little
as possible". 637 In this inquiry, the Court must accord Parliament a measure of deference,
particularly on complex social issues where Parliament may be better positioned than the
courts to choose among a range of alternatives. 638 However, if the State is best
characterized as “the singular antagonist” of an individual whose Charter right has been
violated, then a court can assess with greater certainty whether the least intrusive means
have been chosen to further the State's objective. 639 In Multani v Commission scolaire
Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 640 a case involving issues of discrimination, the Supreme Court
pronounced in its minimal impairment inquiry that there is a duty to make reasonable
accommodation for those adversely affected by a State rule or policy that is neutral on its
face, but causes undue hardship to a claimant. 641
The Judge in BCCLA ruled that segregation is overly restrictive by sanctioning
solitary confinement in circumstances where some lesser form of restriction would achieve
the legislative objective. 642 The Judge noted that the previous iteration of administrative
segregation under CCRA subsection 31(1), which existed prior to 2012, stated the
following: “The purpose of administrative segregation is to keep an inmate from
associating with the general inmate population.” 643 Contrarily, the current statutory
purpose of administrative segregation is more restrictive, and involves “not allowing an
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inmate to associate with other inmates”. 644 The Judge observed that the previous iteration
allowed for accommodations where sub-populations of compatible inmates could coexist
in the same space. 645 If an inmate’s safety is in jeopardy because of other inmates, the
Judge concluded that the logical and less impairing recourse is to simply remove the inmate
from those particular inmates, not from all inmates. 646
The Government in BCCLA claimed that the law on administrative segregation, in
particular, ensures a minimal impairment as the State says that segregation is used in
exceptional circumstances when no other option exists to maintain the safety of inmates
and/or the institution.647 Further, it is only applied for the shortest time possible to achieve
these ends. 648 But the Judge found there were other options that the State has already
implemented instead of solitary confinement to achieve its legislative objective.
As one example, Stony Mountain Institution in Manitoba has a sheltered unit for
intellectually, low-functioning inmates who have difficulty living in general population,
because they engage in habits that are offensive or annoying to other inmates, or they are
loner inmates who prefer staying in their cells. 649 The activities in the unit promote social
skills in inmates. These inmates would have otherwise been at high risk for segregation.650
As another example, a living unit at Edmonton Institution for Women is available for lowfunctioning women who require special supervision to live among others – previously their
dysfunctional behaviours often led to conflict and violence – landing them in segregation.
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But, in the living unit, a behavioural counsellor supervises the unit part-time to provide
supportive counselling and teach social skills. 651
As for inmates suffering from mental illness, the Judge in BCCLA concluded that
“the most obvious – and far less impairing – alternative to administrative segregation is
treatment.” 652 The Judge specifically said that “There is no reason why CSC cannot treat
mentally ill inmates as a health problem, not a security problem.” 653 Dr. Kelly HannahMoffat pointed out in evidence one illustrative initiative in the United States for inmates
with serious mental health issues. 654 The New York Department of Corrections and the
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene aim to abolish solitary confinement and adopt
a treatment approach for inmates with serious mental health issues who break institutional
rules. These inmates will be placed in clinical settings where clinical staff have authority
to provide individual and group therapy in response to problematic behaviour. Moreover,
inmates with mild to moderate mental health and behavioural problems (e.g., personality
disorders) can be managed in a setting where tangible incentives that allow inmates out of
their cells are awarded when inmates participate in programs and obey institutional rules.655
In his minimal impairment analysis, the Judge in BCCLA accepted the testimony of
the Government’s witness, Dr. Margo Rivera, who commented on alternative measures
that have been created over the years. 656 Dr. Rivera explained that those measures that
failed and were shut down, did so because resources were reduced, rendering these
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measures no longer ineffective. This would happen, even though staff approved the utility
of these alternative measures in providing the extra attention and intervention that was
needed to lessen episodes of “acting out” and divert vulnerable inmates from solitary
confinement. Moreover, Dr. Rivera advised that special-needs alternative measures are
more effective when they are created and supervised by staff who are committed to the
success of their functioning. 657
These creative examples of alternatives represent healthier and more productive
ways for the State to achieve its legislative objectives in a real and substantial manner.
These measures avoided solitary confinement, in spite of situations where inmates exhibit
intellectual challenges or behavioural problems that would attract administrative
segregation or commit institutional offences that would attract disciplinary segregation.
The measures demonstrate the ingenuity and progressive imagination that can be unlocked
for the safety, well-being, and rehabilitation of inmates. 658 Surely, there are more
alternatives that can be devised to engage all inmates in these ameliorative measures and
avoid instances of regressive solitary confinement. A court can know with great certainty
that these lesser intrusive means will advance the legislative objectives, especially since
the State is “the singular antagonist” of the Charter rights of Aboriginal women inmates,
specifically, and the custodial population generally. 659 The State has primary control over
how inmates are managed and rehabilitated in correctional institutions. Solitary
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confinement – in any form – is simply an archaic, excessively restrictive, and counterproductive measure. The State has alternative means at its disposal.

(c) Salutary Versus Deleterious Effects
This final inquiry of the proportionality analysis weighs the impact of the law on
protected rights against the beneficial effect of the law and policy in terms of the greater
public good. 660 The inquiry entails a broad evaluation of whether the benefits of the
impugned law and policy are worth the costs of the rights limitation. 661 The more severe
the deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be if the
measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 662
Regarding the salutary effects of solitary confinement, the State argued in BCCLA
that administrative segregation is “a measure that is used to separate either at-risk inmates
from unsafe conditions or aggressors who pose a threat to personal or institutional
safety.” 663 The State contends there is no greater salutary effect than keeping inmates alive.
Administrative segregation restricts a segregated inmate’s residual liberty interest to
protect the Charter section 7 right to life of the segregated inmate or others. The
correctional system also has a societal interest in protecting the safety of inmates under its
care. 664 Surely, segregation based on mental health issues would have similar salutary
effects. In the case of disciplinary segregation, another salutary effect that might be
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proffered is the opportunity to instill respect for the law and for authority figures, which
include those within prison and outside prison.
However, the salutary effects mentioned above are not being achieved through
solitary confinement. Rather, the deleterious effects better represent the impact of the
practice of solitary confinement on prison society and general society. Solitary
confinement aggravates the depressing and oppressive carceral environment due to
instances of racism and bias exhibited by correctional staff. It triggers and worsens the
psychological, social, and spiritual health issues of inmates. It develops vengeful and
enraged attitudes in inmates towards staff and creates a lack of trust between correctional
staff and inmates. It dissuades women inmates, largely Aboriginal women inmates, from
seeking help from correctional staff – including health professionals – regarding their
struggles with self-injurious habits or suicidal ideation. It makes inmates more likely to
commit suicide, which directly militates against the State’s main salutary appeal of keeping
inmates alive. It impedes the successful rehabilitation and integration of inmates in the
community, which means that isolated inmates leave imprisonment posing the same or
greater risk to public safety. And without access to the programming that is either available
or possible as an alternative to solitary confinement, isolated inmates lack sufficient social
skills training, psychiatric help, and counselling for challenges they face while imprisoned
or for criminogenic life obstacles they experienced prior to imprisonment. These
deleterious effects reveal that a court should afford little weight to the State’s alleged
salutary effects.
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Justifying the Remedy
It is a longstanding Canadian legal principle that one cannot depend on a right, if
there is no effective remedy available to protect it. 665 The remedy imposed is the operative
component of a court order that makes a right concrete within a fact scenario. 666
Constitution Act, 1982, subsection 52(1) is applicable to this discrimination challenge to
the extent that law and policy enables the State to subject Aboriginal women to different
forms of solitary confinement. The unique combination of personal characteristics of
Aboriginal women in the context of Canadian society has resulted in their compounded
vulnerability and risk of disadvantage in the correctional system. And this renders any law
or policy that allows the State to isolate, seclude, or segregate Aboriginal women inherently
discriminatory. Charter subsection 24(1) is also applicable to this discrimination challenge
to the extent that the State’s conduct or actions, while enforcing the law and policy on
solitary confinement, demonstrates a disposition of the State to discriminate against
Aboriginal women.
From the outset, the point of this analysis on remedies is not to suggest that a court
should grant Aboriginal women remedies under both subsections 52(1) and 24(1), as it is
recognized that courts will rarely award remedies deriving from both provisions in the same
case. 667 The point of this analysis is to show that under either remedy provision, which
showcases a different perspective on how discrimination is perpetrated by the State, it can
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be demonstrated why a court should order a remedy that ensures the State ends the practice
of solitary confinement on Aboriginal women.

Constitution Act, 1982, Subsection 52(1)
A remedy under subsection 52(1) is sought against prescriptions in law or policy
that sanction administrative segregation, disciplinary segregation, segregation or seclusion
for mental health reasons, and other forms of internment that equate to solitary confinement
under The Nelson Mandela Rules. The law and policy governing solitary confinement are
inconsistent with the right against discrimination under Charter subsection 15(1) to the
extent that they enable the State to subject Aboriginal women to this practice. The array of
law and policy that exists, which authorize different forms of solitary confinement, do not
allow for requesting a remedy that addresses a pinpointed singular passage of text in either
the federal or provincial legal schemes. 668 Accordingly, under subsection 52(1), the
remedy requested is for a reading down of law or policy, so that all Aboriginal women in
prison or jail must not be subjected to conditions of solitary confinement. I will explain
why this remedy is warranted to address the Charter subsection 15(1) violation concerning
Aboriginal women.
Constitution Act, 1982, subsection 52(1), the constitutional supremacy clause, reads:
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the
inconsistency, of no force or effect.

668 Department of Justice Canada, “Subsection 52(1) – The supremacy clause” Charterpedia (28 June 2018)
online:<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/check/art521.html> [DOJ, “Subsection 52(1)”].
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The broad language of subsection 52(1) reflects that all law, which includes common law,
must be consistent with the Constitution of Canada. 669 Subsection 52(1) is available when
a Charter violation results from the legislation itself, as opposed to when the State engages
in a Charter-infringing discretionary action despite a constitutionally-consistent
legislation. 670 In other words, it must be demonstrated that the provisions themselves
cannot be enforced upon without violating Canada’s constitutional laws. 671 In providing a
remedy under subsection 52(1), the guiding principles that must be adhered to are respect
for the role of the legislature – that is, going as far as necessary to protect rights and no
further – and respect for the purposes of the Charter – which is represented by the purpose
of the specific Charter right that is engaged in litigation. 672
The purpose of section 15 is to promote substantive equality in Canada. This entails
considering the impact of laws on members of groups subjected to stereotyping and historic
disadvantage and striving for a society in which everyone can feel secure in knowing that,
under the law, they are recognized as human beings who are equally deserving of concern,
respect, and consideration. 673 The law and policy authorizing solitary confinement as
applied to Aboriginal women is inherently discriminatory and will continue to offend the
constitutional principle of substantive equality, because of the unique intersecting aspects
of identity that represent Aboriginal women in the context of Canadian society.
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The identity of Aboriginal women in Canada is forever marked by colonial trauma.
The Supreme Court in Gladue recognized that the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders
differ from the majority, because they are victims of systemic and direct discrimination,
derived from the deep-seated colonial legacy in Canada. 674 The CSC admits to the current
day ripple effects of colonialism in Canada in CD 702, which lists various features of
“Aboriginal social history”. Again, the list includes the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

effects of the residential school system
sixties scoop into the adoption system
effects of the dislocation and dispossession of Inuit people
family or community history of suicide
family or community history of substance abuse
family or community history of victimization
family or community fragmentation
level or lack of formal education
level of connectivity with family/community
experience in the child welfare system
experience with poverty
loss of or struggle with cultural/spiritual identity

However, this list in correctional law does not capture the derogation of the social
positioning that Aboriginal women once had prior to European contact – a time when they
were leaders and matriarchs possessing inheritance, wealth, and power in their
communities. This list does not highlight how the plundering and dislocation of their
communities, or the funnelling of their children in residential schools and the child welfare
system, commenced cycles of physical, emotional, and sexual abuse of Aboriginal women
and girls. This list does not emphasize the high prevalence of psychological harm sustained
by Aboriginal women and girls, because of their histories of abuse and impoverished

674 Gladue, supra note 76 at para 68.
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upbringings. Nor does this list explain how the psychological harm sustained by Aboriginal
women and girls is manifested in the substances they abuse, or the crimes they commit, or
the lack of their collective progression in society. This list does not mention how
incarcerated Aboriginal women removed from their reserve lands experience a
deterioration of social and cultural ties that diminishes their chances for rehabilitation and
successful re-integration in Canadian society. Colonial trauma has become ingrained, allencompassing, and prevailing in the experience and identity of Aboriginal women in
Canadian society.
The vulnerability is apparent. But then they are subjected to solitary confinement.
The law and policy permitting this practice on Aboriginal women has been determined in
court to cause a more severe disproportionate effect on Aboriginal women’s ability to
rehabilitate and socially re-integrate. Aboriginal women, themselves, have expressed that
they perceive their placement in solitary confinement as punishment, whenever they
disclose their suicidal or self-injurious ideation and behaviours to correctional staff. The
histories of abuse which haunt and distress Aboriginal women are all the more exacerbated
when they are deposited in solitary confinement. They share that they feel rejection,
abandonment, invisibility, and a denial of their existence when placed in solitary
confinement. The law and policy on solitary confinement do not demonstrate to Aboriginal
women that they are equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration, as they are
entitled to under section 15. Rather, the law and policy perpetuate disadvantage against
them.
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A remedy that excludes Aboriginal women from any form of solitary confinement
shows respect for the legislature by only going so far as it is necessary to protect the
equality rights of Aboriginal women and shows respect for the purposes of the Charter –
specifically section 15 – by promoting substantive equality.

Charter Subsection 24(1)
In the alternative, a remedy is sought under Charter subsection 24(1). Subsection
24(1) is applicable to this discrimination challenge to the extent that the State’s conduct or
actions, while enforcing the law and policy on solitary confinement, demonstrates a
disposition of the State to discriminate against Aboriginal women. The remedy requested
is for declaratory relief: the court should declare that the manner in which the State uses
solitary confinement against Aboriginal women is unconstitutional, because Aboriginal
women’s section 15 rights to equality are violated by the State’s discriminatory use of the
practice.
Charter subsection 24(1) states the following:
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been
infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain
such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.

Charter subsection 24(1) should be given the same generous and purposive interpretation
as other provisions of the Charter. 675 While subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
provides a remedy for laws that violate a Charter right either in purpose or effect,

675 Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62 at para 25, [2003] 3 SCR 3 [DoucetBoudreau].
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subsection 24(1) of the Charter provides a remedy for State actions that violate a Charter
right. 676 The purpose of a subsection 24(1) remedy is to provide responsive and effective
remedies. 677 Under subsection 24(1), judges are afforded an explicit grant of remedial
discretion to redress persons whose own rights have been violated. The Supreme Court has
pronounced, “It is difficult to imagine language which could give the court a wider and less
fettered discretion.” 678 This remedial discretion is not hampered by statutes or common
law, but only the following constitutional principles:
1. An appropriate and just remedy in the circumstances of the Charter claim is
one that is relevant to the experience of the claimant and that meaningfully
addresses the circumstances that led to the violation of a Charter right. 679
2. An appropriate and just remedy must respect the relationships between, and
the separation of, the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. By
imposing a remedy under subsection 24(1), a court must not depart unduly
or unnecessarily from its role of adjudicating disputes and providing
remedies focused on redressing those disputes. 680
3. An appropriate and just remedy is judicial by its nature – it vindicates rights
while invoking the powers of the courts. 681
4. An appropriate and just remedy is one that is fair to the party against whom
the order is made. The remedy should not create substantial hardships that
do not relate to protecting a right. 682
5. Section 24 is a component of the constitutional scheme for vindicating
Charter rights and freedoms. Considering the broad language and the array
of roles this remedy provision plays in Charter cases, it should be allowed to
evolve to meet the challenges and circumstances of cases. The evolution may
lead to creative and novel features relative to the traditional and historical
practice of applying this provision, since tradition and history cannot impede
reasoned and compelling notions of appropriate and just remedies. 683
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Sharpe & Roach, supra note 382 at 374. R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6 at para 61, [2008] 1 SCR 96 [Ferguson].
Doucet-Boudreau, supra note 675 at para 25.
Ibid at para 50.
Ibid at para 55.
Ibid at para 56.
Ibid at para 57.
Ibid at para 58.
Ibid at para 59.

Cracking Down on Cages | 168

Under subsection 24(1), a court of competent jurisdiction has discretion to make a
declaration of unconstitutionality, as it is regarded by the Supreme Court as “an effective
and flexible remedy for the settlement of real disputes”, 684
While the Judge in BCCLA noted the Management Protocol, which mainly targeted
Aboriginal women, including Ms. BobbyLee Worm, was terminated by the CSC in
2011, 685 this does not mean that the State’s discriminatory use of solitary confinement has
ended. The end of the Management Protocol did not lead to the end of disproportionate
numbers of Aboriginal women in solitary confinement. Reporting from community
advocates and the OCI repeat this same problem on a consistent basis. 686 With the
permanent closing of the P4W in Kingston, Ontario, came an influx of cells constructed
for solitary confinement in women’s federal prisons and provincial jails, enabling the overrepresentation problem to increase. Although several of CSC’s witnesses confirmed that
Aboriginal inmates are still subjected to racism and racial profiling, 687 the Judge in BCCLA
was still willing to permit a practice to continue that disproportionately affects Aboriginal
inmates. Despite the fact that racism against Aboriginal inmates is reported by correctional
staff in the Ontario provincial system, the practice of solitary confinement is legitimized as
tool for managing inmates.
Awarding remedies, the Judge in BCCLA ruled that “The impugned laws are invalid
pursuant to s. 15 of the Charter: . . .to the extent that the impugned laws authorize and

684 Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3 at paras 46-47 [2010] 1 SCR 44.
685 BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 463.
686 See as examples 2014-2015 Annual Report, supra note 126. OCI, “Risky Business”, supra note 223. NWAC,
supra note 514. Pate, supra note 87.
687 Ibid at para 486.
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effect a procedure that results in discrimination against Aboriginal inmates.” 688 In his
decision, the Judge was narrowly focused on administrative segregation and the following
problems deriving from the impugned laws that authorize this practice: (a) instances of
prolonged or indefinite segregation; (b) the phenomenon that the institutional head is the
judge and prosecutor in its own cause; (c) internal review rather than independent review;
and (d) deprivation of rights to counsel at segregation hearings and reviews.
These identified problems in BCCLA hearken back to the 1996 Arbour Report that
was conducted after eight women were subjected to violent strip searches, cell extractions
by male guards, and were held in segregation for months at P4W in 1994. The same exact
problems noted in BCCLA were also noted by Former Supreme Court Justice, Louise
Arbour. Arbour noted the problems with prolonged segregation on the women inmates. 689
Arbour raised concerns about the lack of independent review in decisions regarding
continued segregation. 690 Arbour found that the segregation review process for “prison
within a prison” was not operating in accordance to the principles of fundamental justice. 691
And Arbour pointed out that the CSC did not respect inmates rights to counsel and
discussed some barriers to providing inmates with access to counsel. 692 Despite this report
illuminating the problematic conduct of the State in prisons, over twenty years later, and a
court is tasked with addressing these same problems, because of the State’s unwillingness
to respect the constitutional rights of its inmates. What’s worse is that the OCI, which
functions as a legally-prescribed watchdog of the federal prison system, serves a frequent

688
689
690
691
692

BCCLA v Canada, supra note 120 at para 609.
Arbour Report, supra note 185 at 80-81, 105.
Ibid at 79, 105.
Ibid at 105.
Ibid at 16, 31, 36, 90, 108.
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reminder to the CSC that it is failing to provide inmates with these procedural
safeguards. 693 The legislative branch of government may mean well in legally prescribing
protections and safeguards for prisoners, but history shows that the executive branch of
government fails to change its ways.
In addition to this culture of resistance to change by correctional officials, there is
a culture of racism that prevails. The Supreme Court made it clear in Gladue, that racial
bias at nearly all points of criminal justice decision-making has contributed to Aboriginal
over-representation. The over-representation problem since this Supreme Court decision
has not alleviated, but instead has gotten worse. Solitary confinement has become one of
many criminal justice measures that has disproportionately impacted Aboriginal women in
particular. Solitary confinement will continue to be used in a discriminatory manner as long
as it is at the disposal of the State and the State is bent on making adverse determinations
concerning Aboriginal peoples. Procedural safeguards against solitary confinement will
not amount to safeguards against discrimination, especially if the courts do not feel
compelled to impose effective safeguards against discrimination, specifically. Procedural
protections do not make right the prejudice and stereotyping that Aboriginal women
experience at the moment of the initial decision by correctional staff to place them in
solitary confinement.
Aboriginal women need assurance that they will not be relegated to silence and
subjected to psychologically harmful treatment on the basis of their identity. Aboriginal
women should not have to feel that their personal security can be further jeopardized when

693 See for example 2014-2015 Annual Report, supra note 126 at 21, 25, 29,
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they find themselves in State custody. Aboriginal women in the hands of the State should
never have to worry that by entering the doors of a correctional institution, their likelihood
of suicide increases. Given the already marginalized and vulnerable condition in which
Aboriginal women enter the correctional system, and their continuing vulnerability at the
mercy of the State’s highest degrees of control, the circumstances of this Charter claim
warrant the vindication of Aboriginal women’s equality rights through a declaration of
unconstitutional invalidity.
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CHAPTER TWELVE: CHALLENGES WITH THE LITIGATION
In the past, launching a Charter section 15 claim for other problems in the
correctional system has presented different obstacles. 694 Claims of racism have been
unsuccessful due to insufficient evidence or because evidence is expensive to gather.
Furthermore, much of the research on prisons is commissioned by the government or public
institutions, and they may be unwilling or cannot be compelled to testify on issues of
discrimination. 695 Claims have also failed because cases have been poorly framed, usually
by unrepresented litigants or counsel who lack experience in prison law or Charter law.696
These issues certainly affect the success of the discrimination claim that I have put forward.
This is why the financial and legal backing of ally advocacy groups or organizations that
are willing to do pro bono work can be very beneficial for overcoming and avoiding a lot
of the problems that arose in past discrimination litigation. In cases where an inmate relies
on the assistance of an advocacy group or organization, the public interest advocate must
keep close contact with the inmate. This may be difficult if that inmate is restricted from
privileges, such as phone use and public visits, while held in isolation.
An advocate for a woman inmate asserting the Charter claim, should be guided by
a feminist and prison abolitionist perspective, and they will have the responsibility of (1)
ensuring that women, and the intersecting aspects of their identity, remain a key focus of
the litigation; (2) dismantling constitutionalized and entrenched carceral logic; and (3)
attacking the legitimacy that has been attributed to the practice of solitary confinement by

694 Parkes, “Prisoner’s Charter?”, supra note 219 at 667.
695 Ibid at 668. For example, psychologists and psychiatrists had refused to testify against CSC for fear that they
would jeopardize service delivery contracts and/or access to the prison(s) for women to conduct their research.
Ibid.
696 Ibid at 667.
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the State throughout history. 697 Attacking the carceral logic is critical in order to avoid the
expansion and proliferation of carceral sites as a result of ill-strategized advocacy. 698 The
safety and well-being of criminal inmates and immigration detainees depends on this.
Even as a conscious advocate makes effort to incorporate intersectional feminism
in a discrimination claim against solitary confinement, courts may have difficulty with
seeing the value of this litigation approach or incorporating intersectional feminism in their
legal decisions. The advocate should not only advocate against solitary confinement, but
they should advocate for intersectional feminism. This will help to validate having a female
inmate advance the discrimination claim, as opposed to a male inmate who represents the
majority of the individuals navigating the criminal justice and immigration systems. The
advocate may very well have to educate courts on intersectionality, so they can become
more aware of how discrimination can be experienced differently and more comfortable
with engaging in a multi-ground discrimination analysis.
The prison abolition ethic may generally present as a form of political ideology,
given its heavy focus on the social changes that the State should implement to address
criminality and reduce reliance on the criminal justice system. An advocate who employs
a prison abolition ethic will have the task to adapt this ethical framework to legal argument

697 Parkes, “Solitary”, supra note 62 at 178, 180.
698 Of relevance, I note that I am concerned about the major discrepancies between these two civil liberties
associations cases, such as the amount of historical accounting of solitary confinement in Canada, the Charter
violations invoked, the constitutional remedies requested, and the remedies the courts ordered. Both superior court
cases seem to be moving onto the appeal stage now, partly because of the inconsistent court rulings. See, Mike
Hager, “Federal government appealing B.C. Supreme Court decision on solitary confinement” The Globe and Mail
(19 February 2018) online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>. Perhaps the discrepancies that exist will lead to further
diminished or meagre constitutional protections won for prisoners, particularly if the cases are appealed further to
the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Supreme Court is tasked with reconciling the differences between these
superior court decisions. Considering these cases were heard before the superior courts around the same time, the
parties launching the constitutional challenges would have benefited from concerting their litigation strategies, as a
matter of solidarity and as a matter of achieving consistency in prisoner advocacy.
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and the doctrinalism of the legal profession. The advocate should strive to anchor
arguments to constitutional and legal principles, to which the courts will be most receptive.
Cognizant of the fact that discrimination can be experienced differently, it is
important to galvanize support from other vulnerable groups affected by solitary
confinement and encourage intervenors from these other vulnerable groups to advocate on
their behalves. This can breakup the heavy workload of proving the discrimination claim
among multiple advocates. Working in concert, they can more easily achieve the
evidentiary burden by bolstering each other’s discrimination claims through making
connections between different experiences of discrimination in solitary confinement.
Due to the piecemeal fashion in which law develops – guided by the facts presented
in court and an awareness of Canadian history – a Judge may hear a case of discrimination
against Aboriginal women, for example, and because the courts are more familiar with
their significant plight in Canadian society, the courts simply restrict the abolition of
solitary confinement to Aboriginal women and are unwilling to protect other vulnerable
groups from the practice of solitary confinement. In the case of immigration detainees, a
court may be less willing to affirm their equality rights, because they are deemed a national
security risk and because of the prejudice that their constitutional rights as foreign nationals
are less important than Canadian citizens. Nevertheless, all other inmates would be at risk
of solitary confinement, which is not ideal. An advocate should endeavour to further
challenge the carceral logic of solitary confinement using evidence of its harmful effects
and emphasize the possibility of lesser restrictive means for achieving legislative objectives
that stand to benefit all inmates, not only Aboriginal women inmates. It would also help
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the advocate to highlight how discrimination is experienced differently by the claimant
they are representing, due to the unique intersecting aspects of their identity, which
compound their vulnerability.
Another concern is that if a court awards a remedy under Charter subsection 24(1),
the underlying premise of this remedy, as indicated by the difference in purposes between
subsection 24(1) and subsection 52(1) remedies, is that the law and policy on solitary
confinement is constitutionally consistent. In other words, it is simply the State’s
unconstitutional conduct that must be redressed. Contrary to a subsection 52(1) remedy,
which addresses unconstitutional laws, a subsection 24(1) remedy may perhaps entrench
the carceral logic that the practice of solitary confinement, itself, is legitimate. This carceral
logic would crystallize in constitutional form and may create an obstacle for other
vulnerable groups before the courts to prove that a practice, whose laws and policy, were
previously determined by courts as constitutional, is inherently discriminatory when it is
applied to them. It may be more difficult to convince a court, that may already be leaning
towards awarding a subsection 24(1) remedy, that a remedy under subsection 52(1) is more
appropriate in the circumstances of the Charter claim. This is especially if this request for
a subsection 52(1) remedy is largely motivated by reasons derived from the prison
abolitionist lawyering ethic.
While the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 699 will most likely be the court of first
instance for a discrimination claim under the Charter, it may be difficult to decide who the

699 Provincial superior courts have constant and concurrent jurisdiction to award constitutional remedies under both
subsections 24(1) and 52(1). Yet, to award a remedy under subsection 24(1), a court must have jurisdiction,
independent of this remedy provision, over the parties, the subject matter of the constitutional case, and the remedy
requested. Sharpe & Roach, supra note 382 at 375.
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respondents implicated in the Charter claim of discrimination will be. Rules 16.02 (1)(f)(h) of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure 700 will dictate the key actors to serve with the
originating process 701 in commencing the Charter challenge, namely Her Majesty the
Queen in right of Canada, Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario, and the Attorney
General of Ontario. For discrimination suffered by the inmates of the criminal population,
the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services 702 will have to be
served with an originating process, as well. For immigration detainees, there are quite a
few government ministries that would likely have a stake in the outcome of the
discrimination case: the Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 703 the
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 704 and the Ontario Ministry of Community
Safety and Correctional Services. One approach is to sue all the possible respondents that

700 Ontario, RRO 1990, Reg 194: Rules of Civil Procedure.
701 According to Rule 1.03 (1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure:
“originating process” means a document whose issuing commences a proceeding under these rules, and
includes,
(a) a statement of claim,
(b) a notice of action,
(c) a notice of application,
(d) an application for a certificate of appointment of an estate trustee,
(e) a counterclaim against a person who is not already a party to the main action, and
(f) a third or subsequent party claim,
but does not include a counterclaim that is only against persons who are parties to the main action, a
crossclaim or a notice of motion; (“acte introductif d’instance”)
702 The Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services establishes, maintains, operates and
monitors Ontario's adult correctional institutions and probation and parole offices. For more information see
Ontario, “The Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services: Ministry information” online:
<www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about_min/mandate.html>.
703 Public Safety Canada was created in 2003 to ensure coordination across all federal departments and agencies
responsible for national security and the safety of Canadians. Public Safety Canada works with five agencies and
three review bodies, united in a single portfolio and all reporting to the same minister. The Canada Border Services
Agency (CBSA) manages the nation's borders by enforcing Canadian laws governing trade and travel, as well as
international agreements and conventions. The CBSA facilitates legitimate cross-border traffic and supports
economic development while stopping people and goods that pose a potential threat to Canada. For more
information see Government of Canada, “About Public Safety Canada” online:
<www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/bt/index-en.aspx>.
704 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada facilitates the arrival of immigrants, provides protection to
refugees, and offers programming to help newcomers settle in Canada. For more information see Government of
Canada, “Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada” online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship.html>.
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would have a stake in the discrimination case, and then leave it up to the trial judge to
decide whether all the respondents who have been served with this discrimination
challenge are the appropriate respondents. That way, by suing all who are potentially
responsible in the case, the discrimination case is less likely to fail as a result of not having
the right respondent involved in litigation.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN: CONCLUDING REMARKS
You know, I'm not the first to have said that the way you could measure the
level of, the quality of a civilization, is how it treats its offenders. Because
the temptation, it can bring the worst out of us and it has, I think,
historically, both in mobs and in politicians. I think that's where we need to
rise above that and, you know, go to the heart of the human dignity, of people
who are essentially in the care of the state, regardless of the fact that they're
serving a sentence as a form of punishment, I accept that.
- Former Canadian Supreme Court Justice, Louise Arbour 705
This paper focused on the practice of solitary confinement in the context of Ontario
jails, federal prisons, and immigration holding centres, and the experience of women who
are subjected this practice while serving criminal sentences, awaiting trial, or held in
immigration detention. The paper aimed to demonstrate how Charter section 15 is the ideal
means of eradicating solitary confinement – guided by prison abolition ethic and
intersectional feminism – considering the severely negative impact that it has on women
who are Indigenous, racialized, mentally-ill, or immigration detainees. With the benefit of
reading the CCLA and BCCLA decisions that were released by provincial superior courts
in December 2017 and January 2018, respectively, I showcased the welcomed strides and
unwelcome drawbacks that these reform-oriented cases provided in tackling procedural
aspects to this practice. But more importantly, with the BCCLA case, I utilized the court’s
failing in exploring a discrimination analysis focused on Aboriginal women, to carry out a
section 15 analysis and substantiate the key argument of my paper.
The thought of abolishing solitary confinement may appear to the retributivist or
the reformist as unthinkable. In practice, it may seem like a hard-fought war featuring

705 The House, supra note 297.
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multiple constitutional battles to vindicate the rights of different vulnerable groups, one
after another. Yet, McLeod reminds us that history reveals that when persistent and fearless
advocacy is galvanized in the face of detractors, we inch closer and closer to realizing
major social transformations that reflect better versions of justice in a liberal society.
The Late Nelson Mandela said, “A nation should not be judged by how it treats its
highest citizens, but its lowest ones.” It is notable that there are many members of the
international community who resonate with this principle of determining a country’s regard
for human dignity. Canada’s esteemed international reputation for progressive social
policy and human rights is tainted by the fact that it treats its most vulnerable individuals
in its custody, like they are not humans at all.
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